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Political Science

Governmentality and the History of Statistical Reason
(203 pp.)
Director: Bill Chaloupka
Governmentality is the late Michel Foucault's neologism for
governmental rationality. By rationality Foucault meant the
particular way in which an object or process is conceived and
from this the logic by which it is acted upon. The art of
government is the application of rationality in a specified
way through practical techniques and principles upon objects
and process constituted as political by such rationality.
I use these concepts of governmentality and the art of
government to examine the history of statistical thought and
practice. From this examination I illustrate the historical
forms assumed by statistical reason and its interaction and
relationship with the historical forms assumed by the art of
government. Through this examination I show statistics to be
a technology of government.
The goal of this paper is to trace, in a general way, the
transformations that have occurred in governmental and
statistical reason. I describe the role of statistics in the
transition from an essentialist epistemology to a nonessentialist, relational or systems based formulation of
objective rational knowledge. It is my thesis that the
development of theories of complex dynamic systems understood
explicitly as cybernetic information processing systems
constitutes a fundamental shift in how process and change are
understood. I argue that such theories constitute the basis
of a new way of conceiving of the objects of government and
hence is leading to new ways of governing them, a new art of
government.
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Chapter

1: Introduction

Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality is a useful
way to analyze phenomena that seem political on their face
yet prove difficult to specify precisely how they produce
their political effects. In the late twentieth century,
information is just such a phenomena. Information is a term
that elicits numerous definitions and explanations. It is
widely recognized that information is somehow involved in the
current political order. Names attempting to capture this new
order such as "information age," "post-industrialism" or
"global society" are thrown around with abandon. Such
conceptions, however, tend to describe information as some
sort of new commodity or the result of a new social process
without attempting to delve into what this process might be
or what sort of exchange system might be implied by this new
commodity.
I suggest that information constitutes more than just a
new commodity. It is a new way of conceiving of the dynamics
of complex processes such as society. It is also a technical
knowledge which allows what Foucault calls the art of
government to proceed in new ways according to this new
conception of society. Further, this new conception and these
new political practices are intimately linked with
statistics. In this paper I attempt to illustrate this link
by showing the intimate relationship between the thought and
practice of statistics and that of government. Through
illustrating the history of this relationship I arrive at the
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thesis that a new mode of governing is, in fact, emerging
that takes as its object a new formulation of society as a
complex information processing system. This transition can be
seen through an analysis of the evolution of the art of
government, especially in terms of the evolution of
statistical reason.
Foucault's concept of the art of government takes a wide
view of what constitutes the political. This is because many
different disciplines with many different objects of analysis
are involved in elucidating the world and producing knowledge
about it. Governing is an activity that requires knowledge
and thus has a close relationship to its production. This is
perhaps not so controversial. It is Foucault's particular way
of conceiving the relationship between knowledge and
governing, however, which has generated intense interest and
criticism.
Foucault's thought is a product of the post World War II
emergence of dynamic systems in which the conception of
things, ideas or processes linked to unchanging and essential
natures has given way to conceptions of things, ideas and
processes as relational, contextual and contingent. This
includes the relationship between government and the
production of knowledge. For Foucault, the link between
knowledge and governing is a two way street. The activity of
governing is implicated in ways of knowing because ways of
knowing implicate ways of governing. The production of
rational knowledge, no matter the discipline, is therefore a
political act.

From a critical point of view this perspective too is
not so scandalous. But for Foucault, the link between
governing, knowledge and rationality is not to be understood
in terms of the ideological uses to which rational knowledge
may be put, the idea of the illegitimate use of legitimate
knowledge. The link is much deeper and more complex than
that. For Foucault, there is no objective ground to judge
legitimacy. Rather legitimacy is the result of an agonal
contest. Not only a contest of wills, but a contest of
evolution an effect of the continuous change in the art of
government. For legitimacy is linked not only to individual
thinkers but the larger system of thought within which
individuals and their own thought processes exist.
By art of government Foucault means the application of
practical techniques and principles rationally applied to
rationally understood objects for the purpose of affecting
this object in a specified way. It also refers to the
reflection upon the specific strategies and techniques by
both those who implement them and those who are the targets
of them.1
The art of government is unique from other historical
forms of rule in its interrelationship with knowledge.
Government as an art began to emerge when knowledge ceased to
be solely the effect of religious interpretation and became
connected to investigation into and experimentation upon the
material world. That is, the art of government emerged
1
Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Foucault Effect; Studies In
Governmentality With Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel
Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991).

roughly simultaneously with the development of an
epistemology of objectivity and the beginning of empirical
scientific inquiry. From this point on the objects and
objectives of government ceased to be subsumed within a
divine cosmological and theological order. The principles of
government, the rationality by which it operates and the
knowledge of its object, became autonomous. The object of
government and the principles by which they are administered,
whether the state, society, or individuals, become immanent
to themselves. It is through investigation into such objects
of government, how they work and by what means they can be
made to work better, that the principles of government, and
its rationality, are determined.
Governing became linked to objectivity and rationalism
not simply because these outlooks produced useful devices and
techniques for manipulating and affecting things and
processes. It also became linked to objectivity and
rationalism precisely because objectivity and rationalism
became imbued with moral and ethical overtones or capacities
especially in terms of the struggle over legitimacy.
Objectivity replaced divine and cosmological capacities for
judgment. Moral concerns did not disappear, they became
invested in rationality, governmental rationality in
particular.
Governmental practices and activities based on objective
knowledge were not only effective, they were the morally
right way to do things. Good government became rational
government - government that reflected in an objective manor

upon its goals and methods for achieving these goals. And
rational government became good government - government which
had as its goal the enhancement of what is good and proper,
the right order of things, within its domain.
Government is a broad and complex topic. There is one
particular facet to the art of government that is
particularly interesting and provides a degree of coherence
to my story. That is statistics. Statistics emerged as one of
the primary investigative activities to discover the
objective facts about the state and to establish what the
right order was. In 1615 Antoine de Montchrestien in his
treatise on political economy remarked "One thing alone is
lacking to you 0 great State, the knowledge of yourself, and
the image of your strength."2 By 1778 the demand for such
knowledge had become common: "There can be no well-ordered
political machine, nor enlightenment administration in a
country where the state of population is unknown." M. Moheah
stated.3 He pointed out further that "kings and their
ministers are not the only ones who may draw knowledge from
the table of population...The progress or loss of population
presents a host of truths from which Physics, Medicine and

2
Antoine de Montchrestien L'Economie politique patronale. Traite de
l'oeconomie politique, dedie en 1615 au roy (Paris, 1889), 34. Quoted in
Pasquale Pasquino "Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of capital - Police
and the State of Prosperity," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller eds.
Foucault Effect, 114.
3
M. Moheau, Recherches et considerations sur le population de
France (Paris, 1778), 20. Quoted in Pasquino, "Theatrum Politicum," 115.
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all the sciences which have for their object the health,
conservation, protection or succor of humanity may profit."4
Statistics and the modern state system in Europe emerge
together in the seventeenth century. Since its inception in
the seventeenth century statistics has been at the center of
the effort to know the makeup and composition of these new
states. The general goal of the art of government is
prosperity or the right order of the state. Prosperity and
the right order of society are familiar themes in the late
twentieth century. This concern is not unique to the modern
art of government. Foucault and others refer to this concern
as the pastoral responsibilities of the state. Such pastoral
conceptions of the role of political rule goes back at least
to the Greeks. Through the middle ages this pastoral
responsibility assumed by political leadership was invested
with Christianity and religious or cosmological conceptions
of what constituted the right order of the kingdom.
What distinguishes the art of government from earlier
forms of rule is the derivation from within the object of
government itself of knowledge about this object. From this
knowledge emerges the particular form by which the right
order of the state is understood and the governments pastoral
responsibilities are carried out. Governing requires that the
reality of individuals and groups, their relationships with
each other and with the processes of life, be made thinkable
and intelligible. The art of government encompasses the
"strategies, techniques and procedures through which

4

ibid.

different forces seek to render operable" the various
rational knowledges of the social relationships of and
between individuals and groups as well as their interface
with material resources for the sake of production.5
Governmental knowledge, in other words, elucidates its object
in such a way that renders it thinkable, manipulable and
amenable to government.
The various techniques and principles constituting
statistics since the seventeenth century have been the
primary means of obtaining rational objective knowledge about
the object of government. However, statistical thought and
practice themselves have a history. They have not been stable
but have evolved. The need by the emerging states for
knowledge about themselves provided the impetus for the first
statistical practices. These practices were themselves
informed by the emerging conceptions of rational scientific
method. As the first statistical activities began to produce
knowledge about the state the perceptions of it began to
change. As the perceptions of the object of government
evolved, so did the governmental activities aimed at it.
The history of statistics is unique in its peculiar
relationship not only to the art of government but also to
the very conceptions of rationality and objectivity upon
which the art of government depends. What are the
implications of rationality having a history? In terms of
government it means the evolution of the right order of the
5
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller "Power Beyond the State," British
Journal of Sociology 42, no. 2 (June 1992): 183.

object of government and hence how it is governed. Though
statistics began as an explicitly political activity, its
techniques and methodologies quickly found applications in
all the disciplines producing rational, scientific knowledge.
More and more techniques were developed in many different
disciplines.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century statistics
had ceased to be understood as political at all. Where once
statistics had been guarded as secrets of the state, vital
information about its strength, they became, and remain,
eminently ubiquitous, dispersed throughout society open to
all who care to look. This has obscured the political role of
statistics but has not decreased this role. Statistics has
been fundamentally involved since its inception in the
production and definition of rational governmental knowledge.
It may be that the political value of statistical practices
has been increased with this spread and ubiquity. In any
case, the evolution of statistical thought and practice, what
I shall call statistical reason, has been closely linked to
the evolution of the art of government. The first discovery
of statistics was the population, the first object of
government for the new states in Europe. Continued
transformations in conceptions of the object of government,
partly as a result of continuous statistical examination of
the population led to a reformulation of the object of
government into society.
By World War II rational knowledge had undergone a
dramatic yet subtle reformulation, a reformulation that is

beginning to manifest itself as the modern art of government.
Statistics played a significant role in this transformation.
When society began to be conceived as a complex system by the
turn of the century, techniques for governing it began to
reflect this reformulation. With the development and spread
of information theory throughout all knowledge producing
disciplines, this conception of society as a system became
much more formal and practical. A new form of governmental
intervention began to be imagined based upon new conceptions
of the dynamic processes of society.
We are just now beginning to feel the effects of this
reformulation. They are, I believe, connected to a range of
new technologies which have statistical monitoring and
recording capacities built directly into them. These new
techniques and technologies with their new capacities and
potentials are in turn altering our perception of what
society is composed of, what its right order is, and what the
proper objectives of government should be.
I do not assume that essentialist epistemology has
disappeared or that practices emanating from this position
are no longer effective. They are. Analysis of such practices
are still important to render visible and analyzable such
practices especially when they take the form of exclusion and
marginalization documented so well in feminist and cultural
studies. I believe, however, that the emerging form of
government does not revolve around the identity/different
nexus in quite the same way. The difference between these
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forms of analysis and the one presented here are related in
an obscure way but are not the subject of this paper.
The goal of this paper is to trace, in a general way,
the transformations that have occurred in statistical reason
and to link these with the emerging transformations in the
art of government. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller describe the
art of government as composed of three mutually constitutive
aspects; the moral, the discursive, and the epistemological.6
I focus particular attention upon the epistemological aspect.
The focus on the epistemological aspect of the art of
government clearly illustrates the political context of the
production of knowledge and the evolution of ways of knowing
the object of government. To understand and participate in
the politics of the current period it is vital that the way
the object of government is understood and managed itself be
understood.
Part One begins with a description and explanation of
Foucault's concept of governmentality and the art of
government setting the analytical stage for the subsequent
narrative of the effects of the transformations in
statistical reason. The art of government can be usefully
analyzed by distinguishing between the form taken by
political practices and thought on the one hand and the
object of these practices and thought on the other. The two
are mutually constitutive and irreducible. How the object of
government is understood affects how it is governed and at
the same time the practice of governing this object leads to

Rose and Miller, "Power Beyond the State," 178.
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the same time the practice of governing this object leads to
changes in how it is understood.
Part One continues with a description of the historical
emergence of the art of government as a form of political
rule and statistics as a form of rational knowledge
production. Together they were known as raison d'etat or
reason of state. Reason of state corresponded with an object
of government known as a population. Statistics emerged in
the effort to describe and understand the population. The
subsequent developments of reason of state leading up to the
beginning of a new art of government are then described. This
is characterized by the transformation of the population into
a new object of government known as society and the new art
of government known as liberalism.
Part Two explores the continuous developments of early
modern liberal government and statistics. Liberal government
is characterized by the refinement of what Foucault calls the
disciplines. Statistics provided the knowledge of the normal
that made the disciplines possible. Particular attention in
Part Two is given to the role of statistical reason in the
development of various disciplines producing knowledge about
society. The growth and refinement of knowledge about society
leads to yet further transformations in how this object of
government is understood. At the epistemological level, this
transformation is played out in the decline of essentialist
determinism and the search for a new principle of order
centered on functionalism.

12

Part Three describes the continued transformations in
statistical reason, and the development of equilibrium and
structure as concepts to accompany functionalism, and the
replacement of the norm as a determining force. While short
lived, equilibrium was fundamental for the further
development of concepts of complex processes and their
ordering in terms of dominance and hierarchy.
Part four describes the continued transformations in the
conception of society since World War II. Dominance and
hierarchy as principles of order quickly gave way to the
principle of control during what became known as operations
research during world War II. These transformations led to
the current state of transition in the liberal art of
government and, I suggest, is the beginning of a radical
change in the way the object of government is understood and
hence how it is governed. Control is intimately linked with
several concepts such as information, cybernetics and complex
systems. The conception of society that is emerging, I
suggest, is one of a cybernetic information processing
system.
The concluding discussion focuses primarily upon the
tentative ramifications of the emergence of cybernetic
information processing systems for how the object of
government is understood. The development of complex dynamic
systems as a rational explanation for how many aspects of the
world works implies a dramatic reformulation of the right
order of modern society and how its prosperity can be
enhanced. Dramatic shifts in the art of government are

accompanying this reformulation giving rise to a new form of
government that Gilles Deleuze has simply called control.7

I

speculate only briefly on how the actual practices carried
out upon this new object of government might operate. I
believe it is necessary to first understand the
epistemological basis of this new society of control - where
it came from and how it emerged - before attempting to
understand the specific activities of government by control.
A comprehensive analysis of the practices of modern
government will have to wait.

7
Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," October
59 (1992): 3-7.

Chapter 2:
Governmentality
and the Art of Government
According to Michel Foucault current political theory
pays too much attention to institutions and not enough
attention to the practices and activities by which governing
is carried out. This focus on institutions is based upon a
reification of categories and constructs such as the true
nature or essential characteristics of politics, the State,
Government or Civil Society. The identification of the
essential characteristics or true nature of these categories
have long been the mainstays of political theory..For
Foucault, however, the production and deployment of these
categories themselves constitute political practices and that
"[tjhe nature of the institutions of the state... [are] a
function of changes in the practices of government."1

The

distinction between theory and practice is not as clear cut
as traditional political theory assumes.
Foucault's project had been an attempt to "sketch a
history of the different ways in our culture that humans

1
Colin Gordon "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in
Burchell, Gordon, and Miller eds., Foucault Effect, 4.

develop knowledge about themselves."8
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This historical sketch

treats knowledge and reason as "truth games" rather than
truth as universal and fundamental, what George Lakoff calls
objectivist truth. Lakoff defines objectivism as the
assumption that "rational thought consists of the
manipulation of abstract symbols and that these symbols get
their meaning via a correspondence with the world,
objectively construed, that is, independent of the
understanding of any organism."9 The world "objectively
construed" is understood to be composed, at least partially,
by things that possess essential properties. These essential
properties "are those properties that make a thing what it
is, and without which it would not be that kind of thing."10
Objectivist assumptions of essential properties are the basis
of traditional categorization and classification schemes.
Foucault rejects such objectivist theoretical attempts
to deduce the modern activities of government that begin with

8
Michel Foucault, Technology Of The Self; A Seminar with
Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin, Buck Gutman, and Patrick H.
Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p 17-18.
Foucault has been charged by some of anti-humanism and even conservatism
for this rejection of universal and essential qualities. The rejection
of universalisms however does not simply imply relativity where anything
goes or a rejection of standards of judgment.
Foucault's conception of
modern political reason and forms of governing understood as contingent
and contextual means it is a domain to be participated in and acted
upon. Foucault presents a vision of politics that allows full
participation. It demands recognition of our participation in the
construction of governmental categories rather than simply the
rearrangement of already established "essential identities."
9
George Lakoff, Women, Fire, And Dangerous Things: What Categories
Reveal About The Mind (Chicago: The Chicago University press, 1987;
paperback edition 1990), XII. Italics in original.
Ibid., 161. Italics in original.
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a priori assumptions of essential properties and propensities

of the State, Civil Society or Government etc.11

Such

theories, however, are instructive - not for their
description of the actual workings of government or society
per se but rather as representations of the theoretical
practices that form past and present modes of the art of
government. Foucault does not focus upon the truth or falsity
of how Government, the State or Civil Society have been
conceived at any given point in history. Instead he asks how
%

such conceptions and their associated practices became
possible. "These forms of knowledge and these apparatuses of
power are linked in a constitutive interdependence."12
In Plato's allegory of the cave the philosopher produces
truth in his pretense to revelation of the good and the just
by the light of reason and philosophy.13

For Foucault the

truth whose shadow is cast on the cave walls is not revealed
by the sun's light during the philosophical ascent out of the
caves darkness. Even in the sunlight (reason) the truth
remains enigmatic. We have no privileged access to, or god's
eye view of, the really real or objectively real that
characterizes the Platonic ideal of the philosopher king.
Foucault's analysis is not prescriptive. Foucault
explicitly refrained from constructing a theory of the state
11
Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in
Burchell, Gordon and Miller eds., Foucault Effect. 4.
12
Colin Gordon, "Afterword," in Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews
And Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 239.
13
Plato, Republic. Translated with an introduction by Francis
MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941; Twenty
seventh printing, 1965), book VII.

or good government. He is more interested in how ideas and
practices came about, what made them possible and what they
in turn make possible than whether they are "right" or
"wrong." He prefers to to analyze the development and
functioning of truth and knowledge rather than engage in
pronouncements as to the degree of correspondence the object
of a theory has with the "really real." The governmentality
critique tries to destabilize the traditional categories of
political theory and show them to be the effects of, as much
as the basis for, political theory. Through this
destabilization governmentality tries to illustrate how our
essential political truths produce and are produced by
political reason and political practices in an intimately
interwoven process.
Foucault refers to this mutually constitutive character
of theory and practice as an ensemble. It is an "ensemble
formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and
reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of
power."14

The ensemble comprising the art of government is

not to be thought of as hierarchical with a fixed structure.
Rather, the relationships within this ensemble are fluid or
thixatropic in character displaying nonetheless "an overall
coherence without answering to any determinative principle or

14
Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Burchell, Gordon, and
Miller eds. Foucault Effect. 102.
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underlying logic."15

The coherence and logic that obtains

within such ensembles, as well as any fluid disturbances,
arise from within the ensemble itself. The close relationship
of these two dimensions leads Foucault to often use these
terms interchangeably. For clarity's sake I will refer to
governmentality as denoting Foucault's mode of analysis while
referring to the art of government as the object of this mode
of analysis, the practices of governing.
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller have developed a schematic
for breaking down Foucault's governmental ensemble into a
form useful for this paper.16

This schematic, or "conceptual

tool" breaks the art of government into three aspects, again,
understood as mutually constitutive: the moral, the idiomatic
and the epistemological.
The moral or ethical aspect refers to the ideals and
values to which government is thought to be properly directed
such as freedom, justice, citizenship, etc. This includes the
relations that are considered proper between ruler and ruled,
the distribution of tasks and authority whether political,
spiritual, military, familial, pedagogic etc.

15
Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's
Methods and historical Sociology (New Yorks Routledge, 1994), 223.
Thixotropy is "the property of certain gels and emulsions of becoming
fluid when agitated and then setting again when left at rest." Webster *s
New World Dictionary 2nd college ed. (1980), s.v. "Thixotropy."
16
Rose and Miller, "Power beyond the state," 178. Rose and Miller's
delineation is slightly different from the one I use here. They use the
term political rationality where I use the term art of government.
This
is because they do not distinguish between governmentality and art of
government in the same way that I do. These two formulations are
compatible however. They are simply derived from different narrative
goals.

19

The idiomatic or linguistic aspect refers to the
distinctive language with which governing is articulated. The
language that constitutes political discourse is more than
rhetoric, at least in that terms common usage. "It should be
seen, rather, as a kind of intellectual machinery or
apparatus for the rendering [of] reality thinkable in such a
way that it is amenable to political deliberations."17
The epistemological aspect refers to the truth or
knowledge component of political reason and practice. Each
historical form of the art of government conceives its object
in a relatively distinct way. These distinct epistemological
conceptions of what the object of government is in its
actuality gives rise to distinct ways of governing them. As
the epistemological conceptions of society, the state, or the
individual citizen change there is a corresponding change in
how they are governed.
These three aspects are identified with the whole
ensemble of the art of government. They apply to both the
political reason and political practice dimensions. Just as
in the latter analytical differentiation between
governmentality and the art of government, these three
aspects also can not be arranged hierarchically. They
interact and mutually constitute one another.
I have utilized this delineation of the art of
government in this way in order to isolate a narrow and more
manageable field of inquiry. I focus my attention throughout
this paper on the epistemological aspect of the art of
government. Within this relatively narrow confine I shall
17

Rose and Miller, "Power beyond the state," 179.
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trace, in a general way, the history of statistics. I am
interested primarily in how the practice of statistics, as a
technology that produces knowledge, is linked to the
transformations in the epistemological conception of the very
objects it renders knowable.
The first object of government, which will be described
in detail in the next section, is the population. The form of
government exercised viv-a-vis the population became known as
police. In current usage the derivation policy would be more
descriptive of this governing art. It was characterized by
the attempt to arrange the material and processes of the
territory and the population of the state in such a way to
bring out the best arrangement of things, their right and
proper order necessary for a state of prosperity. Police
became more commonly known as raison d'etat (reason of
state).
The population was the first target of statistical
activity, primarily in the form of tabulation of simple facts
such as births and deaths and the number of inhabitants of
villages. The success of these practices altered not only the
perception of the population but also the very practice of
statistics itself. The population became understood in more
complex ways and with increasing refinement. At the same time
the techniques and methodology behind statistical practices
were refined and became more complex. This process of
refinement and complexification of the thought and practice
of statistics played an important role in the evolution of

21

how the population was understood and in the development of
new techniques for influencing it.
As the nature of the population became better understood
and its interactions and exchanges traced the very conception
of what constitutes its proper order and how its prosperity
can be enhanced was altered. This alteration accompanied, and
perhaps at times motivated, further transformations in the
the techniques and methodology of statistics. Because both
government and statistics have a histories and because they
are so closely linked an analysis of the modern practices of
government calls for an analysis of statistical reason.
In modern terms this evolving relationship between the
art of government and its object is described using the
concept of complex dynamic systems. The historical
development of this concept is in fact one of the later
themes of this paper. Complex dynamic systems represents the
current rational understanding of processes of change.
Statistics is of central importance to complex systems
theories and modern evolution. Along with a host of other
related and epistemologically inseparable theories and
concepts, such as information, the object of government is
being transformed once more. Or, rather, it continues to be
transformed. Statistics is so profoundly involved in the
reconfiguration of the object of government, and in such
obscure ways, an analysis of the modern art of government, at
some point, must examine the effects of statistical reason's
historical change. Isolating the epistemological level of the
art of government and statistical reason allows for such an
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examination and reveals at least some of these obscure
relationships between statistics and government.
It is impossible to effect a clean distinction between
the moral, idiomatic and epistemological aspects of political
reason just as it is impossible to clearly distinguish
political reason from political practice. The delimitation of
ages or even a clean distinction between the different arts
and their respective objects is also impossible. Such a clean
distinction, however, is not my point. My point is rather to
show their relationships. That the roots of one art may be
found in the thought and practice of the one before it. It
should also be mentioned that the transitions described do
not take the form of a replacement but of reformulation.
Their are many aspects of the early rationality of police
that get ample play in the modern art of government. Even
earlier forms of the rationality of sovereignty
characteristic of feudal periods finds expression in our
legal system with the important change that each individual
citizen constitutes a sovereign rather than only the monarch.
Rationalities do not disappear, they seem to remain useful
and find application in a number of social processes. But the
art of government, in general terms and at the
epistemological level, displays a certain homogeneity that
can be traced.
Displaying the impossibility of clear distinctions
between historical processes is one of Foucault's recurring
themes. The thixatropic and mutually constitutive nature of
the ensemble making up the arts of government means even a
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careful description of a narrow terrain or line of thought
will inevitably have some discussion of these other aspects
and dimensions seeping into it. This seepage will be obvious
in some places. In others it should be kept in mind that such
seepage is occurring just under the surface of this
narrative. My story begins with the Renaissance and the
emergence of the arts of government as a new form of rule.

The Emergence of the Art of Government

The Renaissance inaugurated a transformation in European
political, philosophical and spiritual thought. Knowledge
began to displace faith as the criterion for judgment. In the
medieval Christian conception of rule, the king served as an
instrument of God. Thomas Aquinas characterized legitimate
rule by the king as mirroring God's rule of nature. Political
rule was linked with concern for human purpose on earth, a
purpose defined in spiritual terms through various
representations of God's will.18

The King must rule his

kingdom as the instrument of God on earth for he was
responsible for ensuring the salvation of his subjects.
The political philosophy of Niccolo Machiavelli marks a
break with this spiritual conception of rule. Proper rule for
Machiavelli was not defined by the divine role of the prince.
For Machiavelli the prince's power was derived from control

18
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of his territory and its inhabitants. Such power wa s ,
furthermore, to be focused towards the good of the republic,
its physical survival and expansion. Machiavelli's advice in
The Prince (1513) is characteristic of an entirely new
formulation of the relationship between the ruler and his
domain. Henceforth increased attention is given to rule in
terms of the relationship between men and territory.
Fostering what is good for the domain and preparing against
what is bad - whether in the form of rival kingdoms or the
caprice of "the winds of fortuna" - becomes the ruler's
primary objective.19
The increasing attention to secular relationships
between the prince and his territory was linked to a general
transformation in philosophical and scientific thought since
the Renaissance. Truth

was becoming linked to reason and the

sciences with a corresponding disassociation from spiritual
knowledges. Francis Bacon for example, wrote that "truth
therefore and utility are here the very same things . "20

Rule

became an activity linked to perpetual inquiry: What was the
thing to be ruled? How did it work? How can it be made to
work better? To quote Bacon further: "the glory of God is to
conceal a thing; the glory of the king is to search it out."21
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For Pierre de la Ramee, a logician and teacher at the
university of Paris in the mid sixteenth century, the central
problem of knowledge of any kind was its teachability.22

If

knowledge is true and if it was to be of utility it must be
able to move between the minds of men. It must be
communicable and teachable. The problem was to accomplish
this movement and make knowledge teachable. For Ramee the
spatial ordering of objects and thoughts into diagrammatic
form represented the most effective pedagogical method.
Regardless of the topic - whether poetry, philosophy or
medicine - organization and display in diagrammatic form on
the basis of contrast and dichotomization became standard
pedagogical practice. Faith in reason had replaced faith in
the divine. Reason became linked to knowledge as topoi.
Rational explanation in general and scientific explanation in
particular became predominantly spacio-visual in form.23
Knowledge as topoi was knowledge manifested in earthly form.
The emergence of secular philosophies of rule did not
produce a simple wholesale rejection of God's will and divine
guidance. God ruled the universe and often intervened,
through miracles, in the affairs of men. But the link between
22
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the sovereign and God became more complex. The secularization

of political authority and of knowledge emerged together. The
right order of things was no longer revealed in scripture but
through investigation of the object of rule itself.
Rational knowledge of the right order and things was to
be discovered by reading the "Book of Nature," Galileo
Galilei's theistic concept of God as the 'Author' of nature.
For Galileo, God wrote down the equations and set the
fundamental laws of the universe in motion. Investigation
into the working of the world, God's world, rather than
devotion and scriptural faith, revealed God's will and the
right order of things. The right order of things in this
conception was still God's order but investigation replaced
faith as the proper mode of divination.
Machiavelli marks the transition in the understanding of
the proper objectives of rule from those revealed in
scripture to those revealed in observation of the states
activities themselves. After Machiavelli much more attention
was given to the objective nature of the kingdom. A secular
objective of "national interest" replaced the spiritual
objective of salvation. Reason of state emerged as the
predominant political reason. Reason of state was simply the
rationality by which the state conducted its affairs, that is
a rationality derived form the actual functioning and the
requirements for this functioning of the state. This
political reason was thus linked to the practical activity of
the king expanding his income and strength.
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This was a period in European history when one of the
central concerns was war and all that war entails. The State
became an object of increasing material needs - soldiers,
food and money. These material‘needs, however, brought with
them the need for new organizational arrangements which would
fulfill these needs - household, barracks and agricultural
practices which would increase production and participation.
One could not expect the treasury to be continually
replenished without some measures designed to increase the
production of wealth and its collection.
The concern for the nature and actuality of that which
is ruled marks the beginning of a transformation in the very
concept of rule. The epistemological, moral and even the
descriptive language of rule changes. The objectives of rule
ahd governmental knowledge of its object become linked in a
new way. Governing becomes understood as an art - in the
sense that it pertains to specific techniques which
correspond to specific rules as part of a rational knowledge.
The art of government has as its goal the assurance and
promotion of the right order of things. Government "is
rational," Foucault observes, "on the condition that it
observes the nature of what is governed."24
The rationality behind the sovereign's pastoral
responsibility under reason of state, represented a
relatively smooth transition from the earlier spiritual
responsibilities of the sovereign to lead his subjects to
salvation. God's will revealed by scripture was replaced by
24
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the needs of the State. The art of government thus arose from

the new relationships between authorities "constituted as
'political' and the projects, plans, and practices of those
authorities which attempt to administer individuals and
society in terms of a prevailing conception of what is good
healthy right normal, virtuous, profitable, efficient etc."25
George Obrecht, an official in Strassburg, was the first
to speak of the population - a neologism he invented.26

The

population is a new social entity, a new concept and a new
object of government. Previously there had been Stande groups, orders, or estates. These were much smaller
organizations of people with only loose ties binding them
together and encouraging cooperation. Along with this new
object of government there emerges a new concept of authority
Obrigkeit, which means government or public authority that is
cognizant of its object. Obrecht called for the gathering of
information about the resources and capacities of the
population and territory. He called for the implementation of
a set of public policies designed to augment these capacities
and resources. These activities Obrecht summarized by the
Latin twords census and censura.n

Census referred to the

knowledge on the part of every individual of their
25
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responsibility towards the State while censura referred to
the obligation on the part of the public authority to take
charge of the public's welfare, gather information and
educate the population.
Government has not only "to deal with a territory, with
a domain, and with its subjects, but...it also has to deal
with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws
and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its
possibilities of disturbance."28

Chemnitz, a German author,

in De Ratione Status (1647) wrote that rule according to
reason must "ascertain political consideration required for
all public matters, councils, and projects, whose only aim is
the state's preservation, expansion, and felicity to which
end, the easiest and promptest means are to be employed."29
The transition from scripture to observation as the basis of
political knowledge was nearly complete. By the end of the
Thirty Years War the emergence of secular territorial
organization was codified by the treaty of Westphalia in
1648, inaugurating the state system in Europe. The
observation and production of knowledge about this new
secular territory emerged as a critical topic for natural and
political philosophy as well as practical administration.
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This was the impetus for statistics. "Statistics began as the

systematic study of quantitative facts about the state."30
Various records had been kept throughout history.
Births, baptisms and deaths had long been recorded with
enthusiasm by churches in Europe and Scandinavia. The city of
London in 1603 began recording weekly tallies of plague
victims noting age location and other contextual information.
But it was not until the mid-seventeenth century that such
record keeping began to be carried out in a systematic way.
In articles on "political arithmetic" and later in Natural
and Political Observations (1662), John Graunt first
tabulated statistics in a systematic form.3*

These works were

not mere records of facts as the earlier church records had
been. These were facts linked and tabulated with other facts.
Graunt and co-author William Petty drew up tables of facts
that were linked together in various way. "Signs of
probability" were tabulated together such as Fracastoro7s
"signs of contagion": the air, the presence of insects and
the alignment of planets.32
Graunt's statistical tabulations were displayed in
proper Ramist schematic form which had by then become simply
a matter of "undisputed practice of normal science," to use
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the term Kuhn would later popularize.33

31
Statistics became the

basic factual units of knowledge about the nature of the
state and its proper order. These practices of counting and
gathering information are intimately interconnected with the
practices of rational government. The increased complexity of
government and the expansion of bureaucracy emerged together
with the increasing detail and sheer amount of information
about the state.
The linkage between increasingly elaborate governmental
practices and increasingly detailed statistical information
is complex. Political authority's desire to know the facts
about the State intimately influenced what was counted and
how the counts were tabulated. Where once the counting of
hearths, for example, was sufficient for tax collection
purposes it later became necessary to count the number of
rooms in a dwelling and the number of animals husbanded by a
family. Which "signs of probability" were to be linked
together was itself a form of governmental practice. The mere
existence of a family evidenced by its hearth preceded the
assessment of a "flat tax." It was not enough to know of the
family's existence but. Its state of existence - as indicated
by the signs of room number and animals husbanded - also
became necessary and useful knowledge.
Statistical thinking emerges along with a general
transformation in scientific theory - specifically its
epistemological aspect. During the plague of 1603, for
example, swarms of rats, mice or other such creatures were
understood as both signs as well as causes of contagion or
33
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corrupt air. Whether or not something acted as a sign or
cause was part of the theory itself. There was no independent
epistemological criteria for judging between signs and causes
and the theory in which they were embedded. Without viewing
such an epistemological criteria separate from causal theory
the mass of tabulated facts could only reveal what the
prevailing theory specified.
Graunt and Petty, however, began to look at their data
not as signs or causes, dependent upon theory, but as data
epistemologically independent of theory. Graunt and Petty
began to look at the tables and see "epistemological
relationship independent of the particular subject matter."34
The tables of mortality ceased to be the "signature of the
plague" and became merely data from which many conclusions
could be drawn.35

Only after such a separation between sign

and explanatory theory do controlled experiments become part
of the scientist's repertoire. This distinction between sign
and theory made modern inference possible.
The amount of statistical information gathered by
national governments grew immensely by the end of the
seventeenth century. All the Western European states had by
then set up some sort of ministry to collect and tabulate
Statistical data. What appeared in these statistical tables
was knowledge about Obrecht's newly conceptualized
population. The pursuit of rational knowledge was not without
its effects. Population statistics soon revealed an object of
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government much more complex than even Graunt or Petty
imagined. The population emerged as an entity consisting of
processes and activities with an order all its own - an order
that seemed to emanate from the population itself. The
population, according to Foucault, "is the subject of needs,
of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the
government, aware, vis-a-vis the government, of what it
wants."36

The population, with its own needs and desires, was

an active entity. The State as a whole came to be understood
as constituted by the activities of its population and the
general processes within its territory with the king at its
head responsible for directing its affairs.
The right order of the State, towards which the art of
government was directed, came to be understood in terms of
the Oikos. Oikos was taken from the Greek concept of the
relations proper to a family and the relationships between
its members and its resources as overseen by the head of the
house.37

The family and the population was an object of

needs. The household was understood to involve a set of
interwoven processes that had to be carefully managed in
order to function properly. The family and the population
thus had needs not only for specific material resources but
certain general arrangements that had to be continually
maintained. The king (the head of the house), according to
this model, was responsible for directing these processes and
providing for the needs natural to the population. Prosperity
36
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or destitution, within the bounds of fate and God's will, was

in the hands of the head of the state. For Samuel Von
Pufendorf "sovereign authority is conferred upon them [the
rulers] only in order to allow them to use it to attain or
conserve what is of public utility."38
The Oikos model therefore represented a relatively
smooth transition from medieval to classic forms of rule. To
run a household one must know of what it is made as well as
its propensities and tendencies. The Oikos model provided
both an impetus for the production of statistical knowledge
(facts about the state) and a framework (the sovereign's
pastoral responsibilities under raison d'etat) in which to
utilize this knowledge. The initial form taken by the art of
government was directed at the assurance and promotion of the
orderly activity observed in the familial economy transferred
to the larger domain of the entire State with the figure of
the sovereign occupying the familial position of the father.
The early reason of state based on the model of the
Oikos was not to last however. Preserving and enhancing the
state proved to be problematic. The population was an
unstable and shifting entity for which the conservative model
of the Oikos provided a viable conceptual framework for only
a short time. Governmental practices based on the sovereign's
pastoral responsibility failed to deliver the order and
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prosperity that was supposed to result from such rule. By the

end of the seventeenth century confidence in the sovereign's
ability to produce the right order of the State had begun to
erode.39
The processes and needs of the population soon became
differentiated from the managerial figure of the sovereign.
It became increasingly understood that even the beneficial
processes within the State proceeded despite the activities
of the sovereign. There were of course many contributing
factors to these transformations, both practical and
theoretical. The political travails in England surrounding
the attempts at Stuart restoration and the competition
between rival oligarchic groups after William of Orange's
death for example, or in France, Louis the XIV's involvement
in several wars. The peasant uprisings in Quercy and Perigord
France at the end of the seventeenth century challenged the
existing order by contesting the payment of taxes to the
king, tithe to the church, or the provision of free labor for
the upkeep of roads.40

Such events seemed to call into

question the notion of the sovereign as in some way
responsible for what little order did obtained in the
processes of the state.
The scope of rational scientific knowledge began to
expand to include not only the idea of reading the "book of
nature" but also Galileo's conception of constant natural
39
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laws operating without the direct guidance of an orderer.
Galileo, and his friend Thomas Hobbes, both received threats
from the church and the aristocracy on grounds of heresy. The
aristocracy eventually warmed to Hobbes' views and later to
Galileo's. Charles II, who was tutored by Hobbes while in
exile in Paris, invited him into his court upon the
restoration of the monarchy in 1660. The new king described
Hobbes as "a bear, against whom the Church played their young
dogs, in order to exercise them."41
Isaac Newton expanded Galileo's theory of fundamental
constants, stating that even 'perturbations' in planetary
motions were due to specific causes that followed from an as
yet unrecognized natural law. Order and what appeared to be
disorderly, and thus the realm of chance, Machiavelli's
fortuna, had both come to be understood as in fact determined
by specific causes. Natural law and determinism was the
immutable cause of order. Knowledge, if it was to count as
reasonable, eventually reflected this understanding. The
conception of the right order as the direct consequence of an
active orderer, a sovereign or God in effect lost its
rationality.
Statistics revealed the order and processes that
obtained in the state. This gave rise to the new object of
the population, an object wholly contained within the state.
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The pastoral responsibility of the sovereign carried over
from medieval formulas of rule made rational thought the
model of the Oikos. But the order and processes of the
population revealed by statistics did not allow this holdover
from earlier forms of rule without substantial renovation.
The sovereign's importance declined and gave way to a much
more bureaucratic form of rule. As the object of government
became more complex - composed of its own forces of
regulation, as revealed by statistics in line with the
emerging rationality of natural law - the art of government
also took on a more complex form.
Paul-Henri Holbach was the first to mount an
"unmitigated defense of atheistic materialism."42

Combining

Hobbes and Newton, Holbach held that the material universe is
self-controlled and that nature was the sum of matter and
motion. The sole role of the state, for Holbach, was to
"nurture, in every possible way, the virtues of cooperation"
on which the good of the population and good government
depends.43 Political reason begins to reflect this emerging
conception which displays its object in terms making it
amenable to intervention and government.
The concept of the State as constituted by an Oikos with
the sovereign at its head begins to change with these
transformations in the concepts of nature, natural law and
causal determinism. By the early eighteenth century the Oikos
42
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model was breaking down. The population and its order became

separated from the figure of the sovereign as the source of
order. As causes of order move from a sovereign pastoral
figure, God, king or father, to internal natural laws, the
process of the population become differentiated from the
institutions of political authority. Foucault notes that by
the mid eighteenth century the "menace" of death in the form
of plagues and famines had been mitigated and a knowledge of
and power over life emerged. "Western man was gradually
learning what it meant to be a living species in a living
world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities
of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that
could be modified, and a space in which they could be
distributed in an optimal manner."44 After a hundred years of
increasing collection of statistical data along with the
inferential possibilities of the epistemological separation
of cause and sign within theory there emerged new
formulations of the object of government.

The Physiocrats
and the End of Reason of State

The transformations in how the population was linked to
the sovereign and the state was dependent on the
transformations in the epistemological basis of rational
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knowledge itself. Early critics of reason of state, such as
the Physiocrats, emerge with the differentiation of the
orderly propensities of the population and the figure of the
sovereign. With this differentiation the economy emerges as a
distinct object of knowledge constitutive of and yet, at the
same time, constituted by a new form of political reason. The
sovereign's direct intervention in the economy actually
becomes the source of disruption and dysfunction rather than
order and prosperity.
John Locke (1632-1704) and later David Hume believed the
inner workings of nature to be unknowable. Abraham De Moivre
in The Doctrine of Chances (1711) had said that fundamental
chance was the result of equally possible outcomes of some
kind of physical

s e t - u p . 45

Newton's mechanics led to

unprecedented precision in astronomical measurement yet the
implication was that gravity in itself is unknowable. PierreSimon Laplace in Philosophical Essay on Probability (1795)
built upon this idea and stated categorically that chance and
probability was merely the result of ignorance of true
causes.46
The Physiocrat's texts are explicit that it is not
through laws and decrees that the right order of things are
to be
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Francois Quesnay suggested that good
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government simply was economic government.48

That is, good

government, government according to reason, had to be
cognizant of the natural laws that determined the economy.
The slogan "laissez Faire et laissez passer, le monde va de
lui-meme" may be loosely translated as "Don't interfere, the
world will take care of itself."49

But this also meant

actively guarding against the disruption of the world's
taking care of itself through its natural processes. That is,
it was an active non-interference. Quesnay's Tableau
Economique, a three columned table of expenditures and
receipts, displayed money in a whole new light. Money and
wealth were conceived in terms of a self contained
circulatory process within the population. The blood within
the body politic, wealth was the product of exchange rather
than the zero-sum conception of surplus characteristic of the
Oikos model.50 This constituted the invention of what is
today called the national economy.51
The Physiocrats' critiques of sovereign intervention
into the economy were modern in terms of their distinction
between political authority and the processes of the economy.
However, their formulations were also consistent with another
distinction that has since been erased. What we today call
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"the economy" had been distinguished, until the late
eighteenth century, between national processes and
international

p r o c e s s e s . 52

internal national processes

corresponded to the reformulated Oikos model - the economy,
newly differentiated from the ordering figure of the
sovereign. The international corresponded generally to what
is now referred to as commerce or capitalism. Commerce was
the domain of the market, characterized by free exchange and
competition. It was the domain of chance and caprice,
Machiavelli's fortuna, where causal laws were of the
unknowable Humian type. Commerce was understood as distinct
from the economy precisely because the model of the Oikos
could not be applied. There was no providential figure of a
sovereign to exercise authority to protect the natural
process of the population.
Quesney and the Physiocrats dismissed the conception of
orderly economic processes dependent on an orderer but
maintained the distinction between the economy within the
State and commerce without. The right order of the economy
was to be ensured through the sovereign's refraining from
direct intervention in the economy yet the sovereign was also
responsible for ensuring that such internationalperturbations
and other events of unknowable cause characteristic of
commerce did not disrupt the State's economic processes. Thus
was the economic logic that propelled imperialism and
colonialism. The sovereign responsibility was distanced from
the economy, in other words, but not divorced from it.
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Sovereign authority for the Physiocrats thus remained
the foundation of rational government - either through the
sovereign's active intervention on the one hand or inaction
on the other. Physiocratic theory constituted the beginning
of a general recognition, however, that, in Foucault's words,
"if one governed too much, one did not govern at all - that
one provoked results contrary to those one desired."53

The

Physiocrat's doctrine of laissez faire proposed a limitation
oh the legitimate exercise of political authority on the
grounds that the population functioned better - followed its
natural propensities - if left to its own devices. That is,
with minimal expense by governing more by governing less providing for the welfare of the population by allowing the
population to govern itself.54 This positive justification
for market freedom would, the Physiocrats declared, make the
State richer and more powerful. The laissez faire criticism
of the authority and rationality of the sovereign's
interventionary practices was the beginning of a new
political rationality.
This new rationality presented new problems however. If
the natural processes of the economy were disruptable, care
must be given to protecting and fostering them. This was to
be the new goal of government. Physiocratic criticisms of the
rationality of reason of state, however, did not offer an
alternative knowledge upon which the practice of governing
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could consistently operate. Good government, government
according to reason, required a tighter link between the
emerging epistemological conceptions of the population and
knowledge that could produce rational techniques for acting
on this object. Quesney and the Physiocrats can be seen as a
phase in the transition from the political rationality of
reason of state to a new political reason of liberalism. The
question of how to arrange and manage all the parts of the
Oikos gave way to the question of how to govern a natural
self regulating process. "What is the principle of limitation
that applies to governmental actions such that things will
occur for the best, in conformity with the rationality of
government, and without intervention."55
The State emerged as a dream of an homogeneous entity
knowable in its earthly reality distinct from the revelations
of scripture. It sooncame to be conceived in terms of the
Greek Oikos, an object requiring direct guidance from the
sovereign lest it fall to the whims of fortuna. The
Physiocrats then articulated the first major critique of this
dream by emphasizing the distinction between the population
and political authority over it. Thus the state had become
understood as composed of two spheres. The classical
economists performed yet a further distinction. Building on
the criticism of the Physiocrats they dividing the population
into two distinct, yet mutually constitutive spheres; the
economy and civil community. Taken together these formed the
new object of a liberal art of government known as society.
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By the end of the eighteenth century it was the
responsibility of rational government to know its society in
order to govern it rationally according to its nature.

Chapter 3:
Know Your Society
The responsibility of rational government to know its
society had profound effects. Statistics effected the very
epistemological level of political rationality. Once the
impetus to read the book of nature produced the massive
archiving of facts about the Oikos, the emergent political
formation that arose from this archive could only be
understood from within a rationality of statistical reason.
The relationship between statistics, society and early
liberal political rationality is subtle. The transformation
from population to society accompanying the transition from
physiocratic to classical political economic formulations was
closely linked to the development of statistics. Statistics
transformed the way the population was understood and at the
same time was fundamental in the transformation of the very
perception and practice of rationality itself. It was through
the technology of statistics that the spaces and processes of
society were first observed and made legible. The development
of statistics into a rational mode of analysis and the
consequent exercise of this form of reason arose from and was
directed at a new domain that frustrated direct control. Or
to put it another way, society emerged because of the
inability of the sovereign to order the population. Such was
the lesson of the failures of the policies arising from the
rationality reason of state.
The new liberal rationality of government was aimed at a
new set of processes - the private, atomistic and egoistic
45
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exchanges that classical political economists spoke of. The
individual to be governed was not only a rational, interestmotivated economic ego but also part of a biological
population, a natural member of society. These processes of
individuals and society were understood as rational because
they arose from nature itself - the natural and historic
milieu made up of personal ties, associations and
communitarian bonds.
Statistics had been understood from the beginning as a
window into the vital heart of the state, a measure of its
vital power. This information about the Oikos was thus
guarded and kept secret. By the late eighteenth century
information about the state was explicitly made public. The
United States, in article 1 section 2 of the Constitution,
was the first to legally mandate the counting of people and
public access to the results. It was only natural, so to
speak, that a society governing itself have access to the
facts about itself. Statistics was no longer a tool for the
king. It became a tool for self government - a tool for
knowing the proper order of nature so that one could conduct
oneself in accordance with this order.
Statistics had emerged in response to the tables drawn
up of plague victims. Eventually it turned to health matters
of all kinds, making life itself in all its forms and
processes inherently political. The rational knowledges
produced through statistical inquiries such as census,
medical and police reports on sickness, crime or suicide,
rendered intelligible and manipulable the political object of

47

society that liberal (self) government had to know in order
to govern (itself) properly. "For the first time in history,"
Foucault notes, "biological existence was reflected in
political existence....[Life] passed into knowledge's field
of control and power's sphere of intervention."56
In the cases of disease and society - problems requiring
some form of collective response - liberal political
intervention did not take the form of direction from above,
as did interventions from within the rationality of reason of
state. Rather, governmental intervention took the form of a
sort of investment of political rationality into society.
That is, an instillment, at the local level within the
processes of society itself, of the necessity to know the
proper order of oneself and ones community in order for the
community to conduct itself correctly.
In England in 1793, for example, "friendly societies"
were encouraged by an act of Parliament as a means for
workers to alleviate some of the negative effects of the
industrialization process then emerging. These organizations
begun by the workers themselves and paid for by weekly
contributions were aimed at providing a certain degree of
self-insurance against disease, death and support for
widows.57

They societies also kept records of their

activities and tables of vital statistics. From these the
government, the first insurance companies and the individual
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"friendly societies" themselves determined how to best
conduct their affairs. By 1815 there were 925,429 of these
"friendly societies".58

A New Art of Government:
The Beginning of Liberalism
By

the end of the eighteenth century a new conception

of the object of government was emerging. This new object was
characterized as self-organizating and possessing internal
drives. Yet statistics also revealed a living species - a
species with specific conditions of existence. The problem
became one of reconciling the requirement for a space of
freedom for the play of natural process on the one hand and
the fact of specific conditions of existence that must be
protected and even fostered on the other. If government was
to rule properly and bring about the right order of things,
it would have to be cognizant of these newly understood
conditions of life including the need for freedom. Only
through such knowledge would government be able to foster and
protect the natural functioning of the population. The
practice of government becomes linked in a new way to its
object - through its freedom. For only proper government
could ensure this freedom. The outlines of this new art of
government began to emerge with the classical economists. It
is a liberal art of government with a society as its object.
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Adam Smith started from a new generalized conception of
human nature rather than the physiocratic distinction between
commerce and the economy. Smith's The Wealth of Nations
(1776) marks the emergence of a conception of the economy
that integrates the previously distinct internal domestic
economic order and the external disruptive realm of commerce.
By combining commerce and the economy the responsibility for
ensuring order is taken from the sovereign and placed into
the (invisible) hand of the market and the natural laws of
the economy. Commerce became understood as a competitive and
dynamic process within the economy of the State rather than
the fearsome realm external to it where, in the absence of
the sovereign, disorder prevailed. The perturbations and
chance characteristic of commerce are now understood to be
checked by forces internal to it: the propensity to exchange
and market competition.
With Smith and the classical economists the separation
between the sovereign and the population was widened even
further by distinguishing between the economy of the
population and civil society. Thus with the synthesis of the
economy and commerce emerges the wholly new object of
society, an object which encompasses the economy and civil
community but taken together form more than the old
population. As Foucault puts it "What was discovered at that
time - and this was one of the great discoveries of political
thought at the end of the eighteenth century - was the idea
of society."59
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Governing was, for Smith, not a question of producing a
good but of "the prevention of so great a public evil."60

The

natural functioning of a capitalist economy was not
understood to promote social good per se but merely
productivity. By this criterion the "society can demahd that
the state account for itself."6* Adam Smith and classic
political economy in general provided a criterion for judging
political authority and the reasonableness of governmental
practices that had eluded earlier critics of reason of state.
Rational government and the right order of a liberal State,
in other words, was ensured by the natural processes within
the State itself. This is the culmination of a long process
resulting in a new form of rule.
By the end of the eighteenth century the "meticulous
observation of detail, and at the same time a political
awareness of theses small things, for the control and use of
men, emerge through the classical age bearing with them a
whole set of techniques, a whole corpus of methods and
knowledge, descriptions, plans and data" came together to
form a "general formula" of managing the self-actuated
collective of society. 62

This mode of knowing and governing

the new object of society Foucault calls discipline. The
emergence of discipline was not sudden but rather the effect
of many minute movements and events. As a kind of political
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anatomy, discipline grew out of multiple and continuous
observations and investigations into the body politic.
Beginning with Petty's and Graunt's "political
arithmetic" statistics quickly generated massive amounts of
information about the new states of Europe. But statistics
also generated new ways of interpreting this information and
it soon became the primary means by which the early states
produced the knowledge used to rule the population.
Interpretation of scripture was replaced by interpretation of
the book of nature. As the techniques and methods of
statistics were refined, they became more and more important
to all other disciplines of inquiry. The very act of inquiry
became linked to government in a new and intimate way by
virtue of the various disciplines' power to make visible the
proper or natural state of things.
Foucault notes that the successful emergence of the
disciplinary form of political rule was due to three simple
instruments or characteristic modes of operation.63

These

are: 1) hierarchical observation; 2) Normalizing judgment;
and 3) examination.64
1)

Hierarchical observation - which took specific forms

such as the military camp, the prison or the school - was
observation in which the figures of authority watched over
their charges and recorded their observed movements and
behaviors. The general form of hierarchical observation was
of course objective scientific inquiry which sat above its
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object actively yet dispassionately peeling away the shrouds

of ignorance and revealing the truth of its nature. It is
this observation and the production of objective knowledge
which renders people and things calculable.
2) Normalizing judgment, also known as surveillance,
takes the knowledge of the natural and proper order of things
and compares these with the successive observations of
individual events, phenomena or behavior produced through
hierarchical observation. The particular instance of an
observed behavior more or less complied with the natural law
particular to it. The resulting political arithmetic gives
rise to measures of correction or encouragement to bring
about or sustain movement towards the proper, natural state.
3) Examination combines the techniques of the observing
hierarchy and normalizing judgment. The examination is the
interface, so to speak, of those in possession of knowledge
of the natural order produced through hierarchical
observation and the individual or collective entity - defined
of course by this very knowledge - to be evaluated and
treated. Observation provides the basis for classification
and qualification while the examination carries it out in the
form of normalizing judgments.
This disciplinary form of government is not uniformly
hierarchical in the same way that feudal kingdoms or even
early sovereign states were with their strictly guarded lines
of authority from God, via the church and/or the sovereign,
down to the individual peasant. This form of production of
knowledge was restricted to the few in the privileged
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institutions of the court and the church. Conflict within
this form of rule generally occurred over ones place in this
singular line of descent. The hierarchies of liberal
government, by contrast, are multiple. Knowledge is available
to anyone following the rules of objectivity. The natural and
human sciences, the professions and disciplines, the business
groups and workers societies and on down to the individual
all assume the responsibility for observing, producing
normalizing judgments and examinations within their
respective spheres of influence. Power was dispersed, spread
out in the vastness of objective knowledge itself.
The openness of knowledge and the multiplicity of
hierarchies of knowledge/power characteristic of society
emerged together with liberal government. In this process the
intimate link between disciplinary rule and reason was
strengthened. Indeed liberal society and the disciplinary art
of government mutually constitute one another. The power
brought to play by the disciplines, Foucault notes "is one of
analysis."65

The liberal institutions of government that

arise at the end of the eighteenth century begin to take the
form of one - albeit perhaps the largest and most extensive observational hierarchy among many. The achievement of self
government was thus ironically accompanied by the dramatic
expansion of the institutions of political authority.
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The Moral Sciences
and the Natural Laws of Society
Adam Smith understood the object he was describing to be
a moral one. He himself thought of his ideas as moral
philosophy. Indeed, the moral encompassed the political,
which in turn came to encompass the biological once power
over it was taken from God's hands and given to science. The
natural order was, after all, the proper order and therefore
moral. By the end of the eighteenth century a new discipline
intimately linked with statistics had emerged to formulate
knowledge in this way: the moral sciences. Through the moral
sciences statistics became both an expression of and at the
same time a necessary condition for reason and liberal
government.
The moral sciences, the precursor of today's social
sciences, were the first disciplines specifically concerned
with the study of the phenomena and processes of society. It
was the moral sciences that were to identify the laws of
society and provide liberal government with the rational
knowledge necessary to bring its right order. Antoine de
Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet was the preeminent spokesman of
the moral sciences. He was a friend and student of AnneRobert-Jacques Turgot, the last of the Physiocrats. Condorcet
understand the moral science to be "all those sciences that
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have as their object either the human mind itself, or the
relations of men one to another."66
For Condorcet "the moral sciences are founded upon facts
and reasoning; their certainty will therefore be the same as
the physical sciences....It is from the more or less constant
order of facts observed in moral and physical phenomena that
the kind of certainty that pertains to reality is derived."67
For Condorcet the natural laws of society were not
statistical in themselves. Statistics merely revealed the
social phenomenon ruled by natural laws.
The "friendly societies" did not fare very well for the
most part. Poor organization and poor information were partly
to blame. The Select Committee of the House of Commons' first
meeting in 1825 gave the reason for their failure thus:
"Until a very few years ago no data were collected whereon a
calculation of the average occurrence of sickness at the
several ages of men could be formed with tolerable
accuracy."6s

The Committee inquired whether any "tables of

sickness formed upon actual observation" were available.69
England's chief actuary, John Finlaison, and the
administrators of other European states all answered no.
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Finlaison's response represented the common rational
belief that no conclusions could be drawn from the reports of
the "friendly societies." This was not merely because of bad
record keeping, although this was also the case. It was
simply thought impossible. Sickness and most undesirable
things (including heathens and savages) were commonly
understood to be the result of the absence of order, the
absence of a determining principle or the breakdown of
natural law. How could there exist an "average occurrence,"
that is, a regular and orderly appearance of a phenomena
which was by definition the result of the absence of the very
source of order and regularity? Sickness and disease could
not possibly have a discernible regularity of their own from
which their occurrence could be perceived with any accuracy.
Disorder could not be rationally linked to an orderly
process. The problem of sickness was not merely the lack of
data. The very idea of regularity and order to an unlawful,
pathological and abnormal phenomena simply made no sense.
Learned opinion in the late eighteenth century held that
chance and luck were vulgar, even the work of the devil.
Dicing, games of chance and probability were the domain of
gamblers and the sure path to atheism and damnation. Chance,
accident and fortune were, after all, phenomena dangerous to
the old order of the Oikos. Fortune, since Machiavelli,
constituted the preeminent antagonistic condition against
which the sovereign was supposed to guard his population.
Probability could be useful however. And rational men, by
this time, did not believe probability to be evil. It was
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merely a subjective frame of mind. While the universe was
necessarily determined through the operation of natural laws,
these laws may not always be known directly as in the case of
gravity.
John Locke, for example, in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1671-89) proposed that the true essence of a
thing was in their "inner constitution." But this inner
constitution was inaccessible to man. Natural laws were
understood to operate upon this essence in order to perform
their work. But this seemed to produce an impasse between the
governing according to reason (that is - the rationality of
reason) and the rationality of natural law - the very
foundation of reason itself. Government needed to know the
functioning of the irrational - the pathological and the
abnormal - in order to govern according to reason. But the
irrational - the chaotic and disorderly - by definition
defied reason.
The moral sciences and statistics were rapidly evolving
disciplines. They soon developed the necessary techniques to
render even the irrational and disorderly visible and open to
governmental intervention. The existence and operation of
natural laws was (and remains) the necessary condition for
reason itself. There was thus no question that there must be
laws governing society similar to those governing the rest of
creation. The problem for the moral sciences was to discover
these laws of society. This was accomplished by rationalizing
probability and making the normal visible and measurable.
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Statistics become natural I:
The Rationalization of Probability
The physicist and mathematician Pierre-Simmon, marquis
de Laplace, Like Condorcet before him, was interested in
questions of jurisprudence. There was great concern among
reform minded men such as Condorcet and Laplace to limit
irrationality - bias, superstition etc. - from judicial
proceedings. A rational society, they thought, must have a
fair and just judicial system. The empirical question in
jurisprudence was whether or not witnesses could be trusted
and what majority of jurors would produce a verdict closest
to the truth.70 Democracy called for equality and jury by
peers but superstition was widespread. Probability applied to
the design of the judicial system was, for Laplace, the best
way of protecting the public from their own unreason.
Laplace, like most educated men of the period, held that
probability was subjective. Chance was simply the absence of
knowledge of true causes and the natural law by which they
operated. Probability at the end of the eighteenth century
thus meant two things at once. It referred to the subjective
reasons one may have for thinking that an event will or will
not take place and, at the same time, probability meant what
Laplace called facilite, the chance or likelihood that
various outcomes will obtain in situations where the causes
are unknown. One was purely of the subjective mind the other

70
According to Laplace's calculations, a tribunal split of 3:2 has a
probability of 0.59 of deciding correctly, while a jury split of 7:5 has
a probability of 0.71 of being correct. Hacking, Chance. 230.

59

was lack of knowledge of the object and thus still
subjective.
Laplace articulated the classic rational explanation
that there existed "petty little causes" for all phenomena.
Every fact in the universe, according to Laplace, was
determined by law. He began his Philosophical Essay on
Probabilities (1814) with the words "[a]11 events, even those
which on account of their insignificance do not seem to
follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as
necessarily as the revolutions of the sun."71 Probabilistic
statements where merely a means of coping with the lack of
knowledge of these causes. It was a concept that provided a
means to aid sound judgment in the absence of direct access
to the inner constitution and natural law of things. Each
observation of an objective event was more or less correct or
incorrect. The problem was to calculate the probability
(likelihood) that an observation was correct. Laplace
calculated the conditions of observation by combining many
linear equations and aggregating the results. From these
calculations he obtained his probability of the accuracy that
the observations accorded with the event itself and thus to
the true causes of the phenomena.
To be sure there were other opinions. Marie-FrancoisXaviar Bichat (1771-1802), lecturing in Paris at the same
time as Laplace, postulated that "there are in nature two
classes of beings, two classes of properties, and two classes
71
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of sciences. The beings are either organic of inorganic, the

properties vital or non-vital, and the sciences either
physiological or physical."72

Both of these conceptions, the

vitalism of Bichat and the mechanism of Laplace, were
deterministic and reductionist.

But there was no room for

probability in the teleology of

Bichat. Arising as it did in

mathematics probability readily lent itself to the
mechanistic concepts of Laplace and it soon began to creep in
at the margins of rational thought.

Statistics become natural II:
Revealing the Norm
Government requires an object that can be known in
manipulable terms. The problem of probability and natural law
for the conduct of science and government preceded a
transformation in the entire domain of reason. At about the
same time Laplace was rationalizing probability, a much more
subtle transformation was underway. Carl Friedrich Gauss, a
German astronomer, had worked out his "law of errors" for
measurement in observational astronomy by 1807. Gauss
produced a graphical representation of the distribution of
error in measurement. The Gaussian bell shaped curve vividly
illustrated the two quantities of mean and dispersion about
the mean. Dispersion has since become fundamental for all
methods of measurement. A normal distribution is defined by
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its mean and standard deviation. When the number of
measurements (or any kind of data) is large enough, and
plotted graphically, a bell shaped curve, peeked at the mean
results. Measurements that cluster about the mean, the top of
the bell shaped curve, are thought to be reliable. That is,
they have a high probability (likelihood) of being correct.
Combined with the more popular work of Laplace, the very
foundations of reason, governmental or otherwise, were to be
changed for ever.
Gauss focused his calculations and attention on
measurement as opposed to Laplace's focus on observation.
Gauss, interested as he was in the position of celestial
bodies, did not assume each measurement to represent an
actual quantity or that each measurement had a corresponding
object. Gauss was concerned with calculating the accuracy of
multiple measurements of the same entity. For him the curve
itself was nothing more than a collection of measurements.
Gauss was essentially calculating the accuracy of the
astronomers' instruments and the conditions of observation.
The true position of the star or planet in question was
understood to lie somewhere within the multiple measurements
arranged in a curve of error. The curve of error thus
revealed the most probable location of the celestial object
to be somewhere in the concentration of points representing
the majority of individual measurements at the top of the
curve.
Calculation of the curve of error allowed statistical
inferences to be made with a high degree of certainty and
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therefore reduced subjective speculation.73

Gauss'

distribution of error was striking for its representation of
regularity and order where none had previously been visible
but merely assumed a priori. Orderly processes, after all,
should, in principle, be measurable. Being orderly and
measurable, they must be objective. The orderly and
calculable had for a long time been associated with the
normal in terms of the good, the lawful and morally right.
This sense of the normal remains today. But the objectivity
of the normal, and thus the proof of its lawfulness,
rationality and, above all, its usefulness, achieved new
heights with the invention of Gauss' distribution. Statistics
- with the addition of the Gaussian curve - became not only a
lens for viewing the order of things but a lens for viewing
the right order of things, the things as they should be
normally. Gauss' bell shaped curve quickly came to be called
the normal distribution or normal curve.
The Select Committee in England reviewing the "friendly
societies" reconvened in 1827, the year of Laplace's death.
One set of reports did show a regularity. Moreover, it came
from one of the few successful "friendly societies," the
Highland Society of Scotland. There were a number of reasons
for the lack of faith in the tables produced by the many
other societies besides the classic conception of natural
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law. Many of the ruling elites suspected that the friendly
societies were a front for combines or trade unions. In
addition, if the numbers from the Highland Society were
accepted the actuaries would be forced to lower their
premiums by one third.74
The numbers and methods of the Highland Society were
soon adopted by the central government however. Disorder and
pathology had come under the sway of natural law. In the
intervening two years it was officially acknowledged that
sickness did indeed exhibit regularities which could be
tracked using statistical methods. By the 1830's it was
perfectly reasonable to speak of the laws of sickness.
By the early eighteenth century the obscure mathematical
work of Gauss and the high profile work of Laplace came
together. Probability no longer constituted a subjective
frame of mind. But the admittance of probability into
rational thought did not leave objectivity and reason
unchanged. Laplace's calculations of probability - in terms
of observation of multiple real events - joined with Gauss'
calculations - which revealed the normal distribution in a
graphical way - together combined to make the bell curve an
actual quantity with objective characteristics.
The Gauss Laplace synthesis, as it has been called, had
further profound effects.75

Objectivity was, and remains, the

touchstone of rational thought. The rationalization of
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probability and the reification of the normal curve made the

laws of society accessible in a way Locke and Smith, for
example, could not have imagined. The normal curve was
believed to be the revelation of natural law itself - the
functioning of natural law made visible in the requisite
Ramist topological form. It was an objective display of the
actual functioning of the natural laws governing whatever
phenomenon the statistical methods were applied to - such as
sickness or crime of a given community.

Natural Laws Become Statistical

The search for Laplacian petty little causes of social
phenomena and the gathering of information within the
administrative framework, established by Farr led not to final
unveiling of an obscure and intricate causal mechanical
process but to the transformation of the conception of
natural law itself. What emerged from this transformation was
a statistical natural law. The Belgian astronomer Adolphe
Quetelet was the first practitioner of the mathematical
methods associated with modern statistics.76

The statistical

regularity that presented itself in the reams of data
suggested to Quetelet the operation of a natural law. Turning
to social matters and the mass of data collected on crime
Quetelet proposed that the number of criminals was constant
and that the relative proportion of different sorts of crime
76
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remained the same.77

The regularity and order that Quetelet

observed in the tables of social data he likened to the
motion and measurement of the heavens.
The Gaussian distribution curve, according to Quetelet,
represented precisely the type of law regulating the
distribution of human social behavior and biological traits.
By virtue of the norm, statistical natural law preserved the
taxonomic order based on essentialism and universalism. In
the course of applying the normal curve to social phenomenon
in the early 1830's through the 1840's, Quetelet came to the
conclusion that, in social matters, the mean was, in fact, an
actual quantity, a real entity, a concrete characteristic of
society. Statistical methods began as descriptive of large
scale regularities, Quetelet turned them into laws of nature
with causal power and truth.78
Once the normal distribution became objective and
measurable the norm took on a fundamental role in government.
Liberal political rationality, according to Foucault "has to
qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize.... [I ]t affects
distributions around the norm."79 For it is the
identification of the normal that allows one to judge whether
ones conduct and the conduct of society is in accordance with
its natural law. That is, in accordance with the right and
proper order of things. The delineation of normality became a
fundamental technology for social management.
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Quetelet was not the only influence on the early
development of the social sciences to be sure. The father of
positivism, Auguste Comte, vehemently disagreed with
Quetelet's social mathematics. Both Quetelet and Comte were
the heirs of Condorcet's moral science but they differed
sharply over the statistical treatment of social phenomena.
Comte came to a radically different conclusion than Quetelet
over the concept of normality. Quetelet took normality to be
the mean, the cluster of data points at the top of the bell
curve, the prevalent and the common. Comte, on the other
hand, derived a conception of the normal from the physician
Francois-Joseph-Victor Broussais. For Comte normality had
nothing to do with probability. Normality was a matter of
degrees, a sliding scale so to speak. In his System de
Politique Positive (1851) Comte wrote "Until Braoussais, the
pathological state obeyed laws completely different from
those governing the normal state, so that observation of one
could decide nothing for the other. Broussais established
that the phenomena of disease are of essentially the same
kind as those of health, from which they differ only in
intensity."80
For Comte the normal could not be linked to a distinct
statistical law governing the clustering about the top of the
bell curve. The normal was the ideal, the good, the best
possible arrangement. Society was to be studied in terms of
its progress through history towards its ideal full
development. It was to be judged judged by its progress
80
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towards ideal. He was furious over Quetelet's appropriation
of the terms "social mathematics" and "social physics" for
his brand of moral science. Comte eventual coined the term
"sociology" for his historical epistemological approach.8*
When Comte applied his normal/pathological distinctions
to the political and social sphere the normal ceased to be a
conception of the normal in terms of ordinary or common.
Instead normality became inextricably linked with the concept
of progress, "progress is nothing but the development of
order: it is an analysis of the normal state."82

The normal

is what society should strive for. The normal as what was
essential and therefore the good, the Aristotelian telos,
rather than what is extrapolated from data revealing an
average or mean.83
Despite Comte's influence, statistical reason remained
central to social science and liberal political rationality.
Charles Babbage, often referred to as the father of the
computer for his invention of the Analytic Engine, noted that
"it is the science of calculation - which becomes continually
more necessary at each step of our progress and must
ultimately govern the whole of the application of science to
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The normal, to this day, continues to stand for both the typical,
banal average at the same time as itstands
for thehealthy ideal
as in
the use of the Latin norma and the Greek ortho so common to the
corrective and restorative disciplines. The normal still lingers between
the is and the ought.

the arts of life."84
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In the mid-1800?s statistical reason and

the new concept of statistical law retained the classic
deterministic quality of natural laws characteristic of
Newton and Laplace. The large scale assignment of numbers to
all of nature and their subsequent calculation was
fundamental to the later emergence of the concept of energy
in physics and biology.85
With the introduction of probability into rational
thought, however, the natural link between counting and
classification became problematic. Babbage was aware that
computation and classification were intimately linked. He
developed a technique of using punch cards as a
classification system. He never completed his analytic engine
however.86

Classification on the basis of essential

properties or universal constants was becoming more and more
suspect. Classification was beginning to be seen as
probabilistic just as precision measurement was - a high
probability of accuracy relative to the distribution of error
rather than an a priori essential quality. The relationship
between the real world and mathematical symbols continued to
become more complex.

84
Charles Babbage, Econonomv of machinery and manufactures. In
Charles Babbage: Collected Works, V 8, M. Campbell ed. (London, William
Pickering, 1989), 266; quoted in Andrew Barry, "Lines of communication
and spaces of rule" in Barry, Osborne, and Rose eds., Foucault and
Political Reason, 132.
85
Francois Jacob, The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 194.
86
F. H. George, Automation Cybernetics and Society (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1959), 47.

But Babbage was also of historical importance as one of
the earliest and most strident advocates for establishing the
"Constants of Nature and of Art" to be put into tables that
"ought to contain all those facts which can be expressed by
numbers in various sciences and arts."87

These should be

undertaken, Babbage thought, by the eminent scientific
institutions of the day such as the Royal Society, the
Institute of France, and the Academy of Berlin. Everything
had a constant associated with it, it was thought, by which
it could be calculated and measured. He had a list of
nineteen categories of constants that should be the initial
focus of such an effort. These included constants of interest
to theoretical scientists such as those of the solar system
and atomic weights to those of interest to industry and
government such as cultivated crops, their production rates,
geographical distribution and profitability or the quantity
of oak or Portland stone a "man laboring ten hours a day will
saw" and the lengths of rivers, populations, buildings, etc.
Babbage was a witness for the Select Committee which
vindicated the numbers of the Highland Society in 1827. He
along with Quetelet and others, founded the British
Association's Section F for statistics in 1833.
Statistical facts by the mid-nineteenth century simply
revealed statistical laws, laws as sure as gravity and the
movement of the stars. The transformation of statistical laws
into real objective causes gave rise to a new form of
teleology: Statistical determinism (or what we might now call
87
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pre-determinism). The conceptual link of probability to
contingency and relativism was not made for several more
decades. When data showed, for example, that 200 to 250
people committed suicide each year by drowning in the Seine
this became a fact that was thought unalterable. It was, in
other words, predetermined by the natural laws of society.
"Society prepares the crimes and the guilty person is only
the instrument" wrote Quetelet in 1832.88
Two general consequences of the emergence of statistical
natural law can be identified: optimistic utilitarianism and
statistical fatalism. Jean-Pierre Falret for example,
compiled a list of predisposing, direct and indirect general
causes of suicide: heredity, temperament, and age; sex,
education, and reading hovels; music, theatrical
performances, and climate; as well as the seasons,
masturbation, and idleness.89
If enough information was collected and if the mechanics
of social laws was discovered, influences upon society could
be changed. The optimistic utilitarian determinism of
statistical natural law maintained the enlightenment
conception of free will and the dream of human betterment and
perfection. The optimistic statistical determinism of
Quetelet and Farr held individual acts of free will to
themselves constitute petty little causes. These minute free
causal acts, taken together, balanced each other out. "The
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larger the number of individuals, the more individual will
fades out, and allows the series of general facts to
predominate, the facts which depend on general causes, and in
virtue of which society exists and is conserved."90 Human
progress was to be achieved through altering the conditions
of mortality and morality.

William Farr, compiler of

abstracts and effective head of the Registrar-General of
England and Wales wrote in 1860:

Despite the accidents or conflagrations, the
unstableness of winds, the uncertainties of life and
the variations in men's minds and circumstances, on
which fires, wrecks and deaths depend, they are
subject to laws as invariable as gravitation and
fluctuate within certain limits, which the calculus of
probabilities can determine beforehand. This holds for
crimes, and other acts of will, so that violation
itself is subject to law. shall a system of fatalism
be built upon this foundation? No, for statistics has
revealed also a law of variation. Introduce a system
of ventilation into unventilated mines, and you
substitute one law of accidents for another. These
events are under control. Some races, however, commit
crimes of violence in greater proportion to others
races. Some classes are more dangerous. [But] as men
have the power to modify their race, they have the
power to change the current of human actions within
definite limits, which statistics can determine.

Farr conceived of the physical infrastructure of
ventilation systems in mines or the sewage systems in London,
for example, as "artificial agencies" acting on an
individuals free will to alter the material conditions
90
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influencing moral life.92

The link between probability and

normality within statistical reason meant that morals, in a
general way, could be mapped creating a moral geography. The
disease ridden areas of the Victorian urban landscape were
easily identified by looking at a map of the city water
supply. Despite the official historical status of laissez
faire as the shibboleth of Victorian political values, state
intervention into the moral boundary conditions of society
were not only compatible with but required by early liberal
political rationality. The Health of Town Commission,
convened in 1837, heard evidence from various sources
including engineers, commissioners of sewers, parish
registrars and doctors.93

The general goal of this hearing

was the improvement of cleanliness and good moral habits. All
were quite sincere in their faith to affect positive moral
change. Cleanliness, after all, was (and remains) next to
Godliness. Governmental intervention, in the form of the
establishment of specific rational forms of infrastructure by
experts and professionals, provided a space for and at the
same time an inducement to the observance of the moral laws
of health at the individual and societal levels. Furthermore,
these sewers and drains affected their moral transformations
and reinforcing the sanitary integrity of the home without
direct intervention. The effectiveness of scientific and
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engineering advances within the framework of the Moral
Sciences lead many to believe society's ills could one day be
solved.

Statistical Autonomy:
The Derationalization of Determinism
Condorcet's enlightenment dream of rational moral
science was short lived however. Optimistic utilitarianism
gave way more and more to deterministic fatalism. In 1857,
the year Comte died, Henry Thomas Buckle became instantly
famous in Britain with the publication of History of
Civilization in England. Buckle quickly became famous
throughout Europe though to varying degrees of enthusiasm.94
Buckle founded his history on QuOtelet's statistical
determinism. Starting from the mass of studies on crime and
the ever popular topic of suicide he made the conceptual leap
and applied the same logic to the entire movement of history.
For Buckle the climate and other environmental factors rather
than free will determined the course of society and
civilization.
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that Buckle did but deduced an entirely nonstatistical necessary
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The identification of constants useful for industry also
contributed to the air of pessimistic fatalism gaining
popularity in Europe by mid-century. Inspired by Nicolas
Leonard Sadi Carnot's study of the efficiency of heat
engines, Rudolph Clausius began writing of "the new kind of
motion we call heat."95

Clausius discovered that the

performance of mechanical work by an engine powered by heat
was accompanied by a degradation, or lowering of the
temperature of the initially inputted heat. The conversion of
heat into energy requiring continual additions of heat was
not surprising in itself. Arriving at a constant to measure
this transformation was, hpwever, very suprising and would
change the way processes were understood forever. The new
constant was a whole new quality of the universe called
energy. This new thing called energy was never created or
destroyed. But the question was how to measure the changes
that occurred in the world given this new quantity.
In 1854 Clausius coined the term entropy from the Greek
word for "a transformation."96 But this constant of
transformation had the peculiar quality of being
irreversible. Heat, Clausius discovered, only goes
"downhill." The extraction of mechanical work greater in
energy than the heat energy put into it was, he discovered,
impossible. Put another way, performance of transformative
work degrades energy from "high quality" to "low quality."
95
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Irreversibility became a natural law. Very soon speculation
arose about the fate of the universe. If entropy is
irreversible and there is only a constant amount of energy in
the universe how much time might be left before all the
energy degrades into a uniform spread of low quality
unavailable for productive work? In short,
universal heat death became a new concern of the growing
followers of popular science and culture in Europe.
Herbert Spencer articulated a theory of social evolution
even before Darwin had published his Origin in 1859. After
the publication of Origin. however, evolutionism gained the
prestige of a scientifically based theory that came to be
called Social Darwinism. By the mid-nineteenth century the
optimistic and utopian utilitarianism of Condorcet and
Quetelet had given way to two popularly intermingled forms of
reductionist determinism: the pessimistic statistical
fatalism characteristic of Buckle's History of Civilization
on the one hand and the hopeful conception of Social
Darwinism on the other. It is in this atmosphere that the
transformative effects of the rationalization of probability
appear. Effects that are at once hopeful in the face of this
prevailing fatalism, but also terrifying in its dissolution
of the comfortable absolutes provided by an iron law of
determinism.
When probability became rational, through Quetelet's
adaptation of Gauss and Laplace, statistical reason coexisted
with taxonomy and classification methods that proceeded on
the basis of identification of essential and universal
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characteristics. Statistical methods - the new forms of
probabilistic rationality - were carried out upon data that
was collected and arranged according to the classic
rationality of essentialism and natural law. The two form of
reason operated uneasily side by side. However the admittance
of probability into the domain of reason, truth and rational
thought eventually transformed the definition of cause and
determinism by de-linking them from essentialism.
There had been previous explanations of the
inconsistency of statistical determinism. John Venn, said to
be the inventor of the frequency account of regularity in
statistical phenomena, noted that probability has no meaning
except in terms of a series "which combines individual
irregularity with aggregate regularity."97

The probability of

an event, in other words, was its frequency relative to the
series in which it occurred. This explanation of the
confusion of determinism in statistics has since become the
second basic theory of probability after Gauss's
distribution. Venn's frequency was not enough to refute the
committed determinist accounts of the world however.
The theory of heat as internal energy put forth by
Clausius arose within the dominant scientific consensus
around the substantive-caloric theory of physical change.
Considerable speculation arose over just what kind of motion
energy in the form of heat actually exhibited.98

Early work
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in kinetic theory was rejected by the Royal Society. Clausius

and others eventually won out, however, with the growing
realization that heat and mechanical work are related and
that energy is the proper way to conceive of this
relationship. This led to the emergence of thermodynamics.
Two key concepts emerge with the development of
thermodynamics and further refined with statistical
mechanics; that of system and that of equilibrium. These
concepts have continued to evdlve ever since. The idea of a
system was not new but the centrality of processes and their
relationships within thermodynamics gave a new meaning to the
term. Simply put, the notion of a system was vital for
understanding the kind of change the new concept of energy
gave rise to. Thermodynamics allowed the identification of
systems - arrangements of particles say- and their
parameters, which further enabled one to accurately
characterize the transformation from one form of matter to
another such as ice to liquid to gas through the application
of energy in the form of heat. The distinction was made
between systems that came into contact with one another or
with an indeterminate environment and those energetically
isolated from one another (adiabatic systems). The concept of
Conservation of energy and the First Law of Thermodynamics
arises by rationalizing the definition of heat flow. Heat
flow is understood to be simply the total energy flow into or
out of the system divided into those parts of the flow that
results in directly observable mechanical work as well as the
remaining (flow of) heat. That is energy is neither created
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or destroyed but merely changes form - that is causes systems

to change form. Change caused by heat, hence the name
thermodynamics.
This leads to the second key concept of thermodynamics;
equilibrium. Since energy can neither be created or destroyed
nor can it "go uphill," as Clausius showed. The macroscopic
state of a system can be simply described by three
parameters; energy, mass and volume (and magnetization for
magnets). Quantities such as temperature and pressure can
only be defined for systems in equilibrium. The question
becomes how to measure the transformation from one
equilibrial state, with, say, one specific pressure and
temperature, to another.
Objectivity, by the 1830's, had already required testing
the validity of beginning assumptions, measurements and
theories. In physics statistical mechanics emerged to fulfil
this requirement for the new field of thermodynamics.99
Maxwell's kinetic theory of gases published in 1860 was the
first important use of statistical reasoning in physics . 100
He may have been heavily influenced by the recently published
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theory of errors of Gauss and Quetelet. 101

Maxwell posited

that molecular collisions must be equally likely, that is
equally distributed, throughout an equilibrial system. The
trick was to discover precisely what kind of distribution
this was.i°2
For Maxwell the statistical method was a technique,
simply a tool. For Ludwig Boltzmann and Josiah Gibbs however
"statistical analysis and the theory of probability supplied
the rules for the logic of the whole world."103

Theirs was a

new kind of statistical law from that of Quetelet or even
Maxwell. The differentiation between the how and the why was
a direct result of the possibility of deriving practical laws
to explain phenomena for which determinate causes were
unknown. These laws were themselves statistical in nature
rather than causal. In the process, essentialist causation
became at worst a metaphysical concept and at best merely
uninteresting. The focus of rational explanation became how
things occur rather than why. This constituted the end of
determinism's link to statistics and represented the
"perfection of the mathematical tool that made it possible to
investigate the structure and evolution of any system
involving large numbers. "1Q4
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A radical shift occurred in the conception of complex
objects and processes in the course of the development of
statistical mechanics. The "concept of the electromagnetic
field was the decisive turning point."105

The mechanistic

notion that every whole was the sum of its parts began to
change. A field is not a concept of things but a concept of
relationships forming a system. A field is a subset of a
system and, generally speaking, systems are composed of
numerous fields. Large numbers were studied not merely
because it was impractical to study individual particles but
because it was understood that the individual particles
themselves could not reveal the behavior of the whole
system.106 Effective theorizing and exploitable discoveries,
in other words, could not be gained from analysis of
individual units.
The structures and behaviors of thermodynamic systems
that statistical mechanics analyzed, and from which it arose,
could not be perceived by the senses or grasped intuitively.
The inability to know the precise characteristics of the
constituent parts of a system was considered a characteristic
of the statistical techniques themselves not of the object
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under investigation.107
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It was assumed that each particle had

a definite and determinable state and conditions. Explicit
probability in the form of statistical techniques was
implicitly thought to be underwritten by some form of
necessity or efficient cause. It was simply the sheer
magnitude of all the particles, in even the simplest systems,
that limited their detailed study.
Eventually the development of thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics in the second half of the century
completely upset the traditional notions of rigid separation
between process and nature, the transitory and the real. Put
another way, the concept of the real as process became
natural and rational. The association of truth and reason
with the old taxonomic epistemology of essentialism and
determinism began to erode. Theory formed on the basis of
essential qualities and universal attributes became
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increasingly understood as subjective beliefs rather than
objective knowledge.109
Statistical mechanics introduced into physics the idea that
the aim of a physical theory could be not to provide an
account of what must happen, but of what might happen.
Phenomena were now to be accounted for in probabilistic
terms, events being accounted for as 'overwhelmingly
probable' or even 'as predictable to occur with some
probability' and macroscopic phenomena as being reflections
of what happens 'most probably,' or sometimes 'on average,'
at the microscopic level.*I0

By 1870 the congenial link between statistics and
determinism

had been severed. Determinism became

probabilistic in terms we would recognize t o d a y . m

The

increasing sophistication of statistics since the
rationalization of probability brought about a new form of
taxonomy based not on essential characteristics but a
taxonomy of calculation itself.
109
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Any event, object or property that could be enumerated
and classified in a discontinuous system could be analyzed
using statistical methods. But the derationalization of
essentialist determinism had the effect of bringing
statistical methods to bear on the process of classification
itself. With the end of determinism, statistics became the
means of identifying discontinuous units previously
accomplished through identification of essential properties
in terms of natural law. The ability to produce discrete
countable units ceased to be the ability to distinguish
essential or universal characteristics of a phenomena or
object and became the ability to apply statistical methods.
To affect the required production or enumeration of
discontinuous units for the application of statistical
methods the traditional techniques of observation,
classification and calculation were carried out. However,
classification was accomplished through the analysis of
relationship rather than identities, processes rather than
traits. These relationships, furthermore, were themselves
statistical in nature, the function of probabilistic
calculations. The transformations brought about by
statistical mechanics constitute what Kuhn called a "change
in paradigm" of a kind "somewhat smaller, because more
exclusively professional" than the shifts brought about by
Copernicus, Newton or later Einstein. 112
What was being measured and calculated at the end of the
nineteenth century was no longer things and their qualities
112
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but relationships between probabilities and correlations.
Things not understood as representative of themselves but
things in terms of certainty of observation and measurement.
By 1889 British physicist Sir William Thomson (Lord) Kelvin
could say that "when you can measure what you are speaking
about, you know something about it; when you cannot measure
it...your knowledge is of meager and unsatisfactory kind".113
According to Thomas Kuhn such sentiments were fairly new at
the time. The physical sciences gave a central place to
measurement only after the experimentation within "Baconian
science" had become mathematicized in the nineteenth
century.114
The mathematization furthered by thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics directly transformed the focus of both
physics and biology and eventually all other rational
knowledges. The emphasis on "force" in classic Newtonian
mechanics gave way to "energy." Until the second half of the
nineteenth century, phenomena were analyzed in terms of
space, time, mass and force. "Force was introduced as the
cause of motion, preexisting and independent of it."115

In

biology the external cause acting on life was vitalism. At
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the start of the nineteenth century, "an organism expended
its vital force in order to perform its work of synthesis and
morphogenesis; at the end of the nineteenth century, it
consumed energy."116

Vital Correlations

and Functionalism

Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics did not
represent the simple triumph of mechanism and measurement.
The effects of these emerging concepts of physics upon those
within the sgcial and biological sciences is complex. The
rationalization of probability freed these disciplines from
the fatalism of Buckle but it created new problems for the
conceptualization of society and its pathologies. Vitalism, a
theoretical/spiritual mode of thought gained prominence in
this atmosphere of receding determinism and emerging
energetic relational systems. A central aspect of vitalism,
or holism as it was called, was the necessary interrelation
of all the parts of an organism which, taken together, formed
a whole much more intricate than a simple sum of parts. The
preeminent complex whole was a living organism or population
of organisms. It is the beginning of what today are called
complex systems though the term system does not get used in
this context until the next century.
In 1866 with the publication of Generalle Morpholoqie
der Orqanismen Ernst Haeckel, coined the term ecology also

116
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from the Greek OikOs.117

A German zoologist and Monist

philosopher, founder of the Monist League, Haeckel used the
term ecology to refer to "the web that linked organisms and
their surrounding environment."i*8

The development of the

concept of equilibrial systems and energy in physics gave
credibility to the vitalist or, strictly speaking Monist,
focus on wholes and dynamic relationships. Holism and fields
or systems emerged together as rational scientific concepts.
But the introduction of systems of relations was made
rational in the form of thermodynamics and its central
principle of entropy directly contradicted the central
problem in biology and social science; that of evolution the growth of complex organisms from simple ones in the
closed system of the world. It provided a measurement of
systems and thus made them objective but at the same time it
made the principle feature of the systems biology and the
social sciences had to explain fundamentally paradoxical.
Negative entropy was not a rational option in physics yet it
was essentially what the vitalist insisted upon. Negative
entropy could be theorized only in vitalist terms verging on
the mystical.
However, the vitalist life forces were not a concept
affording government a means of rational management. Point
mechanics may have been on the way out but government
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required specifics. In the 1860's acquired traits were
thought to be inheritable. Darwin had postulated the theory
of "pangenesis" to explain the phenomenon of heredity
suggesting that characteristics were passed on by "gamules"
circulating in the blood.us Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton,
was an anthropometrist and pioneer of eugenics. He sought to
explain the phenomena of human heredity using his cousins
theory of gamules. Instead of finding gamules however Galton
discovered statistical correlation. At the same moment that
physics was discovering the field Galton in biology was
discovering correlation. The petty little causes of Laplace,
Galton found, could not account for the dispersion about the
mean of human traits plotted on a normal curve.
In a paper read to the Royal Society in 1888 titled "Co
relations and their measurement, chiefly from anthropometric
data" Galton illustrated that if the same statistical scale
was used on the measurements of two symmetrical lines of
regression the two lines formed by these regressions had the
same slope.120 Galton separated statistics forever from
deterministic epistemology. Karl Pearson, a physicist,
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historian and in later life a statistician, said that "it was

Galton who first freed me from the prejudice that sound
mathematics could only be applied to natural phenomena under
the category of causation."121 Correlation, like a field, is
a probabilistic concept. They are concepts of relationships
rather than identities. Causal determinism was becoming less
rational in more and more disciplines.
Galton was motivated by the widely held hope that the
underlying deterministic causes of the Queteletian
statistically determined traits could be found. Galton was a
humanist and utilitarian. Finding these, he hoped, would lead
to techniques for increasing or decreasing the occurrence of
these traits. Following Quetelet's and Farr's statistical
determinism Galton sought the keys to human nature by
measuring the physical characteristics of individuals such as
foot size and arm length relative to overall height, etc. The
identification and differentiation of human physical
characteristics, Galton hoped, would reveal the precise
operation of the natural laws governing the individual with a
given set of physical characteristics. In this way Galton
thought the statistically mapped central tendency of the
phenomenon in question as well as exceptions could be
explained.
Galton's approach was unique however. The Gaussian
normal curve, since Quetelet, was understood as the product
of many Laplacian "petty little causes." It was thought,
outside the obscure world of avant garde physics, that the
121
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characteristics of things followed some sort of natural law
and that this law acted upon the essence of things. Essence
and law necessarily operated together providing direction and
order to the processes of the universe. Galton, however,
observed that "the reason for their doing so is totally
unexplained. "122
For Galton it was the reason for this law-like
regularity (revealed by statistical methods) that had to be
explained, only then could statistical law serve as
explanations for phenomena. Galton was not satisfied to
assume statistical laws caused statistical regularity. Galton
focused on exceptional individuals rather than the mean, the
central cluster of traits at the apex of the normal curve. He
focused on geniuses and criminals, the exceptions to the
norm, the tails of the Gaussian distribution curve produced
from social statistics.
Galton was the first person to find serious problems
with the determinist theory of petty little causes to explain
statistical dispersion.123 Galton's efforts to account for
exceptions to central tendencies in heredity and his focus on
the dispersion lead to his formulating correlation
coefficients and the theory of regression. Galton's theory of
regression fundamentally transformed the popular conception
of natural law.324
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Galton found that reversion towards the mean in the
distribution of a large sample of traits was a mathematical
consequence of the Gaussian curve itself and not the thing
being measured. That is he explained the dispersion of traits
without resort to petty little causes. In his example read to
the Royal Society in 1888 he stated that if the measurement
of forearms and head lengths "were expressed in units of
their probable errors, then both regression lines had the
same slope (r). Hence this number could be taken
unambiguously as an expression of the "closeness of co
relation. "125

This along with the developments in

thermodynamics and statistical mechanics constituted the end
of essentialist causal teleology defined in terms of natural
law. After Galton, determinism and necessity no longer
referred to explicit causal relations but to correlations, to
statistically probable relationships. Correlations became as
real as causes had

b e e n . *26

The real-ization of correlation did not simply bring
about an unproblematic Acceptance of probability. Even in the
physical sciences differences of opinion concerning just what
probability entailed persisted. And they continue to persist
to this day. Onq interpretation is that probability applies
only to collections of unites, aggregates or ensembles
forming systems. In this view probability does not pertain to
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the units making up the system themselves.127

The other

interpretation, initially less widely accepted but
increasingly difficult to ignore was that probability was not
simply a feature that came into being when ensembles of units
were aggregated together but that probability was a real
feature of every state of systems and their components. That
probability (non-essentialism) was, so to speak, an essential
aspect of reality.
Charles Sanders Peirce, father of modern pragmatism, was
perhaps the most outspoken proponent of this view. Peirce
denied determinism in all its forms and believed the world to
be ruled completely by chance. In an intellectual environment
presided over by the attempt to discover Babbage's constants
of nature, Peirce insisted there were none. For Peirce there
were no constants over and above the ones agreed upon for the
sake of consistancy. It was the statistical stability of the
highly probable that made inductive learning and rationality
possible. For Peirce the universe was irreducibly stochastic
- one state of affairs led to the next most probable state of
affairs.
Peirce developed these ideas in the course of his work
for the U.S. Government in the Coast Survey. His attention
was focused upon measurement and measuring devices for the
nearly twenty years he worked in the Coast Survey. Peirce
respected the work of his predecessors in the development of
measurement noting that the "law of distribution of errors
127
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which Quetelet, Galton, and others, have applied with so much

success to the study of biological and social matters" but he
was interested in the relationship between statistics and
Observation.128

For Peirce the distribution of errors was

about judgment and the operation of the senses rather than
the object of the senses as was the concern of biology,
sociology and physics.
Probability as a matter of judgment did not mean that
beyond judgment there lay a realm of true facts, universal
and essential objects whose constants, when found, would
reveal their truth to the enlightened observer, as it had
been supposed by the moral scientists in the early part of
the century. For Peirce, since the universe itself was
fundamentally chancy, judgments were also explainable in
statistical terms. The focus on judgment and the senses lead
to a fundamental innovation in experimental method:
randomization. Randomization has since become a standard
practice in experimental science.
Randomization was introduced into the experiment to gain
a new level of control, not through the elimination of chance
events but by including them. In 1884 Peirce and the
Psychology student Joseph Jastrow conducted the first
experiment in which an artificial randomizer was used to
decide the sequence of trials and also used in the analysis
of the data. This experiment was conducted in order to
determine if the normal distribution applied to judgments
made about sense perceptions so small that they may be
considered below the threshold of conscious perception. It
128
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was commonly held in psychophysics that the curve did not
apply to the realm beyond consciousness.129

Peirce believed

that it did, that the observer will make subliminal
distinctions whose accuracy

will decrease according to the

curve of error.
One can see the importance of randomization in the
construction of such an experiment. But the subject of the
experiment was also taken very seriously. Telepathy was a
popular subject and the late nineteenth century. The tern had
been coined in 1880 and in 1882 The society for Psychical
research had been founded with the goal of replacing mediums
and seances with scientific study.130

In 1884 the American

Society for Psychical research was established in Boston with
the same goal. It was believed that below the minimum
threshold of conscious sensation there occurred the phenomena
of thought transference between people rather than a mystical
realm where the dead spoke to the living.
The existence of a threshold below which the curve of
errors did not operate was necessary for the theory of
thought transference. Peirce insisted that he had proven
there to be no minimum threshold. For Peirce this "gives
reason for believing that we gather what is passing in one
another's minds in large measure from the sensations so faint
that we are not fully aware of them, and can give no account
of how we reach our conclusions from such matters."131
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was in no way a spiritually oriented person. His linking of
probability with subliminal sensations was grounds for his
rejection of various strains of religion he considered
deterministic. He refuted the Vatican Council's 1870
sanctioning of the doctrine of papal infallibility and in a
1893 paper titled "Reply to the Necessitarians" Peirce noted
that only Dr. Paul Carus, editor of the Monist, a journal of
general science published in Chicago linked to the work of
haeckel, had agreed to respond to his challenge.
For Carus, the validity of ethics and morals were their
universality, based on the truth of the unity of the
creation, and their objectivity, based on the truth of
natural laws.132

The spiritual strain of holism derived in

part from the replacement of belief in God and the rule of
Gods law to belief in the oneness of nature and the rule of
natural laws. Carus, and Monists in general, could not
imagine a world without determinism and the necessity of
natural laws. Universalism and determinism were linked at the
heart of Europeanholistic faith.
In Peirce's pragmatics the indeterminateness of reality
meant that activity, whether organic or inorganic, human or
non-human was not the result of the will of a unified wbrld
enforced by natural law but a probabilistic occurrence.
Peirce was sometimes unclear but generally action could be
divided between the dynamic processes between two subjects,
"or at any rate is the result of such actions between pairs"
and the processes occurring as a result of three subjects; a
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sign, its object and its interpretant, a process he called
semiosis.133
Peirce's theories and concepts remained obscure. His
experimental methods were rejected by mainstream psychiatry.
His theory of signs found little initial application. But if
the particulars of his work had to wait until after his death
to receive widespread attention, his position on determinism
was not completely out of the ordinary. The end of the
nineteenth century was a period of transformation in many
disciplines in the way objects of rational analysis were
defined. It is a period in which a new form of classification
and identification emerges. Through statistical mechanics,
the discovery of correlation and general statistical methods,
activities initially embarked upon the quest to identify the
determining natural laws, produced a transformation in reason
itself. Probability had become a central rational concept in
the physical, natural and human sciences. The identification
and classification that preceded any rational analysis was no
longer conducted in terms of categorizing the essential
properties of things linked to their universal natural laws.
In all enterprises producing rational knowledge identity
became a product not of what something was but of what
something does in relation to other things. Rational
knowledge began to take the form of functionalism.
By the end of the nineteenth century functional analysis
of one form or another had replaced evolutionism and natural
law, in the social as well as physical sciences. Franz Boas,
133
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"the father of modern anthropology," studied physics and
geography. He read Galton and integrated it into his work,
making biometrics a standard procedure of anthropological
field work. For Boas and those who followed him,,evolutionist
causal natural law was idealistic and romantic at best and
unscientific, not to mention racist, at worst. In refuting
evolutionist concepts of progress and the separation of the
races Boas pointed out that what appeared to civilized people
as the irrational behavior of primitive cultures was merely
the result of a difference in classificatory schema* Simpler
cultures, according to Boas, merely classified concepts
differently. 134
Boas insisted on a "thoroughgoing description of all
cultural data a§ the sole warrantable scientific attitude."135
Every detail was to be carefully recorded and tabulated. How
this data fit together to form the whole of the social system
in question would guide the science of anthropology. It was
not a matter of identifying which aspects were right or
wrong, normal or pathological by European culture's
standards, but how they fit together. Assumptions of progress
lain on top of the facts would only reveal a distorted
picture of the truth good, perhaps, for supporting dogma but
not science* To judge social processes and phenomena on the
basis of an idealistic concept of higher and lower races and
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normal and pathological progress precluded attention to the
complex relationships actualy making up culture. Cultures
became "not mere arrangements of separate elements but
integrated wholes."I35

After Boas' best known book "The Mind

of Man" (1911) taxonomy in anthropology and ethnology was
henceforth determined through a functional analysis which
attempted to focus on the whole field of culture and social
relations. Comparability was first determined by context and
only then were phenomena to be compared. Henceforth the truth
of a society was ascertianed through some form of functional
analysis that paid attention to interrelationship and
context. The new object displayed by these new methodes were
accompanied by a new mode of governing appropriate to this
new truth. Functional analysis replaced the determinism
charecteristic of Social Darwinism as the dominant
Governmental rationality. This was not a simple replacement,
however, for the epistemology of determinism was at the heart
of nineteenth century conflict between vitalist and
mechanistic conceptions of life and the body-politic. The
emergence of context and relationship as objective aspects of
the real requires a brief discussion of the so called
"vitalist-mechanist" debate.
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Vitalism, Mechanism
and the Mew Arts of Government
Social Darwinism was a vague enough formulation to be
interpreted in many different ways. While it proved to be an
antidote for the fatalism of Buckle it remained firmly
determinist. The determinism of Social Darwinism, however,
was not simply the determinism of Quetelet. It was a
determinism linked to the vitalism and holism of Haeckel and
T. H. Huxley, the outspoken natural scientist who defended
Darwin and his theories from attacks by the Catholic Church.
It was a form of vitalism that sprang from the inability of
purely physical laws, especially the second law of
thermodynamics, to mesh with observed biological and social
reality. The vitalist/mechanist debate by the end of the
nineteenth century had to do with the concept of goaldirected progress or some form of life-energy or vital force
which countered entropy and gave direction to life. Henri
Bergson, for example, thought that materialist explanations
of evolution utterly failed. The fact that things evolved in
the direction of greater complexity, counter to the second
law of thermodynamics was proof of a mysterious force of
life, an elan vital as he called it. Quantifiable rationality
was not enough. The natural sciences, according to Bergson,
needed to be supplemented with metaphysics.137
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Statistical methods played a role in both vitalist and
mechanist concepts. Though no physical scientist doubted the
efficacy of statistics not all vitalists or social Darwinists
were convinced of their value. In general the later vitalists
and Social Darwinists can be divided into two political camps
according to editorial page guidelines; the "right" and the
"left."i38

Social evolutionism was deployed by the "right" by

men such as John Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, who stated
that the richest members of society achieved their wealth
because they were the fittest and best adapted members of
society. This was natural and this was morally correct.
Welfare measures that supported "dependency" and "misfits,"
so it went, would weaken the health of human kind.
Philanthropic charity organizations accepted Social Darwinism
as scientific fact.338
On the "left" social reformers found in evolutionism
scientific evidence for the possibility and in some cases
inevitability of social change and progress. Karl Marx (18181883) wanted to dedicate the first volume of Das Kapital
(1867) to Darwin. Reformers saw evolutionism as a
demonstration that although existing social, economic and
political institutions and arrangements may be natural or at
least determined by, in some cases, identifiable causes, this
did not preclude their eventual transformation into something
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better. Better, in Comte's terms of ideal and normal, as that

which society progresses towards.
Pauperism was thought contagious owing to the theory of
inheritance of acquired traits. Philanthropic responses to
poverty took the form of scientific charity. Scientific
charity instituted the careful development of a welfare
delivery system that would protect the social worker while at
the same time preventing the inducement and spread of a
contagious pauperism. A report in 1874 at the first
Copference of Charities and Corrections in New York advised
against the then common practice of "out-of-doors"

relief in

the form of aid taken to the homes of those wholly

unable to

work. These could not

be regulated sufficiently to ensure

moral health. Relief,

it was advised, was to be connected to

work and carefully monitored as in the case of "indoors"
relief which was aid given to those in exchange for various
labors.
Under scientific charity trained "friendly visitors"
would distribute "out-of-doors" relief and closely monitor
the situation of poor families. In both situations close
monitoring was enhanced for the good of the visitors and
paupers alike.i*o

In 1884 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

was created. Its authority was to "collect information upon
the subject of labor, its relations to capital, the hours of
labor, and the earnings of laboring men and women, and the
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means of promoting their material security, individual and
moral prosperity."141
%

In 1895 George Udny Yule applied Galton's correlation
hypothesis to data on pauperism and declared "the rise in the
mean percentage of pauperism, as the proportion of out-relief
is increased, is as marked as could be desired. "142

Many had

at first thought that Galton's methods applied only to the
field of anthropometry. It was Yule who expanded and
illustrated the applicability of Galton's discovery of
correlation for all the sciences and, at the same time and by
means of which, he developed the method of correlation
coefficient. 143 The regression line hence forth stood as a
surrogate for what is still called a causal relation.
By the turn of the century Social Darwinism, both in the
progressive and conservative variety, gave way to the
Progressive era. At the height of scientific-philanthropic
forms of poverty managing, the family was to be protected
from the evils of indigent individuals. By the first decades
of the twentieth century, however, the family was to be
protected from the hostilities of the industrial environment.
Scientific charity based on the science of Spencerian
evolution gave way to science of a more rigorous statistical
kind. Society began to be understood as a complex system of
functional relationships.
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The end of essentialist determinism played it self out

in the private sector with the development of Taylorism.
Named after Fredrick W. Taylor, Taylorism, or scientific
management as he called it was a conscious effort to affect
the human element of the production process. It was literally
the application of engineering techniques and principles to
human activity in the factory. Scientific management was
basically the attempt to control the human element of
production at the individual and small group level. It
initially proceeded with a simple conception of "economic
man" and sought to manipulate behavior through "incentivepay" or the "shop disciplinarian" to produce the desired
"voluntary" behavior.144
In the public domain social work took a new form. The
social policy that emerged from the epistemological
principles of systems or fields and functional
interrelationship within society played itself out in an
immense expansion of federal political authority. Theodore
Roosevelt in 1901 called on every citizen to help with
"reform through social work."145

Individuals were responsible

for their state of affairs and these could be improved with
hard work. In 1906 the Food and Drug Act was passed. Income
security and workmans compensation was enacted in many states
by 1911. In 1913 the 16th Amendment to the Constitution was
ratified establishing a federal income tax. This same year
144
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the Federal Reserve System was established, drastically
reforming the banking industry. 1914 saw the enactment of the
Clayton Anti-Trust Act leading to the Federal Trade
Commission.
If this may be called a revival of pastoralism it must
be characterized as a new form, an urbane form, in which the
rural or village economy is superseded by the economy of the
factory or industrial space in general. Industrialization and
the formation of the factory as the preeminent form of
production was accompanied by and, at the same time
reproduced, an exceedingly rapid process of technological
change. By the beginning of the twentieth century industrial
machinery had become sophisticated and efficient enough that
"the domestic economy of the factory replaced [this
machinery] as the limiting factor of production."146
Industrial machinery, it was discovered, could only be used
at peak efficiency if the human factors of production were
organized properly.
By the second decade of the twentieth century the
reactions against the social engineering and management
practices of Taylorism

grew intense. Taylor's brand of

scientific management was opposed not only by workers but
eventually by engineers and managers as well. The initial
incarnation of Taylorism was supposed to represent the
application of scientific methods to the organization of the
increasingly complex sprawling industrial empires. Scientific
management utilized incentive-pay arrangements to motivate
workers to cooperate and behave more efficiently. The
146
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development of time-motion studies gave Taylorism its claim

to scientific status but this technique was found to be
employed as often as not by engineers who knew little about
the activities and processes they were accountable for. They
simply guessed at the optimum rates used as base lines for
their measurements.147
In 1916 Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt
banned Taylor's methods in Navy yards and all other federally
funded operations after five years of hearings into the
causds of the strike at Waterton Arsenal.148

The problems

with Taylorism, from the engineering, management and
government inspectors perspectives, was not the concept of
human engineering itself but its actual lack of science.
Taylor's brand of authoritarian scientific management simply
introduced the arbitrary authority of owners and managers in
a new and subtler form. The cure for the problems of industry
and production understood in terms of labor and social
arrangements was the application of real science and the
realization that management and ownership were part of the
domestic economy that had to be reformed. "The new human
focus of engineering required that the discipline of
engineering itself had to expand, to include the new methods
of the social sciences."149
Magnus Alaxander an electrical engineer for
Westinghouse, GE and a researcher for the National Bureau of
147
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Economic Research as well as co-founder of the National
Industrial Conference Board, the largest cooperative
enterprise of American employers ever undertaken, represented
the post-Taylorism form of scientific management or "liberal
industrial management" as it was called.150

Before World War

I Alaxander had conducted statistical research on income
distribution. In 1916 he began extensive research on
industrial accidents and authored the first comprehensive
report on the cost of labor turnover to American industry.
Joining Alexander in establishing the NBER was Malcolm Rorty,
an engineer with interest and expertise in statistics and
economics. In the 1920's before he became president,
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who was himself a
mining engineer before entering politics, commissioned
studies on "recent economic changes" and "recent social
trends" from the NBER.151
The reformulation of scientific management by the
corporate liberal reformers was consciously motivated by the
desire to affect stability, understood as the the sin qua non
of future profits, of the business environment.152

But this

revisionism within scientific management brought with it many
changes and not only for labor. It constituted nothing less
then action upon a new object of industrial governance. The
transfer of the craftsman's skill to the machine was thus
soon accompanied by the transfer of authority from the owner
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and manager to the industrial processes themselves,
industrial processes understood as an economy - a functional
interaction of human and machine within a production system
and the factory environment.
An array of governing institutions were erected that
socialized the individual both as a private citizen and agent
of economic activity in the name of collective security and
wellbeing. This was accomplished through the deployment of
political authority somewhere between liberalism and state
pastoralism or nascent socialism. It was an intervention or
reorganization of the space of social negotiation, the locus
where production and exchange was understood to actually
occur. This rearrangement maintained the classic liberal
separation of the civil, economic and political realms. The
privacy and sanctity of the individual enterprise was
weakened, but formal autonomy of the market as a whole was
preserved. This was justified and made acceptable by ensuring
the security of the economic domain as a whole.
The expansion of the state's role in social work
dramatically increased the size, number and complexity of
social research institutions and government agencies. As a
consequence systematic social surveys and investigations were
refined and deployed extensively. The Pittsburgh Survey of
1907-8 was the "first major attempt to survey in depth the
entire life of a single community."153 As welfare became
increasingly professionalized and bureaucratized scientific
philanthropy was transformed into scientific social work. The
attendants at alms houses and the friendly visitors of the
153
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early aid societies and charities were replaced by paid
agents of the state. The proper techniques and methods of the
professional social worker were first codified in Mary
Richmond's "Social Diagnosis" published in 1917.154
A new state pastoralism was emerging. Social work and
reformed scientific management, on the one hand, and social
security, on the other, constituted two axis of a new
rationality of government. Social security arose from and at
the same time reinforced the connections and relationships
between public or civic activities and the fate of
individuals in their private economic affairs and personal
conduct. Social work and scientific management operated
through investigation by experts who, increasingly with the
aid of statistical techniques, distilled, identified and
categorized the range of social norms in individual and
collective conduct and administered the appropriate treatment
or regime of reform.
The different forms of governmental intervention into
society from the last decades of the eighteenth and the first
decades of the twentieth centuries reflect a shift in the
very constitution of reason and rational knowledge. This
change in the constitution of rational nowledge and how it
was obtained was the result of a transformation in the
mutualy constitutive relationship between the mdthodes of
knowing the object of. government and the actual object
revealed by these new methods. Government, in other words,
precipitates a transformation in the object of government by
its very effort to know this object.
154
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Social policy in the United States by the end of the
last century, for example, was directed at a society no
longer percieved in strictly mechanistic and unalterable
terms. Change and transformation became real aspects of
social reality influenced by context and relationship. This
is a very different society from the one encountered by the
first Select Committee investigating rates of sickness and
the efficacy of "friendly societies" in England. This new
society was one just beginning to be constituted by internal
forces apprehendable through statistics. Soon the city
planning of Farr, with his sewers and vents, marked the
inception of modern attempts to attend to the needs of
society and its conditions of existence. That is, to foster
about the right order of society.
Statistics at this point had been reconceptualized first
as a real natural phenomina then into a full fledged natural
law with determinist capabilities. The development of
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics by the second half
of the century dispensed with determinism in the physical
sciences. A little later, in the period leading up to the
invention of correlation, the natural and social sciences
also came to reject determinism. A reformed mechanistic
outlook of field and function, one which adopted
interrelationship and probability, replaced vitalism and whig
history.
By the end of the nineteenth century society began to
require attention on new terms. The object of government and
its conditions of existence had become one of broad social
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relations in which poverty and efficient production became
some how linked or correlated. The previous emphasis on
adjusting the moral character of the individual gave way to
an emphasis on the individual as part of a set of social
relations. The perceived failures of early nineteenth century
governing practices were articulated from within this new
epistemological formation of rational knowledge. Governing
had to adjust to this new conception of its object.
Government, according to this new rationality, had not
provided nor fostered the wellbeing and prosperity of society
that was expected of it. Instead it had allowed, and perhaps
inadvertently promoted, social and economic disruption such
as the increasing disturbances among workers and rising rates
of suicide, employment concerns and oppressive working
conditibns. Philanthropic responses to such social distress
in the form of altering the statistically determined
circumstances under which certain behavior and morality were
now seen as a failure. The reformed social work of Mary
Richmond and the scientific managment of Taylor and later the
National Bureau of Economic Research represent the birth of
modern attempts to deal with a society composed of
interacting yet also interdependent social agents.
This was the beginning of a vast effort at inducing
cooperation and efficiency through socialization. This effort
was still one centered on the norm and the disciplinary mode
of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and
examination. But with the normal no longer tied to an
essential reality and stripped of determining influence, the

disciplinary mode began to change. In the early twentieth
century there was not yet a replacement for the disciplinary
mode of government. But its emergence was not far off.

Chapter 4:
Decline of the norm and the Rise of Control
The identification of the normal and pathological were
the precondition but also the effect of the new professions
of social work and scientific management. Just as it had been
for the moral scientist and sewer engineers seventy years
previously. But the normal and the pathological identified in
the twentieth century began to conform to a new ratipnality
of functional analysis of roles and relations within a
system. The normal as a hard and fast point assumed to lie at
the top of Gauss' curve gave way to the normal as a field, a
dispersed range of possibilities in a dynamic interrelated
process. The social worker and the manager-engineer relied on
ihstrumental rational knowledge of functional interactions to
devise their interventions. The norm eventualy gave way to a
new principle appropriate to functioning systems - that of
structural

equilibrium.

Functional explanations in the life and human sciences
represented an overturning of essentialist accounts that
sustained the bogeymen of evolutionism and vitalism. With
Boas, Taylor, Yule and Richmond the grounds were laid for the
investigation of intricate whole organisms in the newly
formed rational terms of interrelated functional systems. The
new objects of the life and social sciences were
organizations of complex whole organisms. The difference
between the systems of the physical sciences and those of the
life and social sciences resided mainly in the means of their
coordination and transformation.
Ill
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However, the objects of the life and social sciences
seemed to intrinsically defy the second law of thermodynamics
- energy can only "go downhill," entropy results in a
decrease of constructive work in an energetically isolated
system. Rational instrumental explanations were necessarily
mechanistic. They took the form of a precise description of
the mechanisms controlling the organization and
transformation of living matter. Yet such an explanation for
large scale biological and social phenomena at some point had
to

rely upon the the evolutionist claims of Social Darwinism

or the metaphysical claims of the vitalists to explain the
counter entropic phenomena of life. This was soon to change
and the rational explanations that emerged solidified and
extended the rationality and affectiveness of the ontology of
functional systems.
As scientists began to understand these unique
characteristics of life process, they began to reformulate or
expand a concept that had remained more or less implicit in
physics and statistical mechanics; the concept of structure.
The analysis of nutrition requirements in organisms for
example, based on the new biochemical knowledge of compounds
and metabolism, lead to the discovery that some organisms
could synthesize the compounds necessary for metabolism and
growth while others could not. This was the discovery of
vitamins, or rather, the discovery of the presence or absence
of substances which allowed for certain metabolic processes,
substances later called vitamins. Mammals, biologists
discovered, do not produce these necessary substances on
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their own. Such discoveries solidified the belief that the
functioning of living organisms was unique but also that its
composition and structure was fundamental to this
uniqueness.

155

The secrets of life's processes had to be

sought in its structure as well as its functioning.
Jacques Loeb a German born physiologist who immigrated
to the United states to occupy academic posts at the
University of Chicago from 1892 to 1902 and later the
University California from 1902 to 1910 gained an
international reputation for his experimental skills and
originality. But he was best known for his insistence on
mechanistic explanations for living

p h en o m en a.

155

in his The

Dynamics of Living Matter (1906) Loeb describes the role of
biological chemistry as "distinguishing the functions which
depend on chemical constitution from those that also require
a particular physical structure of the living substance."157
Structures were no longer understood as completely
stable material entities but entities whose stability was
directly linked with its functioning. An important element in
any system became its structural equilibrium. The particular
phase or state of an organic structure at any given point in
time was thus governed by a calculus of probability relative
to its future equilibrial state. Organic structure in
biochemistry were born as statements of probability of the
155
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formation, arrangement and reproduction of specific organic

structures necessary for life sustaining functions.
Biological chemistry and genetics fundamentally changed the
understanding of the very nature of living bodies. Organisms
could now be conceived
in a way that did not simply array structures and functions
around a mysterious life giving force.
This new emphasis on quantitative rigor and the focus on
composition and structure of living systems had a radical
effect upon the life sciences, and eventually the social
sciences. Complex organisms ceased to be understood as layers
of organs and functional processes surrounding a mysterious
source of life and form. The uniqueness of life no longer
resided in the functioning of organisms in defiance of the
second law of thermodynamics. The secrets of life came to
reside in the specific material arrangements of organisms and
unique functions and processes arising from them.
Biological phenomena at the turn of the century were
understood by scientists to emerge from the storing,
releasing and exchanging of energy through the formation,
synthesis and transfer of "energy rich bonds" of specific
phosphorous

c o m p o u n d s .158

Biologists found that a single

compound, adenosine triphosphate, was common to all living
things and constituted the energy storage process in all
organisms. In both bacteria and mammals, whether in
respiration or fermentation, the breakdown of sugars lead to
the same energy rich phosphorous compound. However, the
158
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rigorous clinical methods used to identify these processes
strengthened the conceptualization of the unity of function
or holismin the living world. 159
Most other branches of biology and the human sciences
focused on living organisms at a much larger scale. Earlier
concepts in the human sciences, formulated by such theorists
as Hobbes or Spencer, treated the organism as a large version
of a single body transferring analogically the functions of
individual organs to parts of the collective mass of society.
Where biological chemistry and genetics sought answers in the
minute mechanisms of tissues and cells other branches of
biology reformulated their objects in terms of the importance
of structure on a much larger scale.
Fredric Clements, an American botanist and researcher at
the Carnegie Institution had read the work of Herbert
Spencer, whose use of the organism metaphor to describe human
society may have prompted Clements to respond by using the
community concept in biology. 16° Clements was not alone in
this tendency. Anton Kernor Von Marilaun, a professor of
botany at the University of Vienna also used the community
concept analogicaly from the social realm in the

1 8 9 0 's. i^i

Another naturalist influenced by Spencer was Stephen Alfred
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Fotbes, founder of the Illinois State Laboratory of Natural
History. In 1887 he described a lake as:
an old and relatively primitive system, isolated
from its surroundings. Within it matter circulates,
and controls operate to produce an equilibrium
comparable with that in a similar area of land. In
this microcosm nothing can be fully understood
until its relationship to the whole is clearly
seen... The lake appears as an organic system, a
balance between building up and breaking down in
which the struggle for existence and natural
Selection have produced an equilibrium, a
'community of interest,' between predator and
prey . 162
For Clements the community, with its complex of
relations, was the organism. Every region had a
characteristic pattern of vegetation that he called a climax.
Climax communities of plants were the result of selection by
the specific climate and other factors within a region. Every
region was made up of a variety of communities each with a
different trajectory of development or ecological succession
as he called it. In some communities in the region succession
was slow and in others it was fast. Clements applied the
organisms analogy to these climax communities noting that
they exhibited a kind of social structure. In part this
distinguished organic communities from the individual
organism commonly focused on in

biology.

1^3

These

communities, Clements postulated, went through a cycle of
birth, growth and death each characterized by a stage of
development culminating in what he called climax states. The
focus for Clements' studies of biological communities and
162
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their various stages of development was the interactions
between the biological elements, or biotic components, and
the processes controlling community development.164
British botanist Alfred George Tansley was a colleague
and friend of Clements. It was Tansley who expanded Forbes'
and Clements' concept of organism giving them a larger
audience. The spread of these concepts is linked to Tansley's
efforts to bring greater scientific rigor and quantitative
methods to botany in particular and biology in general.
Tansley was made a fellow of the Royal Society in 1915 and
appointed Sherardian Chair of Botany at Oxford in 1927 where
he remained until his retirement in 1937. Despite this
distinguished career Tansley's academic life was marked by an
intense struggle to open up botany to the concepts of ecology
and to have ecology accepted as part of the natural
•sciences.165

Tansley was influenced by many currents of

thought. In 1920 he published a textbook titled The New
Psychology and its Relations to Life and in 1922 moved to
Vienna to study with Freud disgusted with academics.166

In

Tansley's presentation of Clements' concepts of succession,
development, quasi-organism, complex organism and climax he
emphasized the physical character of these processes and
their relationship within a system.
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Though Clements was characteristic of the rationalist
side of ecological thought and followed Haeckel's opposition
to spiritual interpretations of holism, his conceptual and
theoretical leanings did not display the practical rigor that
Tansley sought in trying to make ecology a respectable
science. Clements grew out of the observational tradition of
botany in which the researcher rode along in the country side
compiling lists of the observed plant and animal species
producing Linnaean taxonomies.167

Clements' concepts of

complex organisms forming climax communities were not
researchable given current methods. It thus amounted to an
idealist concept of mere speculation for Tansley. It was in
an effort to add conceptual rigor to ecological analysis that
Tansley expanded the concept of system in the ecologist's
lexicon.
Concepts of systems appear in scientific thought
stretching as far back as Heraclitus and his notions of
universal ebb and flow in the sixth century B.C.168

In

general terms a system in the twentieth century was
understood from physics as an ensemble of intersecting parts
that produce the processes or behavior of the whole unite. In
reviewing Clements' book Research Methods in Ecology (1905)
Tansley noted the need for an invigorated conception of
systems. In 1935 Tansley coined the term ecosystem.169
167
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Tansley's ecosystems brought ecology closer to the
quantitative rigor he had sought by linking it to the
physical sciences, primarily through the concepts of system
and equilibrium. Tansley emphasized that the idea of a
biome's (a term invented by Clements referring to a component
of an ecological community) interaction with the environment
to form an ecosystem allowed for a wider use of matter
cycling and energy theory in ecology.170 The study of
ecosystems, for Tansley, was the study of physical, chemical
and biological components in an equilibrial system. Tansley's
concept of dynamic equilibrial ecosystems were composed of
four basic elements: first; ecosystems closest to equilibrium
are most likely to survive. Second; ecosystem equilibrium
develops slowly as ecosystems become more and more
integrated. Clements' climax community represented the
closest state of perfect dynamic equilibrium that an
ecosystem may approach. Third; since an ecosystems
equilibrium was measured by its stability its equilibrium can
never be absolutely perfect. Fourth; Tansley noted that
though the components of ecosystems may themselves undergo
constant change the scientific method could isolate the
specific physical processes of the components involved in any
particular change.171
The concepts of organism, equilibrium and the
interrelationship between structure and function were
developing along various lines in virtually every discipline.
170
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By the 1920s the various formulations began to coalesce into

a widely accepted concept of the equilibrial system. Lawrence
J. Henderson probably had the greatest impact on the
development and spread of the concept of equilibrial system,
especially in the social

s c i e n c e s . 172

Henderson's professional

life was devoted almost entirely to the study of the
organization of organisms and later to the organization of
society. Henderson taught at Harvard from 1905 until his
death in 1942. Initially his interests focused on biology,
specifically the new field of biological chemistry, but also
physiology. By the mid twenties Henderson began to pursue
interests in philosophy and sociology through the concepts of
self regulating equilibrial systems.
Henderson was introduced to the concept of equilibrium
in physical chemistry while an undergraduate at Harvard. He
received an MD from Harvard Medical School in 1902 after
which he Studied at Strassburg under Franz Hofmeister, a
pioneer of the application of physical chemistry to
biological chemistry.173

From his earliest studies Henderson

focused on the interaction of heterogeneous elements within
biological organisms especially their modes of self
regulation. Regulation for Henderson, as for all scientists
of the time, was a regulation of equilibrium, or neutrality
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as he sometimes called it.i7^
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His studies of self-regulating

organic mechanisms, however, lead him to conclude that
evolution and natural selection alone were not enough to
explain self-regulating organism. The parameters within which
this process occurs must be considered. Henderson concluded
that the environment within which an organism resides must
also be suited for life. Equilibrium had to be considered in
terms of the system within its supportive environment.
Henderson considered himself a scientist. He was drawn
to materialist explanations but recognized that living
organisms could not be described in purely mechanical terms,
at least not in the mechanics of Newton. The developments
occurring in physical theory, however, especially statistical
mechanics, proffered rigorous explanations and quantitative
techniques that did not necessarily require the a priori
elimination of what was peculiar to the subject of biology.
Henderson had begun to wonder if the focus of evolutionary
theory on the selection of the individual organism was unduly
narrow. By 1912 he had come upon the realization that the
individual organism and its environment were intimately
interconnected forming a complimentary relational process.
His research into this question led to his first book The
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Fitness of the Environment (1912) which set the tone for the

rest of his career:
Life as we know it is a physico-chemical mechanism,
and it is probably inconceivable that it should be
otherwise. As such, it possesses, and, we may well
conclude, must ever possess, a high degree of
complexity,-physically, chemically, and
physiologically; that is to say, structurally and
functionally... Next, living things, still more the
community of living things, are durable, but
complexity and durability of mechanism are only
possible in internal and external conditions are
stable. Hence automatic regulations of the
environment and the possibility of regulations of
conditions of within the organism are essential to
life. 175
Cosmic and biological evolution must somehow be linked
in an integrated orderly process. 176

For Henderson this meant

that the existence of a teleological principle inherent in
matter and energy, organizing the universe in space and time,
surely could not be simply the result of chance.177

Henderson

was acutely aware that this view might lead to the charge of
vitalism. He stressed that by teleological he did not mean
purpose or design but rather an evolutionary "harmonious
unity."178 There was simply no other word to describe the kind
of adaption he was proposing. In Fitness he had blasted the
philosophies of Bergson and Driesch, contemporaries who did
not attempt to explain life in materialistic or utilitarian
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terms, terms that turn of the century life sciences demanded.

Yet they were more alike than not owing to the history and
fundamental holism of the organism concept.
Shortly after the publication of Fitness Henderson
realized that the statistical mechanics of Gibbs could
improve his case, not only concerning the integral
relationship between organism and environment but also the
improving the rationality and scientific character of an
organismic argument. Henderson explicitly adopted Gibbs'
concept of the physio-chemical system noting that Gibbs had
established scientifically that the world of physical
chemistry is made up of equilibrial systems.179

Furthermore,

Gibbs asserted that there was a link between the equilibrium
of systems and their change over time, their evolution.
The fundamental concept in Gibbs' systemics was that of
equilibrium. All systems, according to Gibbs and many other
physicists at the turn of the century, tended towards dynamic
equilibrium. Equilibrium was a process characteristic of all
natural phenomena, a law which could be precisely defined and
in many cases measured. Gibbs emphasized the value of
calculating the equilibrium quantities from the probability
distribution method Maxwell and Boltzmann had derived from
Gauss' original theory of errors.180

For Gibbs, and later

Henderson, a variation in the phase space of a system
represented a change in the distribution, or organization of
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system components.181
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The re-equilibriation (or dissipation)

of a system to its new environment depended upon many factors
of change such as temporal, energetic, spatial and the
material involved.
Henderson believed that the tendency of systems towards
equilibrium, in the cas6 of living systems, betrayed
teleological implications. And teleology in turn raised
questions of origins. He granted that mechanism could not
account for everything, namely the origins implied by the
teleological nature of self-regulating equilibrial systems
but at this point "thought had arrived at one of its natural
frontiers."182

Organization, on the other hand, was well

within the bounds of rational thought. The equilibrial
processes of systems that betrayed some form of teleology did
so because of the undeniable organization of elements and
processes that made life possible.188
Henderson, however, did not simply equate organization
with mechanism. Organization made the very physiol-chemical
phenomena of life possible. Organization was a concept of
structural functional relationships between organism and
ehvironme.nt. The physical elements of a system were
mechanical while the relationship between them was non
mechanical. It was the properties of relationships between
elements that made evolution of the system possible. Dynamic
m
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equilibrium and the organization required for life became
intimately linked concepts. For if organization was the
foundation upon which evolution and life depended and
equilibrium was the form of organization found in nature,
both physical and biological, the logical conclusion was the
necessity of equilibrium for life processes. Dynamic
equilibrium was essential to life and all life acts to
preserve its delicate equilibrium through some manner of
regulatory processes. And it was this process which warded
off entropy.184 How life escaped the second law of
thermodynamics, Henderson thought, need not be conceived in
mystical terms. Henderson had come to view the tendency
towards dynamic equilibrium as a basic fact of nature and the
law of adaptation of organisms as an established a fact of
nature.185
By the early 1920s Henderson had begun to take an
interest in social matters. But until the late 1920s he was
skeptical that the social sciences could approach its subject
matter in a scientific manner. His views changed after
reading Vilfredo Pareto's Trattato di Socioloaia General
(1916). Pareto's work changed Henderson's view that the
social sciences could indeed become scientific. For Henderson
Pareto's concept of the social system so closely mirrored his
own conception of organic systems that he would latter write
"equilibrium of a social system is similar to that of a
184
The survival of a single organism was, for Henderson, almost
infinity improbable. And the continued survival of the flora and fauna
of the earth was an unacountable miracle, ibid., 101.
185
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living

o r g a n i s m . "186

This was primarily due to Pareto's

application of the equilibrium concept to social problems. In
a later work Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's
Interpretation (1935) Henderson utilized a discussion of
Gibbsian physio-chemical systems as an explanatory device to
describe Pareto's concept of the equilibrial social system.
Much of Henderson's latter work was almost entirely focused
on the social sciences. He became closely involved with the
Harvard Business school and eventually took an office there.
Among his students and attendees at a series of lectures on
"Concrete Sociology: A study of Cases" were George C. Homens
and Talcot Parsons.
Henderson provided a device that added new scientific
rigor to the central organizing concept of functionalism in
the social sciences. Functional explanations up to this point
had difficulty fully jettisoning evolutionist causality. The
social norm - the point of reference by which social
scientists observed, compared and judged social functioning increasingly appeared to rely upon vague and suspicious
notions of survival or maintenance of an essential social
quality. The concept of equilibrium popularized by Henderson
proved a perfect match for the functional theories that had
been developing since Boas. With equilibrium an image of
structural stability between these interrelationships began
to emerge which could account for change without deploying
the unscientific idea of an essential or necessary
186
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predetermined end state or a vital force compelling progress.

This is because equilibrium held within it a conception of
the normal as a field rather than the normal as point. An
essential vital core grounding the judgment of social
function gave way to the normal itself as a functional
element. The normal in fact became the equilibrial. George
Homens captured the marriage of these disciplinary concepts
when he pointed out that "the idea of Survival or continuity
can be made rigorous only if survival is redefined as
equilibrium. "187
There were, of course, dissenters on the question of
equilibrium in the social sciences, including Harvard
sociologist Pitrim Sorokin. Their criticisms centered on the
problem of quantifiability of social phenomenon. Sorokin
preferred the term homeostasis introduced by the physiologist
and Harvard colleague

Walter Cannon. Cannon, like Sorokin in

the case of the social sciences, had misgivings about
directly importing into biology a Concept from physics and
statistical mechanics. By the 1930s the anxiety of being
identified with vitalism had passed but the distinction
between nature and culture had intensified. Sorokin agreed
that "a social system, when disturbed, tends to preserve its
integrity." But he questioned whether a concept that required
mathematical precision would be confusing or misleading in
the messy world of social phenomena studied by the human
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sciences.188 Cannon's formulation of homeostasis, however,
allowed the social sciences to import the logic of
equilibrium without the quantification.
Cannon's area of interest was the autonomic nervous
system. Together with the Mexican physiologist Arturo
Rosenblueth Cannon developed the realm of the nervous system
as an object that resided in between mechanistic and
probabilistic explanations. Homeostasis might be called a
soft version of equilibrium. The hard version from the
physical sciences propounded by Henderson emphasized
experimental testability and quantitative measurement of
closed systems. It was simply understood that "every
institution, political or otherwise, must necessarily work
out an equilibrium, if it is to survive."188

in studying this

"working out," quantification was desirable where possible
but need not limit the application of explanatory devices by
the social scientist.
Despite common sentiments such as Sorokin's against the
quantification of social phenomena there emerged an
explicitly quantitative approach to social phenomena known as
sociometry. The focus was primarily upon small groups linked
to the emerging disciplines of group psychology and
industrial psychology. Sociometry, however, encompassed a
more general ambition than the disciplines growing out of the
reformed scientific management that followed Taylorism. The
188
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concerns were the same but the scope was far more grandiose.

"Sociometry is an axis with two poles. The arm toward one
pole is directed toward the discovery of the deeper levels of
society's structure. The other is directed toward promoting
change of society based upon the dynamic facts found in its
structure."190
The basic techniques of sociometry originated in German
psychology in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These
techniques were introduced in the U.S by Jacob Moreno in his
Application of the Group Method to Classification published
by the National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor in
1932. In 1934 Moreno published Who Shall Survive? broadening
the appeal of sociometric methods to the social sciences
generally.i9i

In anthropology sociometric techniques were

seen as the realization of Malinowski's" method of cultural
analysis."i92 Sociometry provided quantitative techniques
which meshed perfectly with the general principles of
190
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structural functionalism. The journal Sociometric Review
appeared in 1936 followed by Sociometry in 1937.
According to Moreno sociometry represented the furthest
development of "measurement in the social sciences" with
"influence beyond its pales, upon all branches of social
sciences, anthropology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry
etc."193

The basic focus of sociometry was the comprehension

and measurement of the socius. This was accomplished through
the measurement of the social system "down to its social
atoms."194

The social atom was understood as the nucleus of

social relations, the smallest social structure in a
community. "One part of the structure is interdependent with
another part; a change in position of one individual may
affect the whole structure."195
Analysis of the geometry of social relations, relations
through space over time, would reveal the goal or tele around
which a group was organized. This goal of the group was
called the group criterion. Once the group criterion was
identified therapeutic procedures could be implemented to aid
in better more efficient organization towards the goal.
Sociometrists fully recognized that interrelationships in
human society were somewhat obscured by depth-producing
factors such as language and self-consciousness. These
factors, however, were not seen as problematic for
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sociometric theory and practice per se other than to make the

problem of observer interference more difficult.
Though sociometry did not specifically focus on the
principle of equilibrium its methods were easily adapted to
such concerns. "Imbalance" between group criterion and the
structure of social relations easily translated into a
problem of the "proper equilibrium" of social dynamics from
which therapeutic procedures to alleviate diseqiulibrial
social pathologies could be drawn up. The principle of
equilibrium, whether in its quantitative or heuristic form,
soon became an essential element of the social object, an
essential a-priori for any rational discussion of social
phenomena. This shift in the epistemological nature of the
object of government had immense practical import. Elton Mayo
in his well known book The Human Problem of an Industrial
Civilization notes that workers can function effectively only
when their relationship with their surroundings is maintained
in a state of equilibrium: "physiologists have found that
work can continue to be performed only in a steady state.

The Refinement of Equilibrium

By the mid 1930s the analytical and heuristic principles
of equilibrium and homeostasis were considerably refined.
Physical and social scientists understood that a steady state
must obtain for effective work, whether in a gas, a cell,
196
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individual or society. How this equilibrium was enforced
remained unclear. In scientific management theory after the
reform of Taylorism the individual ceased to be a machine
requiring fine tuning and adjustment and became a decision
maker. Affective authority became an interpersonal process
rather than a possession. "The individual [became] seen to be
free to decide for or against acceptance of norms,
instructions and standards; at the very least they [norms
were] no longer viewed as unproblematically internalized."197
The individual as an organizational subject capable of choice
rendered authority as the source of equilibrial stability
within the organization very problematic. Authority no longer
compelled social change. It came to be understood that in the
firm "decision is in its important aspects a social
process... [T]he process of decision in individuals is a
psychological process socially conditioned."198

The new

problem for the manager of a large organization was the
alignment of collective goals with those of the individual in
a way that integrated the individual as decision maker with
the imperatives of the organization. How such direction and
management of a collective were to proceed posed a new
challenge to management theorists. What precisely was an
organization? How was it related to authority and what form
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must authority take in light of the emerging principles of
organization?
The introduction of a reformulated equilibrium into the
social sciences spread from Harvard and Chicago into the
wider community of social scientists emerging from premise
"into a carefully defined analytical description."199

The

eventual effect was the convergence of central questions in
both the social and life sciences: explaining the principles,
if not the mechanisms, by which organization and the
direction of collective goals produce and maintain the social
and biological organization of a system. In the social and
life sciences the emergence of organization as an important
concept was accompanied by a reformulation of the old
discourse of authority into a new one of dominance. Processes
were no longer directed but induced.
The physiologist Charles Manning Child pointed out that
[OJnly the simplest sort of integration is possible
without definite and more or less persistent
dominance, that is leadership... [Apparently all
that is necessary for the beginning of orderly
integration in protoplasm is a quantitative
difference in the rate of living and the
possibility of communication. Dominance or
leadership in its most general physiological form
apparently originates in the more rapid liberation
of energy.200
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Organization without dominance and hierarchy would, by
definition according to Manning, remain simple, characterized
by the organization of simple "communistic"

zooids.201

Higher levels of organization required specialization of
function and differentiation of parts into a hierarchy and
division of labor. The sociologist George Lundberg was quite
clear that the mechanisms of integration and maintenance of
organization and dominance were not merely a fundamental
characteristic of social systems. They were also the goal of
social science. "[If] we follow this [scientific] method as
faithfully in the social sciences as we have followed it in
physics it may yield us a corresponding reward in our power
of control."202

Lundberg's sociological theory often utilized

analogies from physics. Human behavior, according to
Lundberg, resembled energy functions understood as the
"amounts of change in relationships."203

Decline of Equilibrium

Some critics felt that the concept of equilibrium
applied to the social sciences amounted to nothing more than
ideology, criticisms which persist today. There were internal
logical problems with the principle of equilibrium as well
201
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however. During the same period that Henderson was adopting

Gibb's formulations of equilibrial systems to move biological
theory away from vitalist cosmology, Gibbs equilibrium was
coming under intense scrutiny within physics.
In 1912 P. and T. Ehrenfest published a critical review
of statistical mechanics in the Encyclopedia of Mathematical
Science titled "The Conceptual Foundation of Statistical
Mechanics." The general argument of the piece was that the
development of Gibbsian equilibrial statistical mechanics was
too general and focused only on special

c a s e s . 204

The

Ehrenfests offered successive expositions and critiques of
Gibb's approach to both the theory of equilibrium and the
theory of the irreversible approach to equilibrium and also
illustrated Gibb's association of statistical mechanical
quantities with thermodynamic quantities by means of
"thermodynamic analogies." This amounted to the reliance on a
large number of "loosely formulated and perhaps even
inconsistent statements occupy[ing] a central position"
within his

f o r m u l a t i o n s .205

molecules, for example, the

in the case ofpoly-atomic
equilibrium theory gave wrong

results and in the case of radiation patently absurd results.
For the Ehrenfests and many others these failures in
predictive reliability potentially cast doubt upon the entire
theory.
Max Planck's turn of the century research into radiation
and the absurd results of kinetic equilibrial statistical
204

Sklar, Physics and Chance. 59-76.

205

Ibid., 70.

mechanic predictions of this phenomena was one of the origins
of quantum mechanics. The development of quantum mechanics
saved the general concept of equilibrium but totally
reformulated statistical mechanics.205

In the physical

sciences at the turn of the century, and especially after the
1916 publication of Einstein's "The Foundation of of the
General Theory of Relativity," the underlying dynamic
behavior of systems and their components began to be
understood by scientists as fully contingent in nature. The
laws of quantum mechanics governed nature, at least at the
micro-level.20? The deterministic laws of classical mechanics
have since served merely as convenient approximations. At the
practical level, however, it was not the theoretical problems
of equilibrium and point mechanics, even in its Gibbsian
probabalistic-statistical variant, that lead to these
concepts fading utility. It was the development of much more
effective social and material technologies that began to
emerge in the late 1930s.
The discipline of primatology illustrates this well.
Primatology's object sits comfortably between the life and
human sciences.208

It was not a matter of naturalization of

culture or socialization of nature. Rather dominance,
hierarchy and the division of labor had become fundamental
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A focus cm primatology "has the double advantage of highlighting
the question of the human being's place in nature and the complex
relations of natural and social sciences." Haraway, "Signs," 135.
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principles of complex systems in both the social and natural

sciences.
Primate studies developed within the ecological paradigm
of the physiological

c o m m u n i t y . 209

unlike the social

sciences/ however, primatology developed as an explicitly
quantitative experimental scientific discipline. There was
never any dissension over the applicability of such methods
because primatology's object was understood to be
unproblematically natural. Yet the questions primatology
asked were often directed at social questions - the
mechanisms involved in the maintenance and reproduction of
complex social structures for example. Thus, primatology
often asked the same questions as the social sciences. Most
important, in practical terms, was that primatology offered
an arena in which social dominance patterns could be studied
using experimental methods unavailable to the social
scientist. Methods such as the physiological defect
experiment in which the dominant male of a primate troop is
altered or removed and the effects upon troop behavior
monitored. By the mid 1930s the concepts of organism as a
community and equilibrial system and that of the relationship
between function and structure as well as the application of
quantitative procedures to analyze such complex social
organization and integration all came together in the
elaboration of hierarchy and dominance as the primary and
necessary mechanisms of equilibrial organization.
The functioning and operation of the objects of the life
and human sciences had become very nearly unified
209
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epistemologicaly by the end of the 1930s. This unification
was marked at a symposium held in September 1942 as part of
the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding
of the University of Chicago. The published volume from this
symposium was titled "Levels of Integration in Biological and
Social Science."
The epistemological unification of the social and
biological objects of study lead not to the discovery of the
mechanisms of structural equilibrium. Instead the the concept
of equilibrium receded in importance, surpassed by the
principles of dominance and hierarchy. Stable systems become
less a matter of structural equilibrium and more a matter of
structural control- With the decline of the principle of
equilibrium the norm receded even further. Equilibrium formed
a kind of stop-gap measure - it was not quite essentialist in
point mechanical terms. But it functioned in a pseudodeterminist fashion to maintain structural integrity.
The investigations into the workings of systems
according to the rationality of functionalism gave rise to
the focus of attention on system structure. The norm having
slid into disfavor as an explanatory device lead to the
adoption of the principle of equilibrium as the mechanisms
maintaining structural integrity. Though the concepts
themselves had existed for centuries the emergence of
structure and equilibrium together as an explanatory
principle for the new rational object of interrelational
process is surely no accident. The efforts to discover the
mechanisms of equilibrium - the precise process of structural
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integretiy maintainance - lead to the overturning of this
principle rather than the discovery of its operation.
Equilibrium and structure ramain important explanatory
principles. But they are no longer central. The search for
the mechanisms that control complex processes by the late
1930s began to look elsewhere. The replacement of the normal
and equilibrial as rational conception of the object of
government coencided with the mobilization for World War II.
The war effert had an immense impact on the continuing
development of the epistemological aspect of the object of
government. One aspect of the war effort was particularly
relevent for this developement - operations research. It is
with operations research that control as a principle for
understanding complex processe. At the same time and linked
to this new epistemology of the object of government control
emerges as a technology for managing these processes.

Chapter 5:
The Emergence of Control;
Operations Research and a New Object of
Government
The scale of the war effort dramatically increased the
intellectual cross-fertilization and synergy within the
social and natural sciences. Indeed, all disciplines worked
together in one form or another. The combination of huge
scale and unprecedented cross-disciplinary cooperation had an
immense transformative effect on the very basis of rational
thought. This cross-fertilization gave rise to new
technologies to be deployed upon the new biosocial object of
government. One of the most important aspects of the war
effort for our story is that of operations research.
Operations research was the largest effort ever undertaken to
bring together every imaginable academic discipline with the
single-minded goal of producing useful techniques and
strategies to win the war. "The war effort brought about the
most radical disciplinary mixing, administrative
centralization and social reorganization of science and
engineering ever attempted in the United States."210
Operations research and the war effert altered forever the
rational understanding of complex processes and their
mechanisms of stability and change.
Control represents a drasticly different form of
knowledge from that of the norm. For control is entirely
contingent upon the arrangements of relationships within a
210
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system. Control does not operate upon an object but a
process. It has no identity per se nor does its target.
Control is fluid. It has no basis in essentialist
epistemology. After World War II the norm, and its shortlived
surrogate - equilibrium - were fuly replaced by an
epistemology of control. Control, like the norm before it,
requires knowledge to operate. And its exercise also produces
knowledge. The epistemological transformation from societies
constituted by the norm to societies constituted by control
can be seen rather clearly as the following discussion will
illustrate. It is also clear that control is an activity of
government just as producing and acting upon the norm had
been. I shall speculate only briefly about what form
governmental activity might take vis-a-vis the new societies
of control. I will restrict myself to illustrating the
epistemological shift leading to the governing principle of
contrpl in the hopes that this will lay the groundwork for
future analysis into governmental practices carried out upon
an object concieved in terms of control.
The story of operations research is the story of modern
systems theory and the introduction of contingency, in the
form of cybernetics and information, into the biological and
social sciences. It is the story of the replacement of a neoessentialist or proto-probabalistic structural/functionalism
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with a fully probabilistic and fully contingent
structural/functional ism.211
Operations research remains a specific field of study
with its own focus. It refers to specific methodologies born
of the war effort. The methods and techniques which emerged
during its formation in the theoretical and practical ferment
of the war effort were, however, much more general in scope
and effected every discipline at the epistemological level.
The very perception of reality and thus political rationality
was greatly effected as well. Machines and their operators
were reconceived as part of a single system. From the
beginning, operations research endeavored to incorporate the
machine operator as seamlessly as possible into the
development and functioning of the machines "themselves." The
range of operating conditions and error rates for both
machine and operator were calculated together by the same
statistical methods and techniques. The operator became part
211
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of the machine while the machine became part of the operator.

Together they formed a new and larger goal oriented system.
It was not a case of reduction of one to the other or a
simple prosthetic addition to an inefficient organic system.
It was the construction of a wholly new object.212
The homeostatic goal oriented system ceased to be a
solely natural or given process whose proper functioning and
very naturalness was marked by its normal or equilibrial
behavior. The function or goal of such a system became an
engineering problem resulting in what is today known as
control theory. When the normal and the equilibrial became
the result of engineering decisions it lost its givenness,
its inherentness. Not because it was no longer natural but
because nature no longer appeared given. Nature too became an
engineering decision. The last vestige of nineteenth century
vitalism was swept away. Not by rational denial but by
rational acceptance of holism as an object of the
communications engineer. "The ability to study goaldirection, function, and signification entirely without
necessary reference to living systems has removed a gnawing

212
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irrationality from the heart of organicist biology."213
Operations research represented the formation of a new
rationality of government. It signals the end of disciplinary
government centered on the identification and production of
the norm and the birth of government by control through
modulation and the identification of system structures and
production of knowledge about how to alter succesive
sequences of system states. Equilibrium was the last
manifestation of the norm and the last rational knowledge of
disciplinary political rationality.
During the 1930s Vannevar Bush, an electrical engineer
at MIT, worked on the new problems involving large electric
power networks. To aid in this work he had invented an
electric powered mechanical device he called a differential
analyzer. It was designed to calculate differential equations
related to switching and transmission capacities. Immediately
after it was shown to work in 1935 the Ballistics Research
Laboratory (BRL) at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground
ordered one. Another differential analyzer was ordered by the
University of Pennsylvania's Moore School of Engineering. The
construction of both of these machines was personally
supervised by Bush.214
During World War II Bush was in charge of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). The OSRD was a
213
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huge and unparalleled effort of over 6,000 scientists and
engineers which produced both material and logistic
technologies for the war department. Technologies such as
computer controlled anti-aircraft guns, radar, the industrial
production of penicillin and antimalarial drugs as well as
methods of resource allocation, antisubmarine warfare and
material transport operations.215

These successes were the

result of an unprecedented level of interdisciplinary
collaboration. MIT's Radiation Laboratory, for example,
employed about 4,000 people from 69 different institutions.
In 1945 the OSRD budget exceeded $100 million compared to the
prewar total for Military research and development had been
$23 million. This was the birth of what Eisenhower later
called the military-industrial complex.
During World War I mathematicians such as Norbert Weiner
worked on ballistics tables at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds.
Their job was to calculate the ranges of various combinations
of projectile materials and charges for the Army's various
artillery pieces. Wiener and the other mathematicians were
called "computers." In the 1930s, when computers were still
wholly biological, Wiener closely followed the work of Cannon
and Rosenblueth on autonomic nervous systems.216

For Wiener

the organicism of Cannon's homeostatic self regulating
nervous system was more than metaphysically linked to the
purely mechanical and mathematically precise servomechanisms
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being produced for a wide variety of industrial processes.
They were variations of the same processes.
At the beginning of World War II Wiener once again
applied his immense mathematical skills to the problem of
weapons targeting. This time, however, Wiener included the
human element into his calculations: artillery, projectile,
target and fire crew. Wiener contacted Bush, his old
colleague at MIT now with the OSRD, about the relevance of
his prewar computation research work both for Bush's
difference analyzer as well as, and more importantly, for
operations research and the war in general. Bush referred the
matter to Warren Weaver of the Fire Control Section of OSRD.
Weaver put Wiener to work on the problem of gunnery control.
The physiologist Rosenblueth accompanied Wiener to Fire
Control and together they tackled the problem of gun control
in terms of the human operator together and complex weapons
as part of a single unified system. Initially their task was
the improvement of anti-aircraft weapons. Wiener started with
the idea of building machines that would approximate the
behavior of human gunners but without the "breakdowns" or
"wild oscillations" humans experienced when faced with
bringing down modern aircraft .217

in short, the human

component of a whole system performed efficiently up to point
but after a certain threshold of sensory input had been
reached their efficiency dropped considerably and the system
as a whole failed. The problem was a traditional engineering
one; the refinement of system capabilities beyond their
current range.
217
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Human and machine capabilities, like any other form of

behavior from an engineering point of view, was understood in
terms of statistics. Performance was plotted on a curve which
revealed, among other things, the range of efficient
behavior, the boundaries of useful performance which could be
expected for that environment. Optimal performance as it was
traditionally understood was linked to equilibrial system
behavior. The problem for the engineer was to maintain
equilibrium within an environment, but in this case the
environment presented radically changing conditions.
Wiener and Rosenblueth sought to discover precisely how
the "mechanism" of homeostasis operated in order to enhance
this operation and expand the boundaries of efficient
organismic behavior. The "mechanism" turned out to be very
unmechanistic however. And it was this discovery that quickly
displaced equilibrium as a fundamental explanatory principle.
The mechanism and new explanatory principle they discovered
was feedback. The initial model was the early steam engine
governor and the later more complex servomechanisms derived
from that governor. The product of these mechanisms, their
output - the mechanical or electrical substance which caused
the change when reintroduced back into the larger machine to
which they were attached - came to be called feedback. Though
it was mathematically implied in the equations behind their
design, the feedback produced by these devices was not
initially considered a substance of which measurements could
be obtained. There was not anything between the machine and
its governor to be measured.
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By the late 1930s the space between the machines had
become something more than empty space. Early researchers
such as Cannon, Rosenblueth and Weiner had come to view
feedback as the key to understanding the processes of
equilibrial self regulation in both machines and biological
organisms. Feedback was more than an instantaneous effect or
automatic response characteristic of classical mechanical
reactions. Feedback was intimately linked to system
maintenance, survival and even expansion. It verged on the
teleological or goal directedness because it was so closely
related to the continuation of systemic processes. Knowledge
of feedback implied the ability to affect the very
equilibrial processes of life (or machine) itself. As the
concept of self regulation became more highly defined
feedback was distinguished between negative and positive.
Negative feedback refers to the circular process of self
corrective cycles in which information from the effects of a
previous adjustment is returned, or fed back, to the system
further adjusting the process away from oscillatory and
erratic behavior. Positive feedback reinforces oscillatory
behavior and leads to system breakdown.
Wiener and Rosenblueth proposed the radical idea that
the space between the governor and the machine, or the brain
and the body, was occupied by the process/mechanism of
feedback. Feedback was not simply a cause in the classic
sense but it was responsible for the regulation and governing
process of homeostasis that made governors work. If feedback
could be isolated and manipulated the process of homeostatic
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regulation could be made more efficient. The trick was
measuring this element or quantity called they called
feedback.
In the early 1920s the mysterious element that passed
between two machines, such as a governor and steam engine,
had become important for practical work in electric
communication. Research in telegraphic communications and
electronics focused the attention of a very few
mathematicians on isolating precisely what it was that was
being sent over the wires crisscrossing the globe. The
question was how substance being sent was related to how it
was sent. In communications engineering this substance had
previously been called intelligence even in the civilian
arena. It referred simply to the speech of the sender
distinguished from distortions caused by the sending
apparatus which was called, simply enough, noise. But it was
clear that this substance was not simply the voice of the
sender that was carried over the wires. But it was not clear
to communications researchers precisely what this substance
really was, what it was composed of.
In 1928 R.V.L. Hartly showed that a mathematical
relationship existed between the medium of transmission and
the substance being transmitted. This substance was
henceforth called "information." Hartly found that the
logarithm of the number of possible states of a transmission
channel, such as the various conditions of wear and tear of a
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telegraph cable, provided a measure of the information
handling capacity of such a channel . 218
However, attaining precise measurements of the condition
of every inch of telegraphic cable was not feasible. The
mathematical techniques of statistical mechanics common in
physics were precisely the kind of equations electrical
engineers required for the identification of the probable
states of the system as well as the transition of a system
from one probable state to another. The substance of
information became quantitatively knowable by statistical
analysis of its conditions of transmission. Information, it
turned out, was not a substance at all but a relationship. A
relationship, moreover, between processes rather than parts.
The process of feedback, linked to the concept of
information, made feedback a communication process. Radar
technology was closely associated with radio. The
conceptualization of feedback as a communication process thus
came quite easily. But it was a unique sort of communication
that was also linked to the goal-directedness associated with
feedback mechanisms. For the problem of anti-aircraft guns
communication meant a radar's observation of the position of
an aircraft communicated to the gun pointer, whether a
machine or a person. The gun and the pointer's position was
then calculated relative to the aircraft's position. Since

218
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the aircraft is moving of course, this process of
communication is repeated over and over until the two
positions are closely aligned. This is a process of
communication between (or about) one state of a system and
another. In this way mechanisms of communication was realized
to be closely linked, if not identical, to to process of
control and control

was recognized to be a two way process

between controllingand controlled aspects
system.

or functions of a

Homeostasis and equilibrium became understood as the

general process of information processing, one which
regulated or controlled the changes between system states
ensuring that they did not vary greatly. Control, in this its
most basic sense, is the selection of
current states of a

feedback inputs into

system to alter - in a predictable way -

the system's transition into future states. Information, in
other words, is the key to system behavior.
The mechanism or process of feedback Wiener and
Rosenblueth were looking for was that of homeostatic control.
Information processing thus referred to the taking in of
information from one state to the next and the calculation of
this data to produce an output which was fed back into the
system as a form of control. Information processing became
understood as the process that complex systems performed whether biological or mechanical - in order to adapt to a
changing environment. If this control process of homeostatic
systems could be manipulated the behavior of the whole system
could be controlled.
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Wartime operations research revolutionized all aspects

Of war fighting from managerial concerns centered on
logistics to weapons design, production and mode of
deployment. The key was the use of statistical methods in the
identification of optimum performance for a given set of
condition with given tools towards a pre-specified end. Like
the communications engineers before them operations
researchers began from the premise that all states of the
transmission medium could not practically be known in
advance. In this purely practical engineering setting
probability was understood to refer to states that were in
principle measurable but in practice extremely difficult. All
processes had to be understood in probabilistic terms based
on incomplete data.
The human operator, understood as a complex information
processor, could be inserted into a larger system together
with other information processors -both machines and humans to achieve a predefined goal. To develop integrated weapons
systems the human/machine engineer specified the conditions
of maximum and minimum performance of the given systems in a
given setting and combined this with the specification of the
goals of the weapons system linked with feedback.
Optimization was never considered in isolation. Optimization
of performance in relation to the goal was a characteristic
of the whole system whether anti-aircraft gun, gunners and
spotters or naval vessels, their cargo and the methods of
moving them. Operations research was itself a new technology
essential in the allied victory. More convoys survived, anti-
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aircraft hits per thousand rounds fired increased,
destruction per pound of munitions in aerial bombardment
increased, and so forth. In virtually every case of increased
effectiveness in the war effort the new technique or tool
directly responsible was developed in terms of an information
processing system composed of many interconnected parts.
Any system whose states could be adequately specified
and formalized could be controlled. The problem was how to
precisely specify these parts and how they interacted so as
to streamline their interaction, their communication, in a
desired way and steer the process in a desired direction.
That is, the problem was one of understanding the precise
operation of communication and control in complex
multidimensional processes. Engineers at OSRD quickly began
working from the premise of feedback as communication and
information processing developed by Wiener and Rosenblueth.
The human sciences soon adopted these principles as well,
also stimulated by the requirements of war.
The machines of World War II were incredibly noisy and
incredibly fast. They were also incredibly complex. The new
challenges of communication and coordination were fundamental
to the war effort. Such challenges were the specific domain
of the Psycho-Acoustics Laboratory (PAL) set up at Harvard
under the direction of the experimental psychologist S.S.
Stevens within the jurisdiction of the OSRD. PAL was composed
primarily of communications engineers and psychologists
focusing on "those problems arising from the fact that a
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human being is part of the total circuit."219

PAL was the

largest university based program conducting psychological
research during the war.220 Researchers at PAL considered
their work to be a form of language engineering. Thus was
born the discipline of psycholinguistics. The PAL researchers
made no distinction between the technology of hardware and
the technology of language and listening. The din of battle
made communication a psychological and psychophysical
problem.221
One of the first PAL experiments established that the
problem of noise was relevant not so much at the individual
level of the soldier but at the level of coordination between
soldiers and especially between soldiers and commanders.
Noise was a command and control problem, a systemic problem.
The individual tialgunner for example could withstand a
considerable amount of fatigue and perform relatively well.
But coordination between a tail-gunner and a waist-gunner,
for example - the organized response of the plane's entire
defense system against enemy attack - suffered enormously.
The problem grew exponentially when larger systems such as
aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious landings were
219
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considered. The research at PAL and in linguistics in general

was closely connected with the developments of Shannon's
communication theory. At a Symposium on Information Theory at
MIT in 1956 "nearly every aspect of cognitive science was
represented . "222

Noam Chomsky delivered a paper on an early

version of his theory of Transformational Generative grammar.
PAL's last military contract expired in 1961 but its work
continued with support from National Science Foundation and
National Institute of Health grants.

Information
During the war, research focused primarily upon received
signals. The "extraction of signals of a given ensemble

from

noise of a known type" such as that of radar tracking a
p l a n e . 223

Electronic communications and the sending of signals

received comparably less resources. The improvement of
communications could be achieved relatively easily by simply
boosting power to the transmitter. After the War considerably
more effort went into the sending aspect of communication.
What emerged was a means of formalizing and quantifying the
entirely non-essential, non-corpuscular substance of
information and feedback. With this development, statistics
has completed its three hundred year journey from the
counting and enumeration of things,
222
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qualities then to reveal their essential qualities, through

probability and the first questioning of essences and
determinism, to the enumeration of relationships and the
contingent assemblages of complex systems with no essential
quality at all.
In 1948 Claude Shannon, an engineer for Bell ,
Laboratories, published "The Mathematical Theory of
Communication" in the Bell Systems Technical Journal. This
has become the seminal work in what has come to be called
information theory or statistical information theory.
Wiener's work in tracking systems provided much of the
mathematical background for this

w o r k . 224

The problems were

similar in that for both sending and receiving of information
one is faced with the problem of distortion and error, or
noise. In any transmission of a signal, whether that received
from the radar readings of a planes location or voice over a
phone line "it is unfortunately characteristic that certain
things are added to the signal which were not intended by the
information source."225

Shannon had basically done what had

previously been considered undoable. He decreased the number
of errors in a transmission over a noisy channel without
recourse to increased transmitter power or larger bandwidth.
This was achieved through a reconceptualization of what the
communications process actually entailed. A communications
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system, according to Shannon, should be understood in terms
of the information it can transmit rather than the symbols
that might represent what is transmitted. That is,
communication is a problem of coding.
Shannon discovered that for the discrete signal, such as
words made from an alphabet as in the Teletype, proper coding
would maximize the rate of transmission and decrease the
amount of distortion and errors in the received message. In
the 1940s the machines partly determined the simplest coding
algorithm of base 2, the binary digit or bit. This became the
standard unit of measure for information and the most basic
level of of coding. The binary digit conveniently matches the
simplest division of process states into on or off,
electrical current flowing or not flowing. Any symbol can be
coded using the binary digit .226

The coded message simply had

to be within the limits established by Hartly's probability
algorithm for channel capacity. However, channel capacity was
now understood in terms of amount of information transmitted
rather than number of symbols.
For continuous message sources, such as a spoken voice
or the reflected signal from radar, the equations are much
more complicated but the same theory holds. The difference is
that a range of band limited frequencies is specified to

226
The bit may be most commonly recognized today in the form of the
ASCII text coding scheme, it becomes apparent here how Shannon could
avoid concern for semantics. The contextual of a symbol, its meaning, is
irrelevant to the symbols efficient transmission. There are ways in
which these areas of coding and semantics overlap and cannot be fully
separated. This was pointed out early on By warren weaver who introduces
Shannon's theory of communication in the 1949 book reprinting Shannon's
original article. Such linkages were the basis for subsequent artificial
intelligence work.
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which the coding must comply. Continuous messages, understood

in terms of a curve, had previously been approximated through
the assignment of a finite number of points through which
such a curve passed. Exact prediction with this method would
require knowledge of all the infinite possible points through
which any given message curve might pass. Instead of
assigning a finite number of points Shannon divided the curve
into a set of frequencies. This method of specifying a
message encompassed the entire curve and all its possible
points within a finite set of parameters. This reduces the
number of variables from the infinite to the finite.
Each frequency and its parameters were assigned, through
calculations of its probable state, in a manner similar to
the standard methods used in astronomy for identifying the
(probable) position of a star. Within the range of possible
points in each frequency Shannon used the statistical
techniques developed by Gibbs to specify the probable state
of a portion of a given volume of gas . 227 with these
probability distribution formulas describing the maximum
message transmission capacity of a given channel, along with
a given power and a given frequency range could be specified.
This capacity thus specified the proper coding of the message
for the most efficient transmission. That is, a transmission
whose sent message maximally corresponded with the received

22/
Gibbs called this state a micro-cannonical ensemble, a state
characterized by a uniform distribution of probability. This probability
itself refers to the average values of the phase quantities of molecules
in what is called the overwhelmingly most probable Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution. Such an evenly spread probability distribution is itself
called ergodic. See Sklar, Physics and Chance. 67.
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message. These frequencies and their corresponding maximally

efficient coding schemes do not eliminate error. This was
shown to be impossible. But such errors, or rather the
frequency of errors, could be calculated.
"The fundamental problem of communication" Shannon
writes "is that of reproducing at one point, either exactly
or approximately, a message selected at another

p o i n t . "228

Information in Shannon's theory is not to be confused with
meaning. He explicitly avoided equating his theory of
communication with a theory of meaning. The "semantic aspects
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.
The significant aspect is that the actual message is one
selected from a set of possible

m e s s a g e s ."229

Proceeding from

the work of Hartly Shannon understood the amount of
information to be the measured by the logarithm of the amount
of available states of the transmission system. But it was
Shannon's focus on the role of probability or uncertainty in
the actual generation of the message within such a
transmission system which brought the full significance of
probability into view.
Shannon proceeded with the application of Gibbsian
statistical mechanics, routine in communications engineering.
The use of these equations in communications engineering had
been driven primarily by practical concerns not philosophical

228
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exploration.230

jn reducing uncertainty "information turns

out to be exactly that which is known in thermodynamics as
entropy."23i

it is here that Shannon's work provided

communications engineering with one of its most valuable
practical applications.
As Hartly pointed out information was linked to the many
possible states of the communication system. Information must
then be a purely relational quantity. As a concept
information applies to the communication system as a whole
rather than to individual messages (the realm of semantics).
Unqualified, pure information is a meaningless abstraction.
It exists only as a relationship at a given time. Thus,
Shannon found, the correlation of input to output in a
communications system the similarity between message sent and
message received, would be strengthened if uncertainty were
reduced. Within a communication system, Shannon discovered,
information was precisely what reduced uncertainty and
therefore strengthened the correlation between input and
output.
The place of equilibrium in Shannon's theory is that it
describes the characteristic of the distribution of
probability within a frequency defined by certain statistical
parameters. These parameters are themselves derived from the
curve of errors produced in measuring the frequency itself. A
frequency and its parameters refer to each other in an
230
In 1925 L. Szilard produced the first extended discussion of
information in physics, begun by Boltzmann's initial observation of the
entropy - information link that emerged in thermodynamics. Von Neumann
later explored information in the context of quantum mechanics.
231
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irreducible way. They determine each other without having
characteristics unconnected one to the other. Until this
point, outside of physics, the concept of equilibrium was
applied to the exact point through which a statistical curve
passed. It was, in other words, a mixture of probabilistic
equilibrium and the equilibrium of atomistic classical
mechanics for which the second law of thermodynamics
specified the ultimate equilibrium; the universal heat death
of maximum entropy.
Shannon discovered that entropy was not such a scary
thing. It could be quite useful to the communications
engineer - not because engineers were nihilists or happy
conspirators in the production of instrumental rationality
designed to alienate the worker from his labor or the
individual from his soul but because entropy, understood in
terms of information could be constructive. Information
turned out to be the measurement of the different
organization of a system from one state to the next. Entropy,
or information, was actually a measure by which organization
could be increased. Increasing organization, the reduction of
randomness is, of course, negative entropy. In
communications engineering proper coding is a form of message
construction and thus a form of increasing organization.
Entropy in information theory, like equilibrium, is not
to be conceived as a deterministic force. Early equilibrium
expanded the scales of explanation in limited cases, such as
cell division and the discovery of vitamins, and it succeeded
in making biology a rigorous science, as Henderson had hoped.
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But as an explanation for heredity and evolution, equilibrium

maintained the old characteristics of a deterministic life
force sucking living organisms to its center rather than
explaining their historical movement. Grand explanations in
terms of equilibrium before the 1940s sounded not much
different from the "evolutionism" that had been rejected as
unscientific and tainted with vitalism and superstition.
Entropy had even gained deterministic powers.
Information provided the conceptual tools to account for
equilibrial, and for that matter entropic, processes in a
non-deterministic manner freeing rational thought from the
clutches of determinism once and for all. The life sciences
have since become a very special kind of communications
science. Recall from the discussion of physics in part three
that entropy refers to the degree of randomness or
disorganization in a state or phase of a dynamic process. The
second law of thermodynamics states that systems, in
isolation from all but the influences internal to it, will
become increasingly less organized and more and more
perfectly randomly distributed. Such a random distribution
was the opposite of organization. Information and entropy are
thus said to be high when organization is low.
Organization was precisely what Shannon, and all his
predecessors, were trying to specify with probabilistic
descriptions of the state of a transmission channel. When
Shannon devised his equations for the specification of
frequency parameters of a transmission channel he was
measuring the (probable) level of organization of such a
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channel at any given state (time). When the probable
organization of a channel's state is calculated one is left
with the parameters or constraints within which a message may
be transmitted. Thus the parameters specify the proper coding
necessary for efficiency. Information (or entropy) is thus a
measure of the level of constraint or freedom of choice in
the construction (coding) of a message.
Complete freedom would be an instance of complete lack
of structure to constrain one's choices - i.e. complete
randomness. In the English language the letter "U" has a very
high probability of following "Q." In the visible spectrum
orange has an even higher probability of following yellow.
Because a reasonably large sample size tends to be
representative of the whole, a probability equation can be
made for any sequence, relative to other variables acting on
such a sequence. The statistical regularities arising from
the organizational of such a sequential phenomena is known as
an ergodic process.
Shannon found that in any information source that is not
completely random there exists a statistically determinable
parameter of that source. Within these parameters there is a
necessary amount of extra information. This extra information
in a message was known as redundancy. Nyquist had previously
referred to this redundant component of the signal as
useless, conveying no intelligence.232

Efficient transmission

before Shannon consisted largely of trying to eliminate this
redundancy. Information as a measure of organization however
meant that noise (errors in received message) could be
232
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accounted for by inserting extra bits into the coded message.

That is, adding redundancy specifically tailored to the
communication channel's capacities (parameter) increased the
correspondence between sent and received messages. These
extra bits acted as checks against errors caused by noise in
the transmission process. Redundancy turned out to be a
"predictable departure from the random."233
This is an important point. At first glance it appears
that Shannon is suggesting that entropy counteracts entropy.
What it actually amounts to is that organization "itself" is
a source of

counter-entropic or negentropic effects.

Shannon called this relative entropy. Shannon's relative
entropy is derived by comparing the actual degree of entropy
of an information source at the time of transmission (by
calculating its statistically probable organizational state
in Gibbsian statistical mechanical fashion) and comparing
this entropy with the maximum entropy the same message source
could possibly have independent of ergodicity. For example in
the English alphabet a completely random selection would
produce an "A" 1 in 26 times - the same frequency as "X." In
actual usage of the English language, however, constrained by
the parameters of grammar, its organization or relative
entropy, "A"

233
James Gleick, Chaos; Making A New Science (New York; Vicking
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occurs much more frequently than "x."234

it has been said

that these effects of entropy are what Ogives time its
arrow. "235
The effect of this distinction between absolute and
relative redundancy reduced the concept of entropy, and, as a
result, also the concept of equilibrium from an all powerful
force acting on every thing in a uniform way to a much more
complex process in which the effects of entropy at one time
and place can "counteract" the effects of entropy at another
time and place.

234
Shannon calculated that the redundancy of English
Weaver, Mathematical Theory. 13.

is about 50%.
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See Ilya Prigogine and Isabella Stengers Order out of Chaosi Mans
Mew Dialogue With Nature, with a forward by Alvin Toffler (New York:
Bantam Books, 1984). This is actually a matter of great dispute within
physics. Einstein's relativity made time a matter of illusion i.e.
relative, in classic and quantum mechanics time is, in principle,
reversible. See Sklar Physics and Chance for a complex treatment of
statistical mechanics which illustrates the problems with the
"objectivist" view. The two views of time are intimately bound up with
the question of whether probability is an objective feature of reality,
as Pierce insisted, or is merely a reflection of our lack of complete
knowledge, as indicated by Einstein and later David Bohm's contention
that "God does not play dice with the universe." Note the irony of
"objectivism" as a form of "irrationality" in the post-quantum age, an
irony not widely acknowledge outside of theoretical physics save for its
compartmentalized form as a "social" phenomenon relative only to
feminist theory and literary criticism and not to the "real world." it
is basically a continuation of the "vitalism - mechanism debate",
sometimes infused with spirituality, as in the writings of Fritjof
Capra's The Tao of Phvsics or versions of the Gaia principle, and
sometimes "objective" as in modern systems theory and the new science of
chaos, in physics, such as Murray Gell-Mann's The Quark and the Jaguar,
or complexity and emergence, in the life and human sciences illustrated
by Brian Goodwin's How the Leopard Chanced its Spots, in any case,
probability - objective or relative — has demolished the essentialist
determinism of the classical paradigm of an atomistic point mechanical
system as a form of rational explanation.
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Cybernetics
Shannon's formalization of information had dramatic
ramifications for virtually every discipline. In conjunction
with feedback and information processing a new paradigm for
understanding the world emerged. Cybernetics replaced the
epistemological basis of affectiveness from a one-way command
with that of a two-way message sending and receiving system.
Wiener and Rosenblueth were explicit in their view of the
unity of the set of problems centered on statistical
mechanics, communications and control in both the machine and
living organisms.236

it was soon realized that social

organization also fell within the purview of cybernetic
epistemology. This is because cybernetics does not generaly
distinguish between the material involved in a system. The
focus is upon organization of relationships. The importance
of structure lies with analyzing specific material
manifestations of systems and the nature of interactions. A
system is defined by its organization, however, not its
structure. Shannon's specification of a formal mathematical
methode of conceptualizing information makes the transitions
between system states, that is, the organization of
relationships within a system, thinkable and manipulable.
Systems became governable.
In 1942 Rosenblueth gave a presentation of the research
he and Wiener were conducting to the Cerebral Inhibition
Meeting organized under the auspices of the Macy Foundation.
The concept of feedback was introduced to a wide variety of
236
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disciplines including engineering, psychoanalysis,
mathematics neurophysiology, philosophy, sociology and
anthropology, notably including Gregory Bateson and Margerate
Mead. Rosenblueth, Wiener and Julian Bigelow, a fellow
engineer in the Fire Control section, published "Behavior,
Purpose and Teleology" in the journal Philosophy of Science.
They described goal oriented behavior in both the machine and
human as a process of negative feedback. Henceforth,
cognition, group dynamics, social organization in ant, monkey
and human populations as well as the successful tracking and
targeting of enemy missiles or human genes was linked with
the new formulation of communication as a cybernetic control
system.
The Macy Foundation sponsored numerous conferences
spreading the concept of feedback and control. The first
regular meeting held in 1946 was titled "Feedback Mechanisms
and Circular Causal Systems in Biology and the Social
Sciences Meeting." In 1947 Wiener coined the term cybernetics
to give a name to the newly unified set of concepts and the
methodologies of investigation of systems according to these
concepts. Wiener summarized the themes of cybernetics as:
"(1) The Gibbsian point of view has revolutionized modern
life; (2) society can only be understood through the study of
messages and communication facilities; and (3) physical
functioning of the living individual and the operation of new
communication machines are parallel in their attempts to
control entropy through feedback."237
237
Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics and Society; Human use of Human Beings
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950). Quoted in Haraway, "Signs," 180.
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A few years later, an introduction by Wiener and others

to an Academy of Sciences conference illustrates the radical
epistemological shift being wrought by cybernetics:
The concepts of purposive behavior and teleology
have long been associated with a mysterious, selfperfecting or goal seeking capacity or final cause,
usually of a super-natural origin. To move forward
to the study of events, scientific thinking had to
reject these beliefs in purpose and these concepts
of teleological operations for a strictly
mechanistic and deterministic view of nature... The
unchallenged success of these concepts and methods
in physics and astronomy, and later in chemistry
gave biology and physiology their major
orientation. This approach to problems of organisms
was reinforced by the analytical preoccupation of
Western European culture and languages. The basic
assumptions of our traditions and persistent
implications of the language we use almost compel
us to approach everything we study as composed of
separate, discrete parts or factors which we must
try to isolate and identify as potent causes.
Hence/ we derive our preoccupation with the study
of the relation of two variables. We are witnessing
today a search for new approaches, for new and more
comprehensive concepts and for methods capable of
dealing with the large wholes of organisms and
personalities.238
The authors thought that these new concepts, even if
"expressed in different terms" represented "an attempt to
escape from these older mechanistic formulations that now
appear inadequate, and to provide new and more fruitful
conceptions and more effective methodologies for studying
self-regulating processes, self-orienting systems and
organisms and self-directing personalities."239
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Systems

Reformulated

Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics made points and
identities much more complex, but reality until the 1940s
remained firmly corpuscular. The growing importance of
probability and statistics and its fundamental importance for
statistical mechanics existed uneasily within the
epistemology of point mechanical systems. The development of
a formal theory of information and its circulation in terms
of cybernetic feedback loops also radically transformed the
concept of systems. The reemergence of the system concept as
a general explanatory device focused attention upon dynamic
relationships. The basic schema of a Gibbsian interconnected
and dynamic system, adapted by Henderson into biology and
Parsons in the social sciences, was transformed by the
continued evolution in the statistical reasoning that had
given it its earlier form.
Ludwig Von Bertalanffy first articulated the modern form
of the system concept. Bertalanffy explicitly rejected the
mechanistic interpretation of interaction yet he was not
satisfied with metaphysical and materially ineffective
explanations. He

attempted to grasp the specific operations

by which systems functioned, were maintained, transformed,
expanded or destroyed in a relational non-point mechanical
way. Bertalanffy made the fundamental distinction between
open and closed systems to move beyond the vitalism-mechanism
controversy.
Bertalanffy, an Austrian biologist, published his first
book Theories of Development in 1928 (translated into English
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in 1933) in which he stressed that the task of the biological

sciences was to discover the laws specific to biological
systems, what was needed was a "system theory of the
organism."240 His goal was no less then the settlement of the
vitalism-mechanism antithesis. Bertalanffy was well aware
that his biological theories constituted a natural philosophy
and as such would not be widely received.241

Bertalanffy

first presented his ideas of a general systems theory in the
United States to, one of the few forums in which such non
mechanical ideas found acceptance outside of spiritualism:
Charles Morris' semiotics seminar at the University of
Chicago in 1937.242
For Bertalanffy the adoption of closed equilibrial
systems explanations in the life sciences constituted an
unwarranted abstraction. An abstraction which obscured rather
than clarified the behavior of such systems, especially
complex highly organized systems such as those of concern to
the life and human sciences* Bertalanffy was aware, however,
that in biology a holistic theory such as his was too close
to the vitalism that the lacuna of early twentieth century
biology had worked so hard to exercise.242

When the
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theoretical was discussed, system remained in the background

and relationships were understood in mechanical terms. All
that was necessary was to assume an eguilibrial arrangement
and the important work of clinical research could proceed.
Equilibrium, after all, was an established fact of science.
"Excessive" attention to natural philosophy, Bertalanffy
thought, revealed that the equilibrium concept in the life
sciences necessarily occupied an explanatory position very
similar to Bergson's elan Vital in vitalist epistemology. But
Bertalanffy did not reenter the vitalism mechanism debate. He
*

merely pointed out that the closed system concept of physics
applied to living organisms would require such a vital force.
But he proposed that an expanded conception of systems
appropriate to the life sciences, one that attempted to
explain change rather than stability, would not require an
epiphenominal force to propel it through time and space
foiling entropy.
The concept of open systems brought to the fore two
fundamental issues in the analysis of complex processes statics and dynamics .244

statics refers to the homeostatic

maintenance of a systems organization relative to its
environment while dynamics refers to changes in this
organization. Neither is reducible to the other but both
require the other for their existence (as well as their
differentiation on the part of the observer). In
informational terms both are ways of identifying the states
of a system and the transition processes between such states.

244
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In other words, statistics and dynamics are two general
categories of system organization.
The distinction between open and closed systems and
statics and dynamics had the effect of erasing the lingering
differences between organic and inorganic systems and
process. The distinction between biological, chemical,
electronic and mechanical systems since World War II has
become the level of complexity of organization rather than a
qualitative distinction. Generally speaking, the more complex
an organizational structure the greater the distance the
system may be from a source of energy. Simpler systems
require a closer proximity to an energy source.
As a form of organization homeostasis and equilibrium
became one possible state among many. They are an important
states but have been stripped of their causal properties
laying unmentioned at the heart of prewar biology and social
science. After the war homeostasis became one of four general
categories or descriptions of states of system organization;
homeostasis, homeorhesis, morphostasis and morphogenesis. In
this new context homeostasis refers to an entropic process in
which the level of organization is maintained by the
importation of negative entropy. Homeorhesis concerns an
increase in complexity of organization but in terms of
development rather than evolution; Morphostasis is a neutral
entropic phase of transition; And morphogenesis is an
unpredictable change in organization to a higher order of
complexity associated with evolution.
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In 1954 the Society for General System Theory was
organized by Kenneth Boulding, an economist with the Center
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto
California, and many others at the Annual Meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science.245
System, information and cybernetics came together to form the
epistemological basis of rational explanation and the
production of rational techniques of management where change
and transformation was not caused but constrained, not
authorized but modulated.
It was precisely these epistemological transformations
brought about by the development of general systems theory,
information theory and cybernetics that allowed Francis Crick
and James Watson to discover the double helix of DNA and the
nature of the hereditary material in 1956. This material was
conceived entirely as an information processing, code
generation and transmission system. This system produces the
dual functions of self-replication and message transmission
via messenger RNA that controls protein synthesis. DNA does
not cause or determine growth or evolution. Rather, it
constrains or organizes the possible states the evolutionary
245
The name was later changed to Society for General Systems
Research. The term "theory" in the name was considered "too
pretentious." Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, 15. Boulding
formulated what he called a rough "skeleton" of ascending levels of
systems organization: Frameworks, understood as arrangements, structures
or maps; Clockworks, simple predetermined dynamic systems; Thermostats,
self-regulating systems, closed loop cybernetic systems; Cells, selfmaintaining structures and self-reproducing open systems; Plants,
multiplicative ensembles of cells; Animals, teleological open systems
characterized by an image or knowledge structure which mediates between
stimulus and response; Human, self-conscious open systems; Social
organization, in which the unit of functional element is not the
individual but the role; and Transcendental system, which is knowledge
itself. Quoted in wilden, System and Structure, 357.
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process may occupy. DNA is a code that mediates between
different states of a system. The environment is a necessary
set of parameters (or constraints) upon genetic code
transmission. Without the environment providing noise and
random mutation evolution would not take place. Only
transformation in the form of non-adaptive mutation would
occur due to random mutations of self replication. Evolution
is a process characteristic only of open systems interacting
with an environment. Evolution is now considered to be ba a
dynamic process operating principly by selection. Selection
is now understood in statistical terms as transition
probabilities.
It should be noted that these epistemlogical
transformations in complex processes and systems occurred
accros the board. The application of methodes emerging from
this epistemological reformulation have been applied to all
sectors of society. The practical application and efficeincy
of these new methodes have not always, perhaps even rarely
been analyzed except in terms of refinement of methodes.
there has been little critical analysis of purpose. Managment
science has been particularly interested in the new
technologies of system organization. In this sense systems
analysis can be distinguished from systems theory. Systems
analysis applies the principles durived from the new
epistemology of non-deterministic and open cybernetic
information processing systems for the narrow purpose of
aiding decision makers by identifying central componants of
complex systems and producing optimized ruitines to guide the
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transition of systems from state to state. This is in fact a

definition of control. It is the attemtp to influence state
transition by taking into account the multiple objectives
within a system and manipulating boundary and resource
constraints in order to affect change towards the desired and
predefined, yet constantly refined, goal. This is the source
of the modern fetish o£ real-time. This is slightly different
from the wider concern of systems theory wih the
epistemological aspect of complex processes.
The developments of information theory and cybernetics
made it clear that relationships and organization were
fundamental aspects of all processes. Perhaps more
importantly, they showed that systems could be approached
empirically and technical knowledge could be produced about
the regulatory process and thus control techniques could be
devised to affect system behavior. Such knowledge had immense
practical applications.
Innumerable techniques have been developed for the
identification and construction of parameters or boundaries
for the implementation of control techniques. In engineering
and business management one of the most common techniques is
systems analysis. Systems analysis is not to be confused with
general systems theory though they are very closely related.
Systems analysis is a technique developed at RAND in the late
1940's to Consider problems of a more speculative nature than
those of operations research. Emerging out of operations
research systems analysis retained the feature of optimizing
communication and the inter linking of every aspect of the
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system into a functioning whole. But it differs in that it
attempts to identify "a range of problems to which there
[could] be no 'solution' in the strict sense because there
[were] no clearly defined objectives that [could] be
optimized

o r m a x i m i z e d ."246

That is, systems analysis is

future oriented. Optimally efficient organization can be
constructed with an optimum capacity to adapt to probable
short term changes in system organization.247

In 1946 the Air

Force and Douglas Aircraft formed RAND and in 1948 separated
into a non-profit corporation.
Other techniques for generating knowledge of complex
systems were also developed shortly after the war. Game
theory was developed at RAND by Von Neumann and the economist
Oskar Morgenstern. Queuing theory, decision theory and
ergonomics also emerged directly from the war effort. In one
form or another, techniques and technologies arising from the
three linked concepts of system, cybernetics and information
began to permeate nearly every other discipline.
In 1946 the Psychology Department at Harvard split apart
with the social and clinical psychologists joining the new
Department of Social Relations under Talcot Parsons. The
remaining members of the Psychology Department joined Stevens
in at PAL. Parsons was not opposed to the approach of PAL, in
fact he was strongly "predisposed" to "conceptions of
246
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going by the name cost-benefit analysis.
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cybernetic control, not only in living systems but also in
many other kinds of systems."248

He developed, along with

Edward Shils, what he called the "pattern-variable" scheme as
the theoretical framework for the analysis of social systems.
With a reformulated concept of system explicitly understood
as arising not from "variation in terms of a single variable,
but also as a resultant of a plurality of independent
variables." The existing sociological theories arising from
the capitalism-socialism dichotomy, according to Parsons, did
not provide the basis for "a rigorous non-deterministic
analysis" of individual action or social behavior.249
From this pattern-variable principle arose what Parsons
refers to as the "primary reference point of all [his]
theoretical work," that of the "four-function paradigm."25°
These four functions, or "elementary pattern variables of a
social system," are 1) adaptation, 2) system goal-attainment
(not unit or individual), 3) integration, and 4) patternmaintenance and tension-managment. This four-function
paradigm was Parson's attempt to deal with the "empiricaltheoretical problems that have entered prominently into the
critical discussions of this type of theory."251

That is, the

theoretical problem of the neo-deterministic equilibrial
systems inherited from Henderson and, later, the homeostasis
248
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of Cannon. The problem of "consensus vs. conflict" rendered

the concept of function itself problematic. For Parsons this
came down to a problem of control:
Clarification of the problem of control, however,
was immensely promoted by the emergence, at a most
strategic time for me, of a new development in
general science-namely, cybernetics in close
relation to information theory. It could now be
plausibly argued that the basic form of control in
action systems was of the cybernetic type and not
primarily, as has been generally argued, the
analogy of the coercive-compulsive aspects of the
process in which political power is involved.
Furthermore, it could be argued that functions in
systems of of action were not necessarily "born
free and equal", but had, along with the
structures and process implementing functional
needs of the system, differential hierarchical
relations on the axis of control.252
For Parsons the continuities in the social and
biological conceptions of stability and change to evolve
together. In 1955 a Harvard graduate student from the
Department of Medical Zoology named Stuart Altmann was one of
the first to use the term sociobiology to refer to this new
way of conceptualizing the social system as a cybernetic
communication systems or information processing. Altmann
explicitly viewed primate society as a communication system
based on the statistical characteristics of information.
Cybernetic functionalism permeated his research questions:
What are the roles of the various sensory
modalities in communication? What is the function
of the communicative signals in the integration of
the society? For every signal: what are the
necessary, sufficient and contributory stimuli;
what members of of the society respond; and what is
their response? What is the relation between
communicative feedback and social homeostasis? Are
there any social communicative networks that are
"self-damping"? Does metacommunication exist? Are
252
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there (a) signals whose only function would be the
"acknowledgement" of a signal emitted by another,
(b) signals "asking" for a signal to be repeated,
or (c) signals "indicating" failure to receive a
signal?253
In 1956 the sociobiological section of the Ecological
Society of America was formally founded. 254 Altmann's work
later became the primary material on primates used by Edward
0. Wilson in his 1975 book Sociobioloqy.255

David Hamburg, a

psychiatrist from Stanford University's Medical School, was
interested in the implications of communications theory and
sociobiology for the study of emotions. As Hamburg conceived
of them, emotions were some sort of adaptive complex linked
to social evolution.256 While chairman of the Department of
Psychology Hamburg was instrumental in arranging Jane
Goodall's chimpanzee studies in the Gombe in Zaire.
In management science the problem of the organizational
subject perplexing the discipline in the 1930s was finally
resolved. Some management specialists were quite explicit in
the source of their ideas. B.G. Schumacher wrote, though
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never published, A Sociobioloqical Approach to PostIndustrial Management.257

In business management the process

of evolution had to be synthesized and the system provided
with direction. The goals and choices of individuals within
an organization could be considered, in Shannon's
informational terms, as combinations and permutations within
roughly identifiable parameters. Control-systems theory
provided the principles and technologies needed for the
identification and shaping of these organizational goals. In
the business world and increasingly in the public sector
"such a control system was the

b u d g e t ."258

Control of the

budget, understood not only in terms of money but also time,
cost and scheduling as well. The budget allowed for the
modulation of organizational behavior. Money plays the role
of the bit in information theory. Value does not lie in the
coinage itself. Coinage is merely the measuring device of
currency.
The budget in a modern large-scale corporation
plays two basic roles. On the one hand, it is used
as a management control device to implement
policies on which executives have decided and to
check achievement against established criteria. On
the other hand, a budget is a device to determine
feasible programs. In either case, it tends to
define-in advance-a set of fixed commitments and
(perhaps more important) fixed expectations.
Although budgets can be flexible, they cannot help

257
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but result in the specification of a framework
within which the firm will operate, evaluate its
success, and alter its program.259
This focus upon the budget should not imply some form of
crude economic determinism however. Rather, capitalism has
undergone a general transformed along with the art of
government. Capitalism is just as much an effect of the
transformations of the object of government as other spheres
of rational thought and political practice. Deleuze noted
that "[t]he operation of markets is now the instrument of
social control."260

To quote Deleuze further:

nineteenth century capitalism is a capitalism of of
concentration, for production and for property. It
therefore erects the factory as a space of
enclosure, the capitalist being the owner of the
means of production but also the, progressively,
the owner of other spaces conceived through analogy
(the workers familial house, the school). As for
markets, they are conquered sometimes by
specialization, sometimes by colonization,
sometimes by lowering the costs of production. But
in the present situation, capitalism is no longer
involved in in production, which it relegates to
the Third World, even for complex forms of
textiles, metallurgy, or oil production. It's a
capitalism of higher-order production. What it
wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy
is stocks. Thus it is essentially dispersive and
the factory has given way to the corporation. The
family, the school, the army, the factory are no
longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge
towards an owner - state or private power - but
coded figures - deformable and transformable - of a
single corporation that now has only
stockholders.261
259
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The irony of societies of control is that the logic of
cybernetic information processing systems denies the
possibility of certainty - the dream of determinism.
Determinism and certainty were the ideals of point mechanical
systems based on essential identity. In societies of control
determinism and certainty have been replaced by highest
probability and correlation. But probability always leaves
room for error, signal distortion and the possibility of
mutation. Increased manipulatory affectiveness arising from
the mastery of probability has thus also been accompanied by
the realization of constant potential hazard. The
impossibility of determinism and certainty has therefore lead
to a state of perpetual crisis and crisis management. Control
is always on the verge of panic. In an attempt to head off
potential disaster, crisis management in societies of control
brings with it a new form of observation.
The reconfiguration of all dynamic processes into
cybernetic information processing systems brought with it the
discovery (and invention) of the control mechanisms of these
system - the program or coding scheme. Though the cause of
this reconfiguration is linked to the logic of observation
and the responsibility to know the object of government (a
logic common to all the arts of government since the late
sixteenth century), the effect of this latest reconfiguration
was an unprecedented expansion of this logic of observation
bringing it to a wholly new level. The will to knowledge
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operates in (and by) a radical new mode. This new mode of
observation we will call profiling.262
Observation within the disciplinary mode sought to
apprehend the act at the moment it occurred. Disciplinary
observation guards against undesirable acts through the
constant threat of the act being observed. Profiling, on the
other hand, looks at the information code that
(statistically) establishes the parameters of a system's
processes - its behavior. Choices, or any system behavior for
that matter, are understood in the discourse of control as
permutations and combinations of predefined sets of code the program - underlying every (rationally understood)
system. Profiling simply seeks to now in advance what the
most statistically likely choice or behavior will be. Through
reproducing the code of a system and constructing a profile
probable system behavior is deduced in advance of its
occurring. In societies of control it no longer matters
whether the disobedient act is performs or not. The profile
reveals its potentialities before hand.263
The quintessential example of such profiling is surely
262
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The dream of realtime is thus unapproachable. The effort to
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realtime by an outside political force. We demand it for our
competativeness, for our very survival. Realtime is always better than
old time but it is always already old. What we are left with is the
irony of realtime profiles. This does not deter the desire for realtime
however. Witness the amount of money to be spent, in a time of tight
budgets and "necessary cutbacks," of database terminals for Missoula's
police cruisers just passed in the recent bond issue vote.
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the Human Genome Project in the U.S. or the international
Human Genome Organization. "The ultimate purpose of [these]
programs is to write down the complete ordered sequence of
As, Ts, Cs, and Gs - the four nucleotides - that make up all
the genes in the human genome."264

Such knowledge "promises"

greater control over our fate. "Genes tell the cells in our
body how to act; when a mutation or alteration in a gene
changes the information, a cell may function improperly.
Identifying the genes and their mutations will provide clues
as to which gene causes which negative result. When we know
which gene leads to an abnormal condition, we can screen for
disease before it occurs - remove a tissue at risk for
cancer, treat a patient with drugs, change a diet, or maybe
eventually put a corrective gene into a cell."265
Gene therapy, like all control technologies, confronts a
fearsome opponent - the environment. Cybernetic information
processing systems interact with their environment in a
symbiotic and mutually constitutive relationship. They
require their environment for survival. But the environment
is teeming with noise, the potential for errors in coding and
signal distortion. The domain of the biological sciences
provide a response to the threats posed by the environment
that are proving compelling to other disciplines (if that is
what we are to continue to call them). "[A] whole new school
of thought on cyber-security is emerging. This seeks to mimic
264
R. C. Lewontin, "The Dream of the Human Genome," in Druckery and
Bender eds. Culture on the Brink. 107.
265
Joan Marks, "The Human Genome Project: A Chalenge in Biological
Technology," in Druckery and Bender eds. Culture on the Brink. 99.

185

the a biological immune system. Like a living organism, a
public network is made up of lots of complex, diverse and
highly interdependent components. Like such an organism, it
cannot predict what kind of attack it might suffer next, nor
how the infection might evolve. Because the organism cannot
simply disconnect itself from the world, it protects itself
with a combination of semi-permiable firewalls (a skin and
cell membranes), sensors (antigens) and circulating killer
agents (antibodies and white blood corpuscles)."266
RAND researchers speculate that this may be the only
viable approach to the problem of computer security since
about 95% of the Pentagons communications travel on the
public network.26? Rand and Pentagon researchers are no
strangers to this sort of panic however. The corollary
principle that arises with the discovery and invention of
profiling is deterrence.
Deterrence, in its modern form, emerged from the
military's desire to build profiles of and control over
warfare. RAND's invention of computer simulations, first to
analyze human-machine interaction in military systems at the
McCord Field Air Defense Direction Center in Tacoma,
Washington in 1950 and later to develop nuclear warfare
strategies, arose in part because of the difficulty of
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planning for something that had never happened before.268 How

could one plan for nuclear war when no one knew what is was
like? Preparations for nuclear war, no matter the form it
took, were tremendously complex. Coordinating in-flight
refueling and equipment propositioning required intricate
planning. Such planning could not take place in the dark with
no sense of what the process was. Planners need to see the
nuclear battle field. The only way to do this was through
simulating it.
Control presents the possibility not for perfect order,
the dream of disciplinary power, but rather perfect
deterrence against disorder, which is to say constant
vigilance and, where possible, preemptive intervention. But
this is only possible if the code is known. Thus in the
modern art of government a premium is placed on the
production of knowledge of system coding and programing. In
societies of control this technique of knowledge and strategy
of government goes by the name information.

268
Edwards, Closed World. 122. The best tools for such analysese are
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analogue technology and was reluctant to pursue what was then a very
unreliable technology. George Brown, a RAND consultant believed RAND's
decision to build the Johnniac in 1950 was "the key spur to IBM's
decision to commit to digital computer develppment."

Chapter 6; Conclusion
Deleuze notes that "the disciplines underwent a crisis
to the benefit of new forces that were gradually instituted
and which accelerated after World War II; a disciplinary
society was what we already no longer were, that we had
ceased to be."169 The "socio-technological study of the
mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception, would have
to be categorical and to describe what is already in the
process of substitution for the disciplinary sites of
enclosure, whose crisis is everywhere proclaimed."!70

This is

what I have attempted here, in a small way, through a tracing
of the history of statistical reason.
The goal of this paper was to trace the transformation
of statistical reason with attention to their mutually
constitutive relationship with the arts of government
especially the epistemological aspect of this art. For
Foucault, observation (or surveillance) is both a technique
of supervision but also, and at the same time, a strategy for
obtaining the truth. Governmentality illustrates how the
practices of governing were also involved in the
transformation of the epistemological conception of the
object of government.
The first of the arts of government - raison d'etat and
its object the population - gave way to a liberal art of
government and society by way of the Physiocrats and their
illustration of the economy separate from the will of the
169
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sovereign. These forms of government and their objects are
drastically different things. The development and growth of
the various disciplines producing knowledge about society
lead to yet further transformations of the object of
government.
The classical economists mark the emergence of a wholly
new object of government - that of society - accompanied by a
new art of governing this object- liberalism. Liberal
governance constituted an unprecedented degree of freedom of
activity for its object - as long as such activity conformed
to the norm. This freedom was predicated on a very close
relationship between the norm, revealed by statistical
methods, and the ability of government to induce normal
behavior, often through non-direct interventionary measures
such as infrastructural development. Foucault called this
form of government disciplinary. The search for more accurate
counting procedures and techniques for knowing and
intervening in society to assure its proper functioning soon
lead to the overturning of determinist epistemology.
Determinism had played a fundamental role in legitimizing
rationality. Determinism and natural law had actually been
the very basis of reason itself.
By the end of the nineteenth century determinism was
under intense scrutiny. Simply put, determinist epistemology
was no longer producing useful and affective knowledge. The
crisis of determinism was not an isolated phenomena. This
state of affairs was brought about in all rational knowledge
producing disciplines; the physical, natural and social
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sciences. This crisis of determinism made the epistemological

basis of the disciplinary form of government problematic for
the norm was a deterministic principle.
The norm as a determining force sounds ludicrous today.
But such was the conception of how the normal worked. The
process of rendering the norm rational in terms we recognize
today is the same process that produced the replacement
epistemological for the norm. This epistemological aspect of
government is called control.
These transformations have never ceased, they have
continued into our present time leading to the current state
of transition from disciplinary government knowledge to a
government and knowledge of control. In the emerging art of
government of control, the strategy of truth appears to be
the strategy of information. It should be pointed out that
this emerging epistemology holds within it its own form of
analysis. Essentialist or neo-essentialist modes of knowing a
system such as the prevailing structural-functional accounts
of social change will not elaborate and will most likely
obscure modern forms of control.
Control is based upon a new formulation of system and
process that is non-essentialist. A modern complex system is
understood as a set of variables selected by an observer
together with a set of constraints effecting these variable.
These variables themselves are relationships depicting an
organization, a particular organization may take the form of
many different kinds of structures generally delineated as
complex (energetically and informationaly open) systems such
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as biological, technological or social or simple
(energetically and informationaly closed) systems such as
gases in a closed container. A simple system, the classic
mechanical system first analyzed by thermodynamics, contains
unites (molecules in the case of gases) whose arrangement is
independent of the other units in the system. Complex
systems, on the other hand, are constituted by units (which
are themselves understood to be subsystems) whose arrangement
is heavily dependent on the position of other units in the
system such as a crystal or an organism. The interconnection
and interdependence of the units in a complex system limits
the ppssible states a system may occupy. This limitation also
provides the negatively entropic effects observed in living
phenomena. In both kinds of systems statistical rationality
is the key component analysis. Simple systems are approached
by ascertaining the randomness of the spread of units while
complex systems are approached by ascertaining the
probability distribution of possible future states defined by
the relationships between system components. That is, the
systems degree of freedom of the system defined in terms of
the possible future states or arrangements the system may
occupy.
In governmental terms control is not yet exercised upon
society as a whole, at least not consciously. Narrow slices
of society such as work performance or the construction of
infrastructures which enhance specific forms of activity and
behavior, especially as concerns business and government. In
this sense information is collected and control is exercised

191
through parameter or frequency modulation, the production of

profiles and the techniques or tactics of deterrence. Avenues
of communication are established in certain areas while
hindered in others.
An example of this narrow application, which nonetheless
has far reaching effects and implications, is exhibited in a
recent issue of the Institute of Electronic And Electrical
Engineers (IEEE) journal IEEE Transactions On Systems, Man.
And Cybernetics of May 1997. The lead article in this special
issue titled "Human Interaction with Complex Systems: Design
Issues and Research Approaches" notes that "design, which
consciously and purposefully supports human interaction with
complex systems, rather than simply the use of new technology
at the human-system interface, is a critical issue for the
research community ."271

jn other words, the new object of

government - complex systems - need to be understood in order
to govern them properly, to bring out the right order of
things and to enhance prosperity.
Perhaps the most well known promoter of the new
technologies of government was Robert S. McNamara appointed
Secretary of Defense by president John Kennedy. During World
War II McNamara worked in the Statistical Control Office of
the Army Air Corps planning the logistics of bombing raids in
Germany and later the Far East. He increased the flying time
of bombers by 30% using statistical systems analysis. He
joined Ford Motor Company bringing with him a troop of "whiz
kids" from the Statistical Control Office. McNamara appointed
271
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the RAND economist Charles Hitch to be the Pentagons
comptroller. Together they set up the Office of Systems
Analysis and instituted the the Planning-ProgrammingBudgeting System (PPBS) introducing modern budgeting and
cost-benefit analysis to the defense establishment. 272

Lyndon

Johnson considered the PPBS so successful that he ordered all
federal agencies to adopt it in 1965.273
This reform of the federal bureaucracy seems to have had
the desired effect, to illustrate this success we can choose
a (unwittingly) postmodern interpretation of the effects of
these budgetary reforms. Daniel Carpenter, an Assistant
Professor of Politics at Princeton University writes in a
recent issue of American Political Science Review that "the
magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased
for executive-branch agencies after 1970 due to executive

272
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oversight reforms."274 He notes "[c]control over agency
budgets is a critical tool of political influence in
regulatory decision making, yet the causal mechanism of
budgetary control is unclear."275

To discover this "causal

mechanism" Carpenter advances a "stochastic process model of
adaptive signal processing."276
Carpenter found that manipulation of aggregate resources
in themselves did not account for agency control. Rather, the
causal mechanism was the "powerful signals" sent via
budgetary shifts. The responsiveness to such signaling,
furthermore, was enhanced by the hierarchy of the agency. The
greater the hierarchy and consolidation, in other words, the
greater the responsiveness to budgetary signals from message
senders in congress and the administration. What is most
interesting about Carpenter's study, however, is not just his
findings but his methodology. Information
processing and systems theory used to analyze information
processing systems would, it seems be appropriate.
Statistics has been intimately involved in these
transformations in the art of government and its object and
the transition from an epistemology of discipline to one of
control. Statistical methods and statistical reason, however,
have never had a distinct form, an essence as it were. Their
history is a history of transformation of both thought and
274
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practice. No doubt they will continue to change. But the
current form of the art of government and its object and the
role played by statistical reason and practices in this new
form can be apprehended, at least in a general way. But only
if we look past surface effects.
Statistics plays a fundamental role in technologies of
control. Besides being fundamental to the specific theory of
control illustrated above, statistical techniques are vital
for simulations and forecasting of every kind - such as
financial forecasting in the global market to forecasting the
needs of future communications systems, both permanent and
t e m p o r a r y .277

Ergonomics, also known as human factors

engineering, is the extension of wartime discoveries of human
performance and machine interaction understood in terms of
probability and optimalization. As a distinct discipline it
began as the adaptation of humans and mechanical devices in
the workplace. It has become familiar to most people as an
aspect of health, especially in terms repetitive tasks
associated with computer monitors and keyboards. But
Ergonomics has a much broader scope than comfortable desks,
chairs and keyboards. A recent article in Ergonomics, the
publication of record for the discipline, notes that "the
history of ergonomics Can be described as military ergonomics
in the 1950s, industrial ergonomics in the 1960s ergonomics
of consumer goods and services in the 1970s and computer
ergonomics in the 1980s. It is expected that the 1990s and
277
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early 2000s will be the phase of both macroergonomics and
cognitive ergonomics"278

There are many other instances of

statistical techniques operating in the background of every
day life subtly altering our ways of behaving.
The current period has been variously described as a
post-industrial society, an information revolution or simply
the information age. Most of these discussions tend to focus
on the production of information as simply another commodity.
A commodity that sometimes helps, and sometimes hinders, an
otherwise familiar economy of production and society composed
of individuals with an essential and universal human nature.
Indeed there are many businesses making fortunes marketing
information on these premises. Because of the expansion of
the amount and availability of stored data a new sector has
been added to the economy - the information economy. But
these descriptions of information and an information based
society do not adequately explain what is new in modern
society or how the two are related or the effect of this
relationship. It certainly does not provide a basis for
critiqiie or active (ethical) participation in modern life.
I believe the information age is not adequately
characterized simply by an increase in some "thing" called
information. The information age must be seen as the
emergence of a new way of conceiving of and governing complex
systems, whether human society or individual genetic traits.
The epistemology of essentialism and its principles of
identity and determinism collectively manifested in terms of,
278
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and thereby governed through, the norm has given way to the
epistemology of probability with its principle of contingency
manifested in and governed through information and control
and the tactics of profiling and deterrence. This is not to
say that attention to remaining essentialist epistemology and
practices should be ignored. Abhorrent ethico-political
effects continue to arise from essentialist distinctions such
as the exclusion and marginalization well documented in
feminist and "postmodern" literature. However many abhorrent
effects are arising from the new practices of control which
cannot be understood and resisted if these are analyzed as if
they too emerge form essentialist epistemology. They do not.
What we are witnessing in this transition from an
epistemology of essentialism to information, I suggest, is
the emergence of a new object of government - a cybernetic
information processing system - and a new art of government
ruling this object - a government of information and control.
This form of government does not seek exclusion but
inclusion. The question is what form and what purpose this
inclusion supports.
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